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CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 39 SPRING 2003 NUMBER 2
A PRIMER ON ENRON: LESSONS FROM A PERFECT STORM
OF FINANCIAL REPORTING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND ETHICAL CULTURE FAILURES
MARIANNE M. JENNINGS*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the stories of the collapse of Enron Corporation (Enron)' and the tra-
vails of its outside auditor, Arthur Andersen (Andersen), emerged2 the usual
. Professor, Legal and Ethical Studies in Business, Arizona State University, College of
Business. J.D., Brigham Young University. The author is grateful to Professor James Boats-
man of the School of Accountancy of Arizona State University for his tutorials and insights
on the accounting issues related to Enron and to Min Wufor her research assistance.
1. Enron, as Part II details, was a Houston energy firm that had reported $100 million in
revenues. However, near the end of 2001, it suffered losses approaching $1 billion; had to re-
state its earnings (they were $600 million less than had been reported over the 1991-2001
time frame); and because of the impact on its stock price, ability to raise capital, and trading
capacity, was forced to declare Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Edward Iwata, Enron Faces "Hor-
net's Nest" of Charges, USA TODAY, June 17, 2002, at lB. The bankruptcy was listed as the
largest bankruptcy in the history of the United States. Elizabeth L. Sanchez, Special Report:
Anniversary Report 2002 (Litmus Test of Leadership: Agenda for Governance), Bus. WORLD,
July 27, 2002, at 34. However, the ranking was based on Enron's own numbers, which, as we
will see, were not always the most reliable in the world.
WorldCom jumped on the scene by declaring not just bankruptcy, but that it was now the
largest bankruptcy in the history of the United States. Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas,
WorldCom's Collapse: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at Al. But, then again, just
days before declaring themselves king of the bankruptcy world, WorldCom confessed to
booking $3.3 billion in expenses in the wrong accounting column. Barnaby J. Feder & Seth
Schiesel, WorldCom Finds $3.3 Billion More in Irregularities, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002, at
Al. By the time WorldCom was done, that number had creeped up a bit, to $9 billion, give or
take a half-a-billion here and there. Kurt Eichenwald and Seth Schiesel, SEC Files New
Charges on WorldCom, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 6, 2002, Cl, at C2. So, not to put too fine a point
on things, Enron is somewhere in the top twenty, bankruptcy-wise, between $9 billion and
$63 billion, give or take a billion. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron's Col-
lapse: The Overview; Enron Corp. Files Largest U.S. Claim for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES,
1
Jennings: A Primer on Enron: Lessons From A Perfect Storm of Financial Repo
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2002
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
questions arose:3 Where were the auditors? Where was the audit committee?
Where were the lawyers? Where was the Board?4
However, the story of Enron and its ripple effect on Andersen is far too
complex of a tale to enable a simple point of the finger and clear placement
of blame.5 The more accurate question is, "What went wrong here?"6 The
Dec. 3, 2001, at Al. While the author recognizes that this piece focuses on the Enron col-
lapse, the WorldCom debacle will be worth another 300-footnote piece. How on earth does a
company hide $9 billion in expenses? A walk-in closet won't even hold the receipts. Ander-
sen was also the auditor for WorldCom and it is safe to say that Andersen auditors were not
the sharpest tools in the shed when it came to ballpark figures on earnings and expenses.
"Close enough" was apparently their model.
2. Between the period of September 2001 and June 2002, when Andersen was convicted
of obstruction of justice, the number of Enron stories was remarkable. Simply take a gander at
the sources in the footnotes in this piece. See infra all my footnotes.
3. See generally Daniel Kadlec et al., Power Failure: As Enron Crashes, Angry Workers
and Shareholders Ask, Where Were the Firm's Directors? The Regulators? The Stock Ana-
lysts?, TIME, Dec. 10, 2001, at 68.
4. Additionally, many have asked post-bankruptcy, as they realize that the earnings were
not only unrealized, but unrealistic and largely nonexistent, "Where was the money?" Another
frequent question is, "Where were the analysts?" The analysts generally pose that question
because they have become generically confused about where they are supposed to be and
what they are supposed to do; apparently no one was aware of this confusion regarding ana-
lysts' roles prior to Enron. At any rate, the New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, found
the analysts, or, more relevantly, found the analysts' e-mails to each other. Mr. Spitzer sum-
marized the emails saying, "[Alt the very moment they were telling us to buy this stock, in-
vest more of your money in it, they were saying internally, there is absolutely no reason to
own this stock.. .f.] It's a dog." Now with Bill Moyers (PBS television broadcast, May 31,
2002). Mr. Spitzer continued, "This correspondence shows that the people writing stock re-
ports at times functioned essentially as sales representatives for the firm's investment bank-
ers." Patrick McGeehan, Merrill Lynch Under Attack as Giving Out Tainted Advice, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2002, at C1. Mr. Spitzer not only found the analysts, he extracted a rather tidy
sum from Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch settled its case for $100 million, an apology to inves-
tors, and disclosure of any investment bank fees it received during the past twelve months for
companies whose stock its analysts had recommended. Charles Gasparino, Merrill Lynch to
Pay Big Fine, Increase Oversight of Analysts, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at Al. Other firms
are under investigation for analyst behaviors and the SEC has joined Mr. Spitzer in the inves-
tigations. Charles Gasparino, New York Attorney General Turns up Heat on Wall Street,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2002, at Cl; see also Charles Gasparino, SEC Launches Inquiry into
Wall Street Research, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2002, at C3. The negotiations over a settlement,
liability and issues for the Wall Street firms continue. Gregory Zuckerman, Wall Street's Set-
tlement Will be Less Taxing, WALL STREET J., Feb. 13, 2003, C1.
5. Apparently, the tale of Enron was far too complex for even its directors to understand.
See infra section III for discussion, including charts and graphs, of the Enron complexity. The
author is reminded of a quote from a Wall Street investment banker who left the room as
some young hotshots were making a pitch for a company with derivatives, leasebacks,
SLOBS, SWATS, FICAS, FUTAS and RUBES. His partners said as he departed, "A little too
complex for you?" to which he responded, "The fact that I don't understand one thing that has
been said in this room does not make this a good investment."
6. Oh, for the days of the 1980s and Gordon Gekko, see WALL STREET (Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox 1987), when the activity was just insider trading, the motivation was just greed and
we could understand what the heck they were doing. Heck, we understood preppie Dan Ak-
royd's (Louis Winthrop's) plan to get even with the Duke Brothers in TRADING PLACES
(Paramount Pictures 1983) for giving him Eddie Murphy's (Billy Ray Valentine's) life as a
street hustler. He got the citrus crop report in advance, lied about its content, had the Dukes
[Vol. 39
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answer to that question is detailed and layered. No singular aspect of corpo-
rate governance, audit rules, or corporate compliance programs is responsi-
ble. For an Enron to collapse, or for that matter, for any of the companies
that collapsed since Enron's bubble burst,7 required a confluence of events
and behaviors, a sort of Perfect Storm8 of Board shortcomings; audit lapses,
bet the wrong way while he bet the right way on the price of citrus and he bankrupt the Dukes
whilst winning Ophelia's (Jamie Lee Curtis') hand. Id. Trading on inside information, selling
short: those are things Hollywood and we understand. "Complexity allowed Enron to hide the
true picture from the capital markets," was the assessment from Professor Henry T.C. Hu at
the University of Texas. Daniel Altman, Contracts So Complex They Imperil the System, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, § 3, at 1. Enron's executives were daft, diabolical or stupid. But, there
was a great deal going on here besides greed and selling short. These seem to be easy con-
cepts next to Enron's offshore layers. See infra section I1.B and accompanying charts.
7. Since the time of Enron, WorldCom filed for bankruptcy and it claimed that it is the
world's largest bankruptcy. Simon Romero & Rita D. Atlas, WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy:
Largest U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at Al. Sure, and I have some broadband worth
a billion I'd like to sell you and you can capitalize the cost, so no impact on earnings. Wait a
minute, that line worked during most of the 1990s. At this point, it is hard to believe it could
matter which of these companies is indeed the world's largest bankruptcy. Who knows, there
may be other surprises out there. WorldCom had to restate its earnings by several billion;
Xerox had to restate its earnings yet another time; and Martha Stewart is making soufflds un-
der a cloud of suspicion related to insider trading because she dumped $223,000 of ImClone
stock the day before the company, (headed by Martha's boyfriend, formerly her daughter's
boyfriend), announced that the FDA was not going to approve its new and highly touted anti-
cancer drug, Erbitux. Constance L. Hays & Patrick McGeehan, The Media Business: Adver-
tising; Stewart Broker Handled Shares for Her Friends, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2002, at C1.
Martha missed her calling-it's soap opera for which she has a flair, not cranberry root and
moss cobbler. When asked on The Early Show on CBS (a show on which Martha has a regu-
lar cooking gig) about the allegations and investigations, Ms. Stewart replied, "I just want to
focus on my salad." Id. (citing The Early Show (CBS television broadcast, June 25, 2002)).
She appeared to be poised to claw the eyes from Jane Clayson's head. CBS executives had
made Ms. Clayson's questions, about the insider trading allegations, a precondition of Mar-
tha's regular appearance on the show. Ms. Stewart cancelled her next appearance on the
show, which was to involve the preparation of icebox desserts. Id. One can distract an audi-
ence from insider trading questions with a salad, but icebox desserts just don't have near the
draw.
The former CEO of ImClone Systems, Inc., Samuel Waksal, has been indicted by the U.S.
Attorney for fraud and has entered a not guilty plea. Jerry Markon, ImClone Ex-CEO Waksal
Pleads Not Guilty to Charges of Fraud, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2002, at A6. Ms. Stewart is
under investigation by Congress, the Justice Department and the SEC, who, reportedly, are
not happy with inconsistencies and holes in the story that her broker sold merely under a stop-
loss order. Constance L. Hays, Investigators Said to Be Frustrated in Stewart Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2002, at C4.
8. THE PERFECT STORM (Warner Bros. Pictures 2000) based on the book SEBASTIAN
JUNGER, THE PERFECT STORM (1998), starred George Clooney as the determined skipper of
the Andrea Gail, a swordfish boat. Clooney, crew and the Andrea Gail wind up in the inter-
section of three major weather fronts, one of which was Hurricane Grace. The result was the
"greatest storm recorded in history." Everyone aboard the Andrea Gail is presumed dead.
They pushed the envelope in search of fertile waters (please excuse mixed and inappropriate
metaphors) and destroyed themselves. Judging from the charts depicting Enron's not-so-
fertile offshore investments, the executives mixed assets and commingled funds destroying
their company, careers and a good chunk of Houston, Texas. Even the Houston Astros no
longer play in Enron Field; it is now the "Minute Maid Park." Michael McCarthy, Sports
Sponsorship Game Heating Up, USA TODAY, June 12, 2002, at B3. Robin Williams refers to
2003]
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including the assumed watchful eyes of auditors, analysts and business me-
dia; and a corporate ethical culture that left those who saw the massive storm
front moving in at the last minute, with few or no options, as it were, for
shelter.
Litigation and prosecutions related to both Enron and Andersen will
continue with the usual goals of assessing blame.9 However, the quest for
it as "Fifth Amendment Field." Robin Williams, Interview on Late Night with David Letter-
man (CBS television broadcast, July 10, 2002).
9. As of July 2002, the following steps occurred regarding criminal, civil and legislative
investigations: Arthur Andersen, LLP, which served as Enron's outside auditors, was charged
by the U.S. Department of Justice with one felony count of obstruction of justice for destruc-
tion of documents related to its Enron work. Jonathan Weil et al., Editor's Ruling: Andersen
Win Lifts U.S. Enron Case, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2002, at Al. Following a six-week jury
trial, Andersen was convicted. Id. A federal grand jury was impaneled in March 2002 to in-
vestigate Enron and its officers for possible criminal conduct including "fraud, perjury and
obstruction of justice." Id. Financial institutions, including commercial banks, are also part of
the federal investigation, as well as an independent inquiry by the Manhattan District Attor-
ney's office. Kurt Eichenwald & David Barboza, Enron Criminal Investigation is Said to Ex-
pand to Bankers, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at Al. Three British bankers were charged with
criminal fraud for their involvement with South Hampton L.P., a partnership with Andrew
Fastow, Enron's former CFO, as a principal. Kurt Eichenwald, 3 British Bankers are Accused
of Fraud in Offshoot of Enron Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2002, at C1. Connecticut's investi-
gation into its $200 million deal with Enron is sputtering because, as some theorize, there is
no heart for looking at corruption in the state. Paul Zielbauer, Bureaucratic Finger-Pointing
Impedes Connecticut's Inquiry into Enron Deal, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2002, at BI. Appar-
ently corruption is as corruption does in Connecticut and it is a classic case of the following
conclusion, "Let's not go there." Congress has been conducting ongoing hearings. The Senate
Commerce Committee held hearings, beginning in January 2002. Greg Hitt & Kathryn Kran-
hold, Internal Probe of Enron Finds Wide-Ranging Abuses, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2002, at A3;
see also Stephen Labaton & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enron's Many Strands: The Overview;
Testimony from Enron Executives is Contradictory, N.Y. TtMEs, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al.
In fact, by the end of January 2002, six Senate committees, including: Banking; Commerce;
Energy and Natural Resources; Finance; Governmental Affairs; and Health, Education, Labor
and Pensions had all announced their own hearings on Enron. Jayne O'Donnell & Jim Drink-
ard, Agencies, Panels Set Hearings on Enron, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2002, at 3B. In the
House, the following committees announced hearings: Education and Workforce, Energy and
Commerce, and Financial Services. Id.; see also Don Van Natta Jr., Enron's Collapse: The
Politicians; Enron Spread Contributions on Both Sides of the Aisle, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 21,
2002, at A13. Andersen and Enron both face shareholder litigation. Jonathan D. Glater, Rivals
and Lawyers Vie over Andersen Remains, N.Y. TiMEs, June 18, 2002, at C4; Eric Berger,
$680 Million Paid to Enron Execs in '01; Lay, Skilling Together Topped $ 109 Million, Hous.
CHRON., June 17, 2002, at Al. States such as Texas are also conducting probes. The Fall of
Enron, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 25, 2002, at A19. The FBI has been investigating insider-trading
issues. Kurt Eichenwald, U.S. Inquiry Tracks Insiders at Enron, N.Y. TMEs, Apr. 15, 2002, at
Al. The Justice Department is focusing on the company and its officers via a criminal probe
and the Labor Department investigates Enron's retirement plans. Julie Mason, Concerned Ex-
Worker Was Sent to Human Resources, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 31, 2002, at All. The SEC has,
of course, also investigated. Jayne O'Donnell & Jim Drinkard, Agencies, Panels Set Hearings
on Enron, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2002, at 3B. When a company collapses, can the SEC be far
behind? The author realized too late that it would have been easier to list those agencies and
committees that are not currently investigating Enron. The Department of Parks and Recrea-
tion in Mankato, Minnesota has declined prosecution.
In a major break-through, Michael J. Kopper, the former financial executive under Andrew
Fastow, Enron's CFO, entered a guilty plea to money laundering and conspiracy to commit
[Vol. 39
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blame is not a helpful exercise to implement the type of checks and balances
that could have provided shelter from the storm or at least created some
warning systems so that the collapse was not so sudden as to leave so many
with no protection. Enron could not have happened without complicity on
many fronts. The examination of that complicity proves helpful in preven-
tion.
An examination of the confluence of these three separate storms pro-
vides insight into the types of reforms, regulatory and otherwise, that might
prevent other unprecedented collapses or perhaps provide the means of in-
tervention before the three components merge. As in The Perfect Storm, an
Enron, with its full creative accounting scenario could not have occurred if
just one of the three legs of the stool had functioned differently.'0 There are
prevention techniques, both minor and those requiring systemic change, ap-
plicable in each of the three legs that could serve to halt what otherwise is an
inexorable march to destruction.
This analysis proceeds, in Part II with the story of Enron, what hap-
pened and when, and the resulting impact on the stakeholders of Enron. Part
III examines the events and system flaws that had to come together at one
time for Enron to collapse as it did, including the complicity of the parties,
the flaws in the various systems created to prevent what happened to and
within Enron, including internal audit, external audit, the Board, the audit
committee, analysts, underwriters, and the business press. Finally, Part IV
offers the prevention tools from the lessons of Enron with a detailed list of
changes companies should make in order to prevent the havoc that befalls
those whose checks and balances might otherwise fail simultaneously for the
creation of the perfect storm.
II. THE STORY OF ENRON: WHAT REALLY HAPPENED HERE
When people speak of Enron, they do so quite easily with catch phrases
such as, "You mean like Enron?" or "There are hundreds of other Enrons out
there."'" Yet, just as when Enron was in business, it is not at all clear that
fraud. Jonathan Weil et al., Guilty Plea by Enron's Kopper Increases Scrutiny of Ex-CFO,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2002, at Al. He surrendered $12 million and agreed to cooperate fully
with investigators. Id. It doesn't look good for the rest of the boys because Kopper knew a
great deal. See infra notes 100-104 and accompanying text for specifics on Kopper.
10. The author recognizes that she once again mixes metaphors, but Perfect Storm, Per-
fect Stool, close enough.
11. Post-Enron collapse, one compensation expert summed up Enron as follows, "I am
dissatisfied with using fuzzy numbers in doing accounting." Matt Kranz & Del Jones, Enron's
Fall Fuels Push for Stock Option Law, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 2002, at B3. As the discussion
following shows, Enron involved a bit more than fuzzy numbers and option reforms won't fix
another Enron. One Fortune writer said the collapse of Kmart for mismanagement was the
real scandal. Geoffrey Colvin, It Ain't All About Enron, FORTUNE, Feb. 18, 2002, at 44. Mr.
Colvin understands Kmart's collapse was no surprise. Id. Martha Stewart caused that. She's
trying to hawk glazed acorn napkin rings to folks who shop at Kmart, who don't use napkins.
Kmart failed because of strategic errors, not knaves running the corporation. There is a differ-
2003]
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those who reference Enron are able to explain exactly what Enron was doing
and why it collapsed. 2 Enron's story is necessarily complex because its
complexity is at least a partial explanation as to why it was able to continue
in such grandeur for so long with so little in terms of performance and so
few realizing, or at least saying aloud, that there were serious issues with a
company that could implode at any time.13
A. The Initial Years
Enron, Corp. was incorporated in Oregon in 1985, as a simple gas com-
pany as a result of a merger of Houston Natural Gas and Internorth of
Omaha. 4 With its principal offices in Houston, Texas, it became the
"world's largest energy company."' 5 While Kenneth Lay, one of the com-
ence between failure due to ineptness in business and failure due to financial shenanigans.
Actually, we remain unsure even about Kmart, for, as they say in business these days, investi-
gations are underway regarding Kmart's accounting practices. Stephanie Armour, Grand Jury
Impaneled in Kmart Probe, USA TODAY, Aug. 12, 2002, at B1.
12. Indeed, when he testified before a House Subcommittee, former CEO Jeffrey Skill-
ing, assured that even he, as CEO, had no idea what was going on, "'[t]his was a very large
corporation.... It would be impossible' to know everything going on." Stephen Labaton &
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enron's Many Strands: The Overview; Testimony from Enron Execu-
tives is Contradictory, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al. Representative Edward J. Markey
(D., Mass.) accused Mr. Skilling of using the "Sergeant Schultz defense of 'I see nothing, I
hear nothing."' Id. Sergeant Schultz was the officer in charge of POWs in the show Hogan's
Heroes in which the POWs had the run of the camp. Schultz suspected something was awry,
but who could argue with his record? No one had ever escaped from Stalag 13. The record
spoke for itself. Of course, the POWs were out through a tunnel doing U.S. espionage work,
stealing furs, diamonds and silk stockings and generally winning the war for the Allies. Ho-
gan's Heroes (CBS television broadcast 1965-1971). Likewise, Enron's traders, accountants
and financial officers were using all manners of creative accounting and while suspicions
were there, who could argue with double-digit earnings growth and a stock price of $83 per
share? Southeast Market Players Abandon Faltering Enron as Dynegy Steps in, SE. POWER
REP., Nov. 12, 2001, at 8. Sixty to eighty times Enron's earnings (or alleged earnings as the
case may be). Id. See also supra note 5, in which the author raised the possibility of daftness
and/or stupidity.
13. See Bethany McLean, Is Enron Overpriced?, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001, at 122.
14. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Collapse: Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzy-
ing Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at AI; Greg Farrell & Del Jones, How Did Enron
Come Unplugged? USA TODAY, Jan. 14, 2002, at BI [hereinafter Enron Unplugged]; see also
Jeff Gerth & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Regulators Struggle with a Marketplace Created by En-
ron, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 2001, at Cl.
15. The author acknowledges that the source for this claim is Enron. www.enron.com
(last visited end of 2001; not on site as of Nov. 2002 because Enron stopped making this
claim). However, support for this claim by Enron can be found in CEO, Jeff Skilling's license
plates, which held the acronym "WLEC" for "World's Largest Energy Company." Kevin
Whited, Once the World's Largest Chutzpah Company, KEvIN WHITED'S REASON F. v. 4.0:
REFLECTIONS-THE J. (Feb. 9, 2002) at http://www.publiustx.net/journal/archives/000056.
htm. Being "the world's largest energy company" means someone has looked at the numbers
and then leapt to that conclusion. See supra note 1 and infra notes 45-51 for thoughts on reli-
ance on Enron's numbers. A banner in the company's lobby read, "The World's Leading
Company." Bethany McLean, Why Enron Went Bust, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 58, 60
[hereinafter Why Enron Went Bust].
[Vol. 39
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pany's founders, was an innovator in the energy field, popularizing utilities'
involvement in hedging activities to cover fluctuations in weather and en-
ergy pricing, it was not until Harvard MBA, Jeffrey Skilling was hired in
1990 that Enron began its descent (or ascent followed by descent) into lever-
aged energy trading. 16
By the end of 2001, Enron held twenty-five percent of all of the world's
energy trading contracts. 17 Enron's public relations materials describe it as
"one of the world's leading electricity, natural gas and communications
companies, which markets electricity and natural gas, delivers physical
commodities and financial and risk management services to companies
around the world, and has developed an intelligent network platform to fa-
cilitate online business."1 8 Enron held interests and operated companies on
all continents except Antarctica.' 9 By 2001, it was called the "most innova-
tive company" in America by Fortune, and with $100 billion in annual reve-
nues, it was number seven of the Fortune 500.20
Enron was also one of the world's most admired corporations, appearing
consistently in listings of the "100 Best Companies to Work For," an annual
analysis done by Fortune magazine of companies and their treatment of em-
16. Mr. Skilling came in contact with Enron as a management consultant during his time
at McKinsey & Co. John Schwartz, Enron's Many Strands: The Former C.E.O.; Darth Va-
der, Machiavelli, Skilling Set Intense Pace, N.Y. TrvEs, Feb. 7, 2002, at Cl. His first position
at Enron, in 1990, was director of trading operations. Id.
17. Noelle Knox, Enron to Fire 4,000from Headquarters, USA TODAY, Dec. 4, 2001, at
B 1. One of the things you quickly learn in exploring Enron is that all of its rankings were
based on the numbers management generated internally, which, as we know now, were spun
out of whole cloth. So, when Enron says that it held twenty-five percent of the world's energy
contracts, it is important to understand the concept of restatement. The author refers not to the
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, but rather, to the new activity of most companies, which is re-
statement of earnings. Enron has restated its earnings, its assets, its equity, ergo the numbers
upon which these were based, i.e., contracts for the sale of energy, were, perhaps, bogus, or
the stated returns from those contracts were fictitious. The problem with the accuracy of the
numbers is exacerbated by the problem of the contracts themselves that no one really under-
stood. In fact, many folks who were parties to Enron contracts were not actually sure what
they had purchased or what Enron was offering for sale. See David Barboza, Ex-Executives
Say Sham Deal Helped Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2002, at Al; Tom Fowler, Broadband-
unit Hype Didn't Match Reality, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 18, 2002, at Al; Rebecca Smith & John
R. Emshwiller, Running on Empty: Enron Faces Collapse as Credit, Stock Dive and Dynegy
Bolts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001, at Al. Like the dot-coins, Enron sold a great deal of air,
but with nice margins, at least as originally reported.
18. Plaintiff's Complaint at 1, Kaufman v. Enron Corp., No. 4:01-3682 (S.D. Tex., filed
Oct. 25, 2001) (on file with California Western Law Review). Enron staked its ground with
this description as opposed to the rest of the world that has developed really stupid network
platforms.
19. See ENRON 10-K (2000) available at http:// www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar. See also
infra notes 29-31 and section II.A.2.
20. Running on Empty: Enron Faces Collapse as Credit, Stock Dive and Dynegy Bolts,
supra note 17. That ranking put it ahead of IBM and AT&T, as far as we knew at that time.
ld.; see also supra note I for discussion of Enron's bankruptcy.
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ployees." Enron's outside auditors, from the beginning of the aggressive fi-
nancial techniques, were Arthur Andersen, with partner David Duncan out of
the Houston office assigned to the Enron account. 22 Mr. Duncan had a ten-
year relationship with Enron; during the last five he was the partner in
charge. 3 As will be noted later, Mr. Duncan played a critical role in Enron's
growth and preparation of earnings statements. 24
Enron was positioned strategically in the 1980s and 1990s to take a
first-mover position and advantage in the energy markets that were moving
toward deregulation.2 ' Enron seized the opportunity to become an energy
21. Shelly Branch, The 100 Best Companies to Work for in America, FORTUNE, Jan. 11,
1999, at 118. Enron appeared for the first time in the top 100 in 1997. In 2000, it was ranked
as #24, and in 2001 it was #22. Robert Levering & Milton Moskowitz, The 100 Best Compa-
nies to Work for: These Employers Show No Signs of Cutting Back on Their Commitment to
Employees, FORTUNE, Jan. 8, 2001, at 148. Employees had a "[h]ealth club, doctor's office,
subsidized Starbucks coffee, concierge, massages, and car wash" on site. Alexei Barrionuevo,
Your Career Matters: Jobless in a Flash, Enron's Ex-Employees are Stunned, Bitter,
Ashamed, WALL ST. J. Dec. 11, 2001, at BI. The key to the options program was running for
your life from the company. Fortune was duped for a time, but its writer Bethany McLean
eventually came through. Why Enron Went Bust, supra note 15. See infra notes 293-298 and
accompanying text for discussion. Enron was, in reality, one of the "100 Best Companies to
Work For," as far as we knew. The company had opulent headquarters and was gearing up to
build even bigger and better headquarters when its bubble burst. Of course, Enron was doing
the square footage computation on the new company headquarters so it might well be that the
square footage was overstated as well. Employees at company headquarters were also able to
enjoy one of the many concierges, a masseuse for relieving tension and a service to have their
cars washed while they were at work. Workout rooms, generous retirement plans, you name
it, and Enron employees had it. Barrionuevo, supra. Actually, the retirement plans also had to
be restated because they included large amounts of Enron stock. Enron employees, current
and former, now have retirement plans that consist, on average, of about 10,000 shares of En-
ron stock, valued at $0.67 cents per share. Julie Mason, Former Enron Workers Air Com-
plaints on CNN, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 21, 2002, at A10. It's not a posh retirement, just about
enough to have your car washed once or twice. Enron Broadband employees got Palm Pilots,
cell phones and wireless laptops. Barrionuevo, supra. Enron International employees had au-
thorization for $5,000 bar tabs. Id.
22. Anita Raghavan, Accountable: How a Bright Star at Andersen Fell Along with En-
ron, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2002, at Al. By all accounts, David Duncan, 43, was a hard-
working family man, committed to his local church, and a fast-tracker at Andersen. After
graduating from Texas A&M, he became one of Arthur Andersen's youngest partners and
earned $1,000,000 per year, as the managing partner for Enron's audits. However, as attorney
Rusty Hardin, the lead defense lawyer for Andersen in its obstruction of justice case noted,
"No question David Duncan was a client pleaser." Id. Mr. Duncan's pastor said Enron put the
pressure on him, "[hie basically said it was unrelenting. It was a constant fight. Wherever he
drew that line, Enron pushed that line-he was under constant pressure from year to year to
push that line." Id.
23. Id. Mr. Duncan's office was in the Enron building in Houston and he was a close
friend of Enron's chief accounting officer, Richard Causey-they traveled together, lunched
together, golfed together, and now after Duncan's guilty plea, apparently cooked the books
together. ld.; see also Cathy Booth Thomas & Deborah Fowler, Will Enron's Auditor Sing?
TIME, May 20, 2002, at 44. Duncan was bringing in $50 million per year in audit fees from
Enron. Id.
24. See infra section ilI.A.1 and accompanying text and footnotes.
25. The first mover position is one of those "strategery" terms that, restated, as it were, in
lay terms (pun intended), "No one has thought of your idea yet, so move on in and make as
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trader at a time when the federal and state governments opened the doors for
utilities to participate in an open market for the wholesale, and eventually
retail, purchase and sale of electricity. Just beginning at the time of Enron's
initial seizure, were the creation of national power grids, the spot pricing of
electricity, and long-term contract commitments with locked in prices.26 En-
ron became a new and critical player in this open market because its trading
operations allowed electric utilities to hedge risk with futures contracts for
energy.27 Enron dominated the market; in fact, utilities around the country
often used "the Enron model" as a basis for their strategic discussions and
plans.28
much money as you can before they do." One Enron executive phrased it this way-Enron
created a "regulatory black hole ... [Its] core management philosophy... was to be the first
mover into a market and to make money in the initial chaos and lack of transparency." Jeff
Gerth & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Regulators Struggle With a Marketplace Created by Enron,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at Cl.
26. Enron Unplugged, supra note 14. Enron was forced to move, because of the heavy
debt from the merger that created it and the stiff competition that soon appeared in the indus-
try, from a simple gas and electric company into the role of a broker, middle-man for utilities,
in the buying and selling of electricity. "Think of it as an energy eBay with algorithms," was
one description of Enron. Id.
27. Enron did not limit its hedging activity to electricity. It was hedging telecommunica-
tions wire load, bandwidth, lumber, and even television ad times. If there were anything that
sounded like a bet, Enron would take by creating contracts that went both ways and selling
them both ways. Enron was AC/DC on electricity and all forms of futures. For example, it
created a market for snowfall, that is, ski lodges could hedge their risk on snowfall. If the
snow fell, Enron made money. If the snow didn't fall, the ski lodge got paid by Enron and
was covered for its lost season. Id. Actually, Enron probably sold contracts the other way to
people who were betting there would be snow and so Enron was covered no matter what hap-
pened with the snowfall. If this all sounds made-up and risky, it was. Bankruptcy at the larg-
est level the U.S. has ever seen, "don't come easy," as Ringo Starr would say. RINGO STARR,
It Don't Come Easy, on BLAST FROM YOUR PAST (Apple 1975). See generally Enron Un-
plugged, supra note 14; see also supra note 1 for an important caveat on bankruptcy rankings.
28. McKinsey & Company, specifically a young consultant, named Jeffrey K. Skilling,
was the mastermind of the Enron model. He piloted Enron through the new waters it had
charted (note apropos and consistent metaphor for The Perfect Storm theme). Audacious
Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, supra note 14.
The Enron model included some market tactics that California and the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission are investigating. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Jeff Gerth, Enron Forced Up
California Prices, Documents Show, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at Al. For example, "rico-
chet" or "megawatt laundering" are names for some trading activities of which regulators now
question the legality. Id. Enron would buy power in California, transport that power to the
national market, and then bring it back into California at a higher price. Enron also used a
"Get Shorty" strategy, which employed the sale of power commitments. Id. They would sell
the commitments at a high price and then buy its own commitments at a low price. In effect, it
was making money selling a service to provide power it knew it would never be forced to
provide. Enron also used the "Death Star" strategy of scheduling power it didn't need to drive
up the price and force others to pay the premium prices required to have them forgo use of
backed-up transmission lines in periods of high volume (congestion, as they say in the trade).
Id. The names are courtesy of Enron traders. The disclosure of the strategies comes from on-
going investigations. See Oppel & Gerth supra; Kathryn Kranhold & Rebecca Smith, Energy
Sellers Teamed up in Profit-Boosting Scheme: Role of White's Unit Raised, WALL ST. J., May
9, 2002, at Al. See generally John Swartz, Daschle: Somebody Ought to Go to Jail, USA
TODAY, May 10, 2002, at 5B.
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By 1995, Enron was the country's largest national gas purveyor.2 9 In
fact, Enron became "the biggest e-commerce company in the world."3
Revenues topped $100 billion and Enron began pursuing investments in hard
assets, such as power plants and water companies. 31 Enron still sold natural
gas, but in long-term contracts that were hedged by other instruments, with
Enron taking a cut in all contracts.32 Enron's niche, combined with creative
and aggressive trading in the boom of the 1990s, saw the company's share
price soar to $83 per share in January 200131 with 20,000 employees and
earning nearly $100 billion per year.34
As other utilities entered the market for national and international
wholesale sales of electricity, however, Enron lost its dominant position and
its ability to post the double-digit earnings growth and resulting share price
increases its investors, employees, officers, and Board had come to expect.35
It was during 1999, when Enron executives began to feel the crunch of the
market; as a result, multifarious forms of financial creativity were began as a
29. Enron's Collapse: Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, supra
note 14. These numbers appear to be real, verifiable and verified, and occurred in 1995, which
was before Enron began making things up, again not to put too fine a point on things.
30. Id. By the time Skilling became COO in 1997, Enron was even selling weather de-
rivatives; utilities could purchase hedges against hot and cold weather, depending on which
way their risk was. And Enron would hedge its risk the other way with those who were will-
ing to be that the weather would do something just the opposite of the original hedge. Id.
31. Id. It had $10 billion in such assets, but they produced very little in terms of earnings.
id. Enron's executives knew how to trade, but they did not know how to manage. By the time
the company collapsed, these plants and companies were in utter chaos. Enron's foray into
India for construction of a power plant, found it asking Vice President Dick Cheney to dun
India for payment of the $64 million it was owed. Bennett Roth, The Fall of Enron: Enron
Project was Raised With India, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 19, 2002, at A20. See generally Melita
Marie Garza, Cheney Discussed Plagued Enron Project in India, CHi. TRIB., Jan. 19, 2002, at
A12.
32. Enron's Collapse: Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, supra
note 14.
33. The Enron Scandal: By the Numbers, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2002, at 3B. These num-
bers are verifiable via independent sources that are more independent than the independent
auditors Enron used.
34. Enron's Collapse: Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, supra
note 14. The number of employees is verifiable. The earnings, well, see supra notes 1, 17 and
24.
35. Bob McNair, a Houston entrepreneur who sold his company to Enron in 1998 stated,
"If they had been going a slower speed, the results would not have been disastrous.... It's a
lot harder to keep it on the track at 200 miles per hour. You hit a bump and you're off the
track." John Schwartz & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enron's Collapse: The Chief Executive;
Foundation Gives Way on Chief's Big Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at Cl. Between
mid 1998 and the end of 1999, Enron's stock price tripled from $20 to over $60 per share.
Peter Behr & April Witt, Visionary's Dream Led to Risky Business, WASH. POST, July 28,
2002, at Al. By the middle of 2000, the share price was over $80. Id. By October 2001, that
price dropped seventy-eight percent. Floyd Norris, Enron Tries to Dismiss Finance Doubts,
N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 24, 2001, at Cl. The 1997-2001 earnings were ultimately restated and re-
duced by $586 million, 20 percent of its earnings for those four years. John R. Emshwiller et
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means of bolstering earnings and maintaining or increasing the market price
of Enron' s shares.36
B. The Creative Years: The Data Behind Enron's Financial Statements
Enron followed two strategies for maximizing revenue growth. During
the late 1990s, Enron expanded itself from energy trader to highly leveraged
hedge fund through a series of structural changes.37 Enron transitioned from
stodgy energy trader to leveraged hedge fund dealer without alarming share-
holders or even analysts because hedge funds have so little regulation in
terms of disclosure requirements when run by a power trading company.38
The second strategy involved complex structures that technically complied
with the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rules and therefore,
not subject to the long arm of the law.
36. See Enron's Collapse: Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, su-
pra note 14. The period between 1999 and Enron's bankruptcy in December 2001 represented
fertile times for officer trading: "Mr. Lay sold Enron stock 350 times, trading almost daily,
receiving $101.3 million. In all, Mr. Lay sold 1.8 million Enron shares between early 1999
and July 2001, five months before Enron filed for bankruptcy." Leslie Wayne, Before Deba-
cle, Enron Insiders Cadhed in $1.1 Billion in Shares, N.Y. TIES, Jan. 13, 2002, at Al. The
sales were at prices ranging from $31 to $86 per share. Id. Beginning in December 2000, Mr.
Skilling sold his shares at a rate of 10,000 every seven days. Id. A suit by Amalgamated Bank
of New York documents what its lawyers call, "the most massive insider bailout that we've
ever seen .... The overall size of this case is unprecedented." Id.
Interestingly, Enron began marketing its earnings management techniques to other companies,
including AT&T, Eli Lilly & Company, Owens-Illinois, Lockheed Martin, and Qwest Com-
munications. David Barboza, Enron Offered Management Aid to Companies, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 2002, at CI. One of the techniques touted was "swap[s]", an area of investigation for
Qwest. Id.
37. Gregory Zuckerman, Enron Quietly Ran a Risky Hedge Fund That Did Well, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 11, 2002, at Cl. Mr. Skilling created the hedge-fund operations in 1996 through
an Enron subsidiary called ECT Investments. Id. The benefit of the hedge fund was two-fold:
(1) large returns (20%); and (2) regulatory no-man's land. Id. The result was the ECT could
bet high and with leveraged funds with little disclosure required. Id. ECT was an autonomous
trading unit and had the highest RO of any of Enron's subsidiaries. Id. It was responsible for
40 percent of Enron's earnings. Id.
38. Id. "They [Enron] didn't hide it, but there was not a lot of financial disclosure about
the hedge-fund group." Id. Of course, no one referred to Enron as such until after the collapse
despite the obvious revelations that basic financial report analysis would have provided. A
safety tip on companies is that when they have income through the roof but nonexistent cash
flow and returns lower than their cost of capital, something might be amiss. The Enron team
quickly mocked those who asked such basic finance and financial reporting questions. For-
tune magazine's editors had to accept a tongue lashing from Jeffrey Skilling because one of
its reporters, Bethany McLean, had the nerve to raise the basic question, "How are these guys
doing this?" Actually, she asked an even better question, "What exactly are these guys do-
ing?" Ms. McLean indicates that she obtained her insights and questions from a short-seller,
one of those risky market types (although no more risky than an Enron investor, as we know
now) who bets that a company's stock will go down. It seems short-sellers really do their
homework. See Why Enron Went Bust, supra note 15; see also Cassell Bryan-Low & Suzanne
McGee, What Enron's Financial Reports Did and Didn't Reveal: Enron Short Seller Detected
Red Flags in Regulatory Filings, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2001, at Cl.
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Two critical FASB rules enabled Enron to make the transition from en-
ergy company to hedge fund with minimal disclosures. The first rule dealt
with disclosures on special purposed entities ("SPEs"). 39 Direct disclosures
about these entities were not required on Enron's financial reports if these
SPEs were structured a certain way. To even understand the scope and
breadth of these off-the-books entities required great expertise and signifi-
cant outside research. Without this significant outside research, it was im-
possible to understand or evaluate Enron's true financial situation.4"
Enron also used the flexibility FASB provided on the booking of reve-
nues for contracts that will be performed in the future, known as mark-to-
market accounting. Under FASB rules, management was charged with the
duty and discretion of valuing those contracts and Enron management used
that discretion liberally.
Enron rode the wave of double-digit earnings and a booming economy
by taking advantage of the flexibility of the FASB rules and the even greater
flexibility of auditors charged with their application to their clients' financial
39. ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND
EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 140 (Fi-
nancial Accounting Standards Bd. 2000) [hereinafter ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS], a re-
placement of FASB 125, governs the consolidation of financial statements with regard to
SPEs. The rule provides that until the company owns fifty percent or more of the voting
shares, consolidation reporting with the parent is not required. Enron's Accounting Issues-
What Can We Learn To Prevent Future Enrons Statement Before the House Energy & Com-
merce Comm., 10 7th Cong. (Feb. 6, 2002) (prepared statement of Bala G. Dharan, Ph.D.,
C.P.A., Professor of Accounting at Rice University)(available through Federal News Ser-
vice)[hereinafter Dharan testimony]. See infra section II.B for further explanation of Enron's
use of SPEs to manipulate the FASB rules.
40. Note, once again, the use of the water metaphor. For example, one of Enron's 10-Ks
(1999) simply disclosed that officers of the company were the principals in organizations that
were doing business with Enron. The mandatory "related party transactions" disclosures re-
vealed the following, a senior officer of Enron "is the 'managing member' of [LJM] with
which Enron had entered into series of transactions." What Enron's Financial Reports Did
and Didn't Reveal: Enron Short Seller Detected Red Flags in Regulatory Filings, supra note
38. This one-line disclosure was a signal to some analysts, i.e., "Dad gum, these guys are do-
ing business with themselves and taking commissions from each other to do it." However,
few analysts actually took the time to investigate Enron's true structure and debt exposure.
Actually, given the revelations on analysts post-Enron and Merrill Lynch's plea agreement, it
would seem analysts were doing very little except touting the shares of companies in which
their firms had an underwriting interest. Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil, and don't say
anything about the financials or 881 Enron subsidiaries, 700 of which are in the Cayman Is-
lands. Professor Alan Bromberg notes, "[t]he heart of disclosure is intelligibility... If the
people to whom it's addressed can't understand it, it hasn't been adequately disclosed.
There's clearly a qualitative, as well as a factual, component to disclosure." Jonathan Weil,
What Enron's Financial Reports Did and Didn't Reveal: Auditor Could Face Scrutiny on
Clarity of Financial Reports, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2001, at C1.
Those who did question Enron were met with the wrath of Khan, or at least Skilling. A short
seller who criticized Enron for not providing a balance sheet was called an "ah" by Jeffrey
Skilling in April 2001. What Enron's Financial Reports Did and Didn't Reveal: Enron Short
Seller Detected Red Flags in Regulatory Filings, supra note 38.
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statements.4 The confluence of the effects of these two accounting rules
permitted Enron's managers to paint a picture of Enron's financial condition
that neither reflected the exposure investors held in terms of risk nor the true
amount of earnings the company had.
1. "Mark-to-Market Accounting"
Enron utilized "mark-to-market accounting," in full compliance with
accounting rules for the reporting of income from futures contracts. These
rules apply not just to energy contracts, but to all types of transactions that
are entered into presently, but will realize revenue over long periods of time.
The right to receive those revenues or the present value of those contracts is
a critical part of a company's, especially one such as Enron, financial pic-
ture. Under FASB 133, for example, energy traders are permitted to include
in current earnings those profits they expect to earn on energy contracts and
related derivative estimates.42 Accordingly, many energy companies were
posting non-cash earnings that they expected to realize some time in the fu-
ture.43
Mark-to-market accounting was an integral part of the electric industry,
but was used by all companies that had any form of long-term contracts, fu-
ture and otherwise.' By the time of its collapse, Enron had eighty percent of
its earnings from "wholesale energy operations and services" or contracts for
sales of power it was not generating but purchasing from others, then hedg-
ing, then leveraging and then hedging again, all based on its valuation of its
contracts using mark-to-market accounting. 5 For some analysts, understand-
41. For examples of their f'exibility, see supra notes 1, 17 and 24, and infra notes 65-
126. Flexibility was everywhere. Even the flexibility was flexible.
42. ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS, supra note 39, no. 133. See generally Paul Krugman,
Cronies in Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at A29. We are still waiting on many Enron
contracts to deliver, and will be waiting until 2015, in some cases. Of course, they need not
deliver the cash if Enron doesn't deliver the power, yet another story.
43. Accounting is a heck of a field. You get to book as revenues sales that have not yet
and may never occur and you can carry money you are owed as receivables if the contract is
performed, but there is some delay on the payment. You can also carry money you are owed
as an asset, i.e., a loan for money you are owed, but don't have is a positive thing. A safety tip
to avoid accounting mumbo jumbo: ask to see the cash. Enron, however, also defied this rule
because despite its earnings being future takes from contracts, it was awash in cash because it
was selling assets right and left, using cash that it had obtained from lenders who were loan-
ing money advanced by other Enron entities and who had Enron stock as their security for the
loan, see infra notes 65-126 and accompanying text.
44. For example, Pinnacle West Capital Corporation, parent company to electric utility,
Arizona Public Service, has twenty-seven percent of its earnings in mark-to-market contracts.
Matt Krantz, Accounting Rule Eyed, USA TODAY, Dec. 3, 2001, at B4. American Electric
Power was at twenty-three percent and Duke Energy has promised to disclose its percentage
of earnings that are attributable to such contracts. Williams Energy was at forty percent at the
close of 2001. See Jonathan Weil, After Enron, 'Mark to Market' Accounting Gets Scrutiny,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2001, at CI [hereinafter Mark to Market Gets Scrutiny].
45. Why Enron Went Bust, supra note 15, at 58. Other companies with mark-to-market
contracts in earnings include El Paso Energy and American Electric Power. Mark to Market
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ing mark-to-market accounting was the key to picking Enron apart, even in
its hay-day.46 The additional complexity in mark-to-market contracts and
revenues is that those who depend on earnings levels of the company for
compensation are assigned the task of valuating the contracts. Mark-to-
market accounting requires that company managers develop the formulas
used for the valuation of future contracts. The numbers are subjective, both
as a function of human error and as a result of the vacillating nature of the
value of the contracts because of their direct ties to the fluctuating prices of
energy.47 Contract values carried in earnings depended upon assumptions
management made about market factors and the resulting impact on the
value of the contracts.48 Such assumptions, used in computing future earn-
ings booked presently, are not revealed in the financial reports and investors
have no way of knowing the validity of those assumptions or even whether
they are conservative or aggressive assumptions about energy market expec-
tations.49
Gets Scrutiny; supra note 44. Once again, accounting is a heck of a field. Remember, you get
to book as revenues sales that have not and may never occur, and you can carry the money
you are owed under these elusive contracts as receivables assuming the contract is performed
and the only problem is some delay on the payment part. You can also carry money you are
owed as an asset, i.e., a loan for money you are owed but don't actually yet have is a positive
thing. Id. The term "mumbo jumbo" springs to mind more and more as the accounting analy-
sis of Enron unfolds.
46. Here is an analysis of Enron stock that might have tipped an open-minded soul, even
at $80/share:
" The company stock was selling at 60 times earnings, but
" Its cash flow was negative despite ever-increasing revenues
" It had a very low return on equity (7% even in 2000) (off-the-balance sheet debt not
counted)
* It was burning through cash as if there were no tomorrow (who doesn't with a conci-
erge at company headquarters?)
" Its operating margins were 5% in 2000 and 2% in early 2001.
Gleaned from ENRON 10-K (2000) available at http:// www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar.
47. See Mark to Market Gets Scrutiny, supra note 44. ABN Amro Analyst Paul Patter-
son, a specialist in energy trading firms, offered the following insight, "[w]henever there's a
considerable amount of discretion that companies have in reporting their earnings, one gets
concerned that some companies may overstate those earnings in certain situations where they
feel pressure to make earnings goals." Id. For example, many of Enron's futures contracts
were for contracts in states that had not yet deregulated electricity. Those contracts could not
be performed until deregulation occurred, but Enron indicated that it had factored in the risk
regarding deregulation in the valuation of those contracts. Floyd Norris & Kurt Eichenwald,
Enron's Many Strands: The Accounting; Fuzzy Rules of Accounting and Enron, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2002, at Cl.
48. Further, the void in regulation permits very little disclosure about the assumptions.
Mark to Market Gets Scrutiny, supra note 44.
49. The assumptions that can be all over the maps, weather and otherwise, are the prices
of the commodities such as oil, gas and electricity, and, get this, the weather. Whether it will
be hot or cold, long winter or short, hot summer or not, controlled the value of these energy
contracts. In fact, the volatility of the pricing and value of these contracts was so great that
Enron often hedged its contracts with what amounted to bets on the weather. Enron Un-
plugged, supra note 14. In lay terms (no CEO pun intended), Enron's contracts bet one way
on the weather and then it went into the derivatives and hedge markets to bet the other way
[Vol. 39
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A simple example illustrates the diversity of opinion. Suppose that an
energy company has a contract to sell gas for $1.00 per gallon, with the con-
tract to begin in 2004 and run through 2014.50 If the price of gas in 2002 is
$0.80 per gallon, then the value of that contract can be booked accordingly
and handsomely, with a showing of a 20 percent profit margin. However,
suppose that the price of gasoline then climbs to $1.20 per gallon during
2003. What is the manager's resolution and reconciliation in the financial
statement of this change in price? The company has a ten-year commitment
to sell gas at a price that will produce losses. Likewise, suppose that the
price of gas declines further to $0.50 per gallon in 2003. How is this change
reflected in the financial statements, or does the company leave the value as
it was originally booked in 2002?
Investors have difficulty cross-comparing financial statements of energy
companies because they are comparing apples and oranges because of mar-
ket changes and adjustments or non-adjustments to financial statements, are
mostly not disclosed.5 It is nearly impossible to view earnings as something
definitive when firms have a substantial percentage of earnings from mark-
to-market accounting.
For example, the unrealized gains portion of Enron's pretax profit for
2000 was about 50 percent of the total $1.41 billion profit originally re-
ported.52 That amount was one-third in 1999."3 Dynegy, another Houston en-
ergy company was poised to buy Enron until it realized the extent of the fi-
nancial issues, also had about one-half of its $762 million in pretax profits in
just in case it was wrong on its assumptions in the weather, the contracts and the pricing.
Then Enron management had to assess a value for the weather bets. So, the validity of income
statements, as you can see, is all tied to barometric pressure under FASB rules.
50. The wisdom of these ten-year agreements for commodities such as gas and electricity
is a stand-alone question. Further, the courts are not particularly generous in forgiving errors
made in entering into the long-term contracts. For example, in a line of cases concerning
long-term contracts entered into by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the courts were reluc-
tant to relieve the company of its liability simply based on changes in expectations. Westing-
house committed to deliver uranium to twenty-two utilities under twenty year supply con-
tracts at prices ranging from $3 to $10 per pound. The contracts were entered into in the late
1960s and early 1970s. When the nation's energy picture changed substantially in 1974 with
the Arab oil embargo, prices for uranium went to $45 to $75 per pound, with availability be-
ing a substantial question. Westinghouse sought to be excused from performance under the
agreements under U.C.C. § 2-615, commercial impracticability. While many of the suits
brought by the utilities for performance under the contracts were settled, the eventual decision
of the federal judge in the case was that while the fundamental assumptions of the parties had
changed and there was some grounds for releasing Westinghouse from the agreements, West-
inghouse had also oversubscribed in its contract commitments and was, therefore, at least par-
tially liable. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 429 F. Supp. 940
(E.D. Va. 1977); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Westinghouse, 69 F.R.D. 5, 6 (E.D. Tenn. 1975); In re
Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 405 F. Supp. 316, 317 (1975).
51. For example, while an outsider could examine quoted market prices, there is no way
to determine timing, inclusion and other discretionary factors in a company's booking of
revenues on futures contracts.
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unrealized gain. 4 The two companies settled litigation following Dynegy's
withdrawal of its offer to purchase a percentage of Enron's mark-to-market
earnings.
2. Related Party Transactions and Disclosures
The General Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") and FASB
standards for disclosure of a company's transactions with related entities
(FASB 125), or those entities in which the company holds an interest, apply
54. Id. Dynegy backed out of the deal to acquire Enron, its major competitor, on Novem-
ber 29, 2001 and Enron filed for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001. Alex Berenson, Deal is
Over but Not Dynegy's Troubles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at C7. Dynegy through due
diligence learned that Enron had only about one-half of the cash it had expected to find.
Dynegy had offered $9 billion for the company and it backed out when Enron's market cap
went to $270 million. Neil Weinberg & Daniel Fisher, Power Player, FORBES, Dec. 24, 2001,
at 52. Dynegy had its own problems by May 2002, CEO Chuck Watson resigned confessing
to "wash trades" or "swaps" or "round trip trades" or offsetting sales of power to other energy
companies just to pump up the volume of trading and illusion of earnings. Holman W. Jen-
kins, Jr., Energy CEOs Fall Victim to Bubbleconomics, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2002, at A21.
Dynegy is under SEC scrutiny. Paul Beckett & Jonathan Sapsford, Dynegy Probe by SEC
Widens to Citigroup, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2002, at Cl.
55. The litigation alleged that Dynegy already understood Enron's business and account-
ing methods and that it failed to negotiate in good faith. Chuck Watson, however, Dynegy's
chairman, stated at an investors' meeting on November 12, 2001, when the acquisition of En-
ron was still pending that Dynegy understood Enron's accounting because Dynegy used simi-
lar methods. "There just may be an exaggeration of the problem in the press and the market.
We're not anticipating any revelation other than what's been disclosed." Deal is Over but Not
Dynegy's Troubles, supra note 54. However, Dynegy had encouraged FERC to clamp down
with more regulation, as in the following quote from one of its filings: "[a]buses abound be-
cause of financial windfalls, difficulty of detection, lengthy investigations and increased com-
plexity of the market." Jeff Gerth & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Regulators Struggle with a Mar-
ketplace Created by Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at Cl. Enron filed suit against
Dynegy, causing Watson to complain to a Forbes reporter with the following result reported
at the end of December 2001:
"I was very disappointed," Watson says in characteristic, laconic understatement.
He also was furious: Enron had tumbled into turmoil by misleading investors, and
now it was misrepresenting its finances yet again-so says Watson-and laying
the blame on Dynegy. "I just hope the other side doesn't think all this spinning,
which got them into trouble to begin with, is going to let them out of it," he fumes.
Neil Weinberg & Daniel Fisher, Power Player, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 53-54. Dynegy
unraveled in the six months following the failed merger with the litigation of questionable
value. Most observers agree that Dynegy was using the same processes and accounting as its
rival, Enron, but that it touted its differences as earnings based in assets. Dynegy's long-term
(mark-to-market accounting) were $133 of the company's $167 million in earnings for the
first quarter of 2002. Neela Banerjee, Disclosing Long-Term Contracts, Dynegy Worries
Some Investors, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2002, at Cl.
The suit asked for $10 billion and alleged that Dynegy wrongfully terminated the contract and
"consistently took advantage of Enron's precarious state to further its own business goals."
Why Enron Went Bust, supra note 15, at 68. Dynegy settled the suit with Enron by agreeing to
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only when the company owns at least 50 percent of the related entity.5 6 If a
company owns 49 percent or less of an entity, any debt obligations the re-
lated entity carries need not be listed as debt on the company's balance
sheet.57
While Enron's efforts at transferring debt off the books began with the
creation of Whitewing in 1997, its complex network of subsidiaries and spe-
cial purpose entities (SPEs) did not begin in earnest until the end of 1999.58
By the time of its collapse, Enron had created 881 to more than 3,000
SPEs,59 with many of them located in the Cayman Islands with their offshore
status designed to eliminate the need for the payment of U.S. federal income
tax by the entities and other business ventures.6 °
Whitewing started Enron down the broad road to destruction with what
was originally conceived as a fairly narrow pathway and proposed to the
Board. Whitewing and its related entities known as Nighthawk and Osprey,
was run by Enron employees, did business only with Enron, and was owned
fifty percent by Enron and fifty percent by Nighthawk with the remainder of
Nighthawk owned by outside investors.6' Enron guaranteed Whitewing's
credit lines for the fifty percent that Enron owned62 and then, Whitewing
purchased, in 11 transactions, nearly $2 billion in Enron assets, 63 leaving En-
ron with a passel of cash, investors enormously happy with an eight percent
immediate return, and everyone none the wiser for owning stock in a com-
pany that was pledged to banks for an SPE's debt even as the SPE owned
nearly half of Enron's assets.64
56. Dharan testimony, supra note 39. Related FASB rules are covered in detail infra
notes 65-126 and accompanying text.
57. Dharan testimony, supra note 39.
58. PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS IN ENRON'S COLLAPSE, S. REP. No. 107-70, at 39-40 (2002), available at
http://www.senate.gov/%7Egov-affairs/070902enronboardreport.pdf [hereinafter PSI RE-
PORT].
59. The Enron Scandal: By the Numbers, supra note 33. The discrepancy in the numbers
is due to the complexity in counting the multifarious entities. Many had the same name, but a
Roman numeral following them, while others used an Arabic sequential numbering system
while others were part of a single umbrella entity. It is impossible to know the exact number
although the exhibits to Enron's 10-Ks for 1999 and 2000 do list about 3,000 SPEs. ENRON
10-Ks (1999, 2000) available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar. See infra note 215 and
accompanying text for more information on this disclosure. Not until the government unfolds
its criminal case or the shareholders get rolling on their suits can we really know how many,
where and what. The why may never be discoverable. Indeed, if there is one consistent theme
in the entire Enron debacle it is that no number is ever certain.
60. There were "about 900" partnerships based offshore. The Enron Scandal: By the
Numbers, supra note 33.
61. PSI REPORT supra note 58, at 39.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 40.
64. For those of you who have reached the conclusion that everyone was investing in air,
you are correct-air with razor-thin margins. Interestingly, Whitewing has not made its way
into the business press. Business coverage and analysis generally begins with the 1999 trans-
actions in SPEs, but Whitewing established a precedent and provided management with a pat-
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Whitewing, however, was only the beginning of the SPEs and their
maximum utilization by Enron for moving its debt off the books. The mas-
sive numbers of transactions are the subject of Congressional, criminal, and
shareholder litigation. A shareholder class action lawsuit filed in November
2001, includes the following descriptions of Enron's practices:
One of Andrew Fastow's "innovative" accounting techniques was to cre-
ate entities (trusts) to which Enron would issue millions of dollars in man-
datory convertible debentures or depreciated assets. The trust would then
use the assets as collateral to receive billions of dollars in financing for
Enron projects, including Broadband. Although Enron Corp. officially
owned less than fifty percent of these entities, Enron controlled them. De-
fendants, improperly, did not consolidate these entities into Enron's dis-
closed financials; rather, Defendants hid the true nature of all of these
transactions from the public. This meant Enron was engaged in business
deals, risk hedging, self-dealing transactions that were never disclosed to
the SEC.
While it would be impossible to review all of the "off-the-books" trans-
actions, there are several illustrative examples of the complexity, debt expo-
sure, and involvement of Enron management in these SPEs. One series of
complex, but fruitful transactions that publicly emerged were the so-called
"Raptor" transactions.6 6 The Raptor transactions were an ongoing series of
transactions that involved the LJM transactions. 67 But, the LJM transactions
were the impetus for the Raptor transactions and necessary to avoid prob-
tern to begin using with the Board. See infra notes 186-216. The Senate Permanent Subcom-
mittee on Investigations covered Whitewing in detail as it discussed the issue of laxity on the
part of Enron directors. See infra notes 178-245 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Enron Board's supervisory role, or lack thereof, as the case may be and as the shareholder
suits play out.
65. Complaint, Shareholder Class Action (N.D. Cal., Nov. 5, 2001)(on file with author).
66. Floyd Norris, Enron's Many Strands: The Bookkeeping: Too Clever by Half: Enron's
Doomed Triumph of Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at A18 [hereinafter The Book-
keeping: Too Clever by HalA]. There was Raptor I, II, III, and IV and LJM 1, 2 and 3. See
generally PSI REPORT supra note 58, at 37-45. See infra notes 87-126 and accompanying dis-
cussion. Are you like me? Do you just no longer care what Enron was doing? See infra notes
87-126, again, and accompanying text.
67. The Bookkeeping: Too Clever by Half, supra note 66. LJM are the initials of the first
names of Mr. Fastow's wife and children. Mary Flood, The Fall of Enron, Hous. CHRON.,
Nov. 7, 2002, at Al. Lea is his wife's name, but the children's names have not been revealed
in public. Id. LJM3 was never used for any types of transactions, as far as we know.
The Powers Report, commissioned by the Enron Board, reveals the same information. The
Powers Report is a 217-page indictment of the officers, the accountants, and Enron's law
firm, as completed by Dean William C. Powers, Jr. of the University of Texas Law School. In
describing the underlying transactions, Dean Powers wrote that they were "a flawed idea,
self-enrichment by employees, inadequately designed controls, poor implementation, inatten-
tive oversight, simple (and not so simple) accounting mistakes, and overreaching in a culture
that appears to have encouraged pushing the limits. Our review indicates many of those con-
sequences could and should have been avoided." Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Many Strands:
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lems with FASB rules.6s The names, as well as the complexity of these lay-
ers of transaction, provide insight into the nature of Enron's business, its cul-
ture, and the hubris that engulfed its senior management. Further, no one
seemed aware of the risks these complexities created until after Enron's
downward spiral began with the revelation of earnings reversals and debt
that had heretofore been off the books.69 That examination is akin to peeling
a genetically mutated onion in which the layers themselves have their own
layers as well as spots and each layer cannot be peeled back until one
reaches the inner layers, but the inner layers cannot be reached without first
penetrating the outer layers.70
The Raptors were really four off-the-books finance vehicles created as
the holding companies for Enron's high-risk assets, including technology
stocks and some of its foreign investments. 7 In short, the Raptors were
hedging vehicles. The Senate Report on Enron's Board concludes:
These documents establish that, step by step, the Enron Board allowed the
establishment of Whitewing, supported it with Enron stock, restructured it
as an off-the-books entity, approved its use as an off-balance sheet vehicle
to purchase Enron assets, monitored billions of dollars in Enron asset sales
68. The Enron Board minutes also document an LJM transaction in which LJM partici-
pated in an "Osprey Add-On" which was apparently a means for Osprey to provide additional
capitalization for Whitewing, of which Osprey was a subsidiary. PSI REPORT supra note 58, at
40-41 (internal citations omitted). How did these guys sleep at night with birds and raptors
dancing through their heads at levels I, II, III and IV and I and 2, but not 3. Trying to keep
track of all the incestuous financial relationships among the SPEs reminds the author of trying
to survive those fire worlds in the original Mario Brothers. Things were flying at you every-
where even as the floor fell out from beneath you and the elevators kept moving.
69. John R. Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Scandals Shake Public Trust, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 5, 2001, at Al. "It was vintage Enron: minimal disclosure of financial information that,
in retrospect, was central to understanding the complex company." Id. "Many Wall Street
analysts admitted to not fully understanding chunks of Enron, a company that had 3,500 sub-
sidiaries and affiliates across the globe." Id. See infra note 232 for other figures on numbers
of subsidiaries. "But to analysts and investors seeking to understand it, Enron was uninforma-
tive. Emshwiller & Smith, supra. The press release for the $618 million loss and the reduction
of shareholder equity occurred on October 16, 2001. Why Enron Went Bust, supra note 15, at
66.
70. Matt Krantz, Peeling Back the Layers of Enron's Breakdown; a Look Inside a House
of Cards, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2002, at B1 [hereinafter Peeling Back the Layers]. See supra
note 64.
71. The Raptors were numbered in sequence and inspired by the film JURASSIC PARK
(Universal Studios 1993), in which the raptors ended up eating everyone and everything and
controlling the Jurassic Park Island. David M. Boje, Enron is Metatheatre, at
http://cbae.nmsu.edu/-dboje/enron/dialogs.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2003). Enron was not
unlike Richard Hatch in the first Survivor television series on CBS. Mr. Hatch's diabolical
conduct with his colleagues found him with all the money. Enron did the same, but without
the nudity. Kathryn Kranhold et al., Following the Trail: As Enron Inquiry Intensifies, Mid-
level Players Face Spotlight, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2002, at Al [hereinafter As Inquiry Inten-
sifies, Midlevel Players Face Spotlight].
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to Whitewing, and monitored Whitewin 's impact on Enron's financial
statements and its claims on Enron 
stock. An
To satisfy FASB 125, the Raptors were required to have at least three
percent equity ownership by outsiders.7 3 The basic theme of the Raptors and
all other Enron partnerships was as follows:
" Enron creates a partnership (an SPE)
* Enron recruits an outside owner to cover the 3% rule74
" The SPE purchases Enron assets (the riskier ones such as broad-
band width, shares in subsidiaries in high tech fields) but the
sale is simply for an IOU from the SPE75
" Enron can show a profit on its books for the sale
* The debt (IOU) of the SPE is not carried on Enron's books
* If the value of the sold asset falls, the SPE can't pay the IOU
" Enron would issue its stock to the SPE
* The SPE sells the shares of stock to raise cash
" The entire scenario is dependent upon Enron's share price re-
maining high76
* If the share price falls, as it did beginning in the summer of
2001, then all of the SPEs have no assets and no value
* Although Enron told analysts it was non-recourse, Enron was the
guarantor for SPE's IOUs-it was the only way to recruit the
outside investor77
* Andrew Fastow, Enron's CFO, was the principal in many of the
partnerships and would net more than his Enron salary in serv-
72. PSI REPORT supra note 58, at 41.
73. Dharan testimony, supra note 39, at 6. As time went by, the definition of "outsiders"
became flexible as the labyrinth web of Enron finances grew. For example, Andrew Fastow,
Enron's CFO, proposed using his wife's family as the outside investors. When Andersen
nixed the idea, he used Michael Kopper, a mid-level employee, who could avoid SEC disclo-
sure because he was not an officer. Joshua Micah Marshall, Talking Points Memo, at
http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/feb0201.html, (Feb. 6, 2002.)
74. Dharan testimony, supra note 39, at 6. Some of Enron's SPE investors were GE
Capital and Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB). Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Enron
CFO's Partnership Had Millions in Profit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2001, at Cl.
75. Acronyms and movie names abounded among the Enron off-the-books empire. See
infra notes 79-104 and accompanying discussion.
76. For diagrams of more details on this process, see Peeling Back the Layers, supra note
70. Several Board members have noted that they felt, during the countless presentations and
approval processes for these transactions that there would be no impact on the company and
that what they were doing were simply "accounting gimmicks." PSI REPORT supra note 58, at
46. However, the Board meeting documents also show that the directors were told that the key
to all of the transactions was maintenance of Enron's share price, which as we now know was
determined by the tides and/or barometric pressure. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
77. They were making this up--they were not non-recourse notes. In fact, no one has
given non-recourse notes since 1929. See infra note 113.
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ing as broker for the various deals between the SPEs and En-
ron
78
Walking through examples of these partnerships illustrates how com-
plex Enron's finances were, perhaps too complex to grasp.79 The Raptor
transactions began with the Raptors created by Enron providing stock in ex-
change for a promissory note (or some form of IOU as noted in the general
model).8" LJM2, with outside funding, invested $30 million in Raptor in ex-
change for a promised rate of return of thirty percent.8' But, Raptor had to
recover LJM2's $30 million investment, so Enron paid Raptor $41 million
for the right to sell Raptor Enron stock at a fixed price at some time in the
future.82 Raptor took the $41 million and repaid LJM2 its $30 million plus
$11 million, thus meeting the thirty percent R01 and providing Fastow with
his earnings. Once LJM2 was repaid for its investment, Enron used Raptor
78. Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Enron CFO's Partnership Had Millions in
Profit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2001, at CI. Mr. Fastow realized $7 million in management fees
and $4 million in investment yields from the LJM2Co-lnvestment LP, created in 1999 to do
business with Enron, in the year 2000. Id. There was also an interesting transaction in which
Mr. Fastow and five other Enron employees formed Southampton, L.P., and purchased a sub-
sidiary of UMI. For those of you still keeping score, (indeed, for any of you still following
along,) Mr. Fastow was buying partnerships he owned that owned assets of the company for
which he was the CFO and for which he received management fees for both the buying and
the selling inasmuch as he was batting for both sides. Bring in his Enron role and he had a
triple play each time a deal to transfer assets occurred. Not bad work if you can get it. The
downside is pleading the Fifth Amendment at Congressional hearings.
79. In a "Top 10" list written by Enron employees entitled "Top Ten Reasons Enron Re-
structures so Frequently," #7 on the list was "[b]ecause the basic business model is to keep
the outside investment analysts so confused that they will not be able to figure out that we
don't know what we're doing." #1 was "[f]orget all the hype about being Fortune's #1-
congratulations to Enron for having broken a Guinness [B]ook of [W]orld [R]ecord with 942
reorganizations in one year!" Peeling Back the Layers, supra note 70.
80. Frank Partnoy, Testimony of Frank Partnoy at the Senate Enron Hearings, FUTURES
& DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1, 4 (Feb. 2002).
81. The Bookkeeping: Too Clever By Half, supra note 66. The author does not want to
mislead, the transaction could have involved UMI. Frankly speaking, the SPEs are more con-
fusing than the financials. But we know that the LJMs did interbreed with Raptors and the
interbreeding netted Fastow and others in the company tidy sums because they were the prin-
cipals of the Raptors and LJMs, but as far as we know, not of the Whitewings and Ospreys
and the add-on rooms to the Ospreys. We are also unclear at to how much Fastow actually
made on the transactions because he was most resistant, even to Board members, about dis-
closing his compensation from LJM, Raptors and even the little-known Southampton. One
Board member, assigned the task to go and face the dragon CFO, wrote in his notes that Fas-
tow acknowledged receiving $45 million from the various SPEs and the transactions he nego-
tiated both for Enron and the SPEs. PSI REPORT supra note 58, at 36. For more discussion of
these fees and Fastow's reticence, see infra section III.D.3.
82. The Bookkeeping: Too Clever By Half, supra note 66. For those of you with finance
background, we have the use of warrants, options, puts and calls going on here. Most of you
have probably realized that Enron had issued stock to Raptor to start and was now issuing the
right to buy stock as Raptor's second asset. So, even non-finance types are able to see that the
price of Enron's stock was important to the success of Raptors, Enron, Fastow, shareholders
and just about everyone in the Greater Houston area.
83. Id. Andrew Fastow is an interesting character study, although "character" is not used
in the integrity sense. He graduated from Tufts University and then received his MBA from
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for contracts with itself that provided Enron with hedges for any potential
losses on investments (including the volatile high tech areas).84 The benefit
to Raptor was that it would enjoy the gains if the assets increased in value.
The downside was that Raptor had to cover any losses in values, but it could
do so with Enron stock so long as the share price remained stable or in-
creased.8 5
It seems that most Board members understood the Raptor transactions'
overall effect. Notes from Enron's corporate secretary at an Enron Board
committee meeting reads "[d]oes not transfer economic risk, but transfers
P&L volatility. 8 6
While "The Raptors" collectively referred to the many SPEs created for
risk transfer, there are several examples that illustrate the extent of other
SPEs and the different types of transactions. For example, in 1999, Enron
announced that it had transferred, by private agreement, 1,999,999 shares
from its affiliate, Sundance Assets, to another affiliate, SE Thunderbird.S1En-
Northwestern. He started at Enron in 1990, fresh from his work as a "troubled loan" specialist
at Continental Bank. Oh, the Shakespearean foreshadowings! He began using off-the-books
partnerships immediately upon his arrival. By age 36, he was CFO of Enron and in 1999 was
honored by CFO Magazine for his innovative financing structures. Finest in Finance, CFO,
Oct. 1, 1999, at 45. Memo to CFO Magazine: we really need to talk. He told the interviewer
for that story that he kept Enron's credit rating high by keeping debts off the balance sheet.
Memo to Wall Street and analysts: the man confessed three years ago and you missed it. At
the time of Enron's collapse, Mr. Fastow was in the process of building an 11,500 square-foot
house. David Barboza & John Schwartz, Enron's Many Strands: The Financial Wizard Tied
to Enron's Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at Al. Again, see supra notes 65-126 for informa-
tion on the extent of restructuring and off-the-books debt; and infra note 238-245 on the taci-
turn Mr. Fastow when it came to Board requests for interviews.
Disclosure of Mr. Fastow's interest in LJM came in the 1999 10-K with a cryptic reference,
"[a] senior officer of Enron is the managing member of LJM's general partner." Enron 10K,
Filed December 31, 1999, at 16 available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar. For those of you who
are curious, the LJMI partnership sold an Enron power plant located in Brazil and followed
the same modus operandi as LJM2. Kurt Eichenwald & Diana B. Henriques, Enron's Many
Strands: The Company Unravels; Enron Buffed Image to a Shine Even as It Rotted From
Within, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at AI[hereinafter Enron Buffed Image to a Shine Even as
It Rotted From Within].
84. PSI REPORT supra note 58, at 44.
85. The Bookkeeping: Too Clever By Half, supra note 66.
86. Id. In fact, in a chilling touch of arrogance, the Raptor transactions were referred to
collectively as Hawaii 125-0, a play on Jack Lord's old show as well as a fist of defiance to
accounting standards and FASB 125 on its three percent ownership requirement coupled with
the fifty percent rule. Rebecca Smith, Short Circuit: How Enron's Plan to Market Electricity
Nationwide Fizzled, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2002, at Al. Interestingly, that corporate secretary,
Rebecca Carter, received a proposal of marriage from Mr. Skilling in July 2001, just after Mr.
Skilling informed Mr. Lay that he was leaving the company. Ms. Carter and Mr. Skilling were
married shortly thereafter. To no one's surprise, this allowed the marital privilege to prevent
testimony from the former corporate secretary about which officers knew what and said what
and explained what at Board meetings. David Barboza, Enron's Many Strands: The Former
Chief- Friends Say Ex-Chief Despairs, Seeking Someone to Believe Him, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
22, 2002, at C 1.
87. Complaint of Shareholder Class Action Members at 7, Kaufman v. Enron Corp., Civ.
Action No. 4:01-3682 (S.D. Tex. Filed Oct. 25, 2001)(on file with California Western Law
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ron did not, however, disclose that Sundance Assets was partially owned and
controlled by Enron's unconsolidated subsidiary, New Power.88 Enron
owned forty-five percent of New Power and New Power had been created to
sell electricity and natural gas to residential and small load customers
throughout deregulated markets in the United States.89 None of these owner-
ship interests or Enron's contracts with these companies was disclosed in
Enron's financial statements. 90
Enron also did a substantial amount of business with LJM Cayman,
L.P., a private investment company that specializes in energy futures con-
tracts and which was also managed by Andrew Fastow, 91 a principal in New
Power.92 These complex interrelationships and the lack of a required disclo-
sure enabled Enron to transfer assets into LJM, thereby increasing Enron's
equity position and its market worth. For example, in June 2000, Enron
transferred, through Mr. Fastow, sufficient shares to LJM2 to permit Enron
to report an increase in its equity of $171 million while also reporting the as-
sets that LJM transferred in exchange for the shares represented $500 mil-
lion in proceeds.93 Also during that quarter in 2000, Mr. Fastow facilitated
the sale of Enron's "dark fiber cable" to LJM2 for $30 million in cash, a $70
million note, and a gross margin of $53 million reported earnings for the
quarter. 4 These earnings were subsequently reduced in October 2001 in the
now infamous press release that was the beginning of Enron's end. 95 How-
ever, the LJM2 partnership reported that the company earned $7 million in
management fees and "about $4 million in capital increases" in 2000.96
Review). These transactions marked the second layer of protections created to retain Enron's
balance sheet, earnings and share price. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. These secondary layers are referred to as the "restructuring of the Raptors." The
special report commissioned by the Enron Board concludes the following, "'[t]he creation,
and especially the subsequent restructuring, of the Raptors was perceived by many within En-
ron as a triumph of accounting ingenuity by a group of innovative accountants.... We be-
lieve that perception was mistaken. Especially after the restructuring, the Raptors were little
more than a highly complex accounting construct that was destined to collapse."' The Book-
keeping: Too Clever By Half, supra note 66 (quoting a Special Report of the Enron Board
Committee).
90. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 7, Kaufman, No. 4:01-3682 (on file with California
Western Law Review).
91. Plaintiff's Original Petition, Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Tem-
porary Injunction at 16, Jose v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., Cause No. 2002-CI-01906 (Dist. Ct.
Bexar County, Tex. 2002).
92. Plaintiffs Complaint at 7, Kaufman v. Enron, No. 4:01-3682 (on file with California
Western Law Review).
93. See id. at 8. For the period of the third quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of
2001, not using the Raptor scheme would have made profits $429 million, or 72%, lower. The
Bookkeeping: Too Clever By Half, supra note 66.
94. ENRON ANNUAL REPORT 2000 at 49, at www.enron.comlcorp/investors/annuals/2000/
at2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2003).
95. See Enron Slashes Profits, supra note 35.
96. Enron CFO's Partnership Had Millions in Profit, supra note 74.
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Often, Enron was using other SPEs to hedge and raise cash for partners
who wanted to recoup their investments and withdraw. For example, the
California Public Employees' Retirement System's (Calpers) formed a joint
venture with Enron called, Joint Energy Development Investments, LP
(JEDI).97 Calpers and Enron formed the joint venture to make energy-related
investments. 98 Both the partners are believed to have put in $250 million
each into JEDI.99
In 1997 when Calpers wanted out of JEDI, Enron could not simply buy
back Calpers' share because it would have been required to reflect a debt
load of $1.6 billion on its balance sheets because of its resulting 100 percent
ownership of JEDI that would have occurred and triggered the application of
the FASB consolidation rule. Further, it was critical to Enron's survival that
any outside company involved in a joint venture not become dissatisfied
with its involvement or investment because Enron would be unable to recruit
new outside partners to assume the stake necessary to keep the transactions
of the SPEs off the Enron books.
To avoid such a disclosure in the Calpers situation, Kopper and Fastow
formed Chewco (believed to be named after Chewbacca of "Star Wars"
fame)' 00 to purchase Calpers' share. In March 2001, a senior officer who re-
ported to Mr. Fastow, Michael Kopper, facilitated a $35 million deal be-
tween Enron and Chewco Investments, LP.'0 ' Mr. Kopper was also listed as
a principal in LJM2 and described "manag[ing] the general partner of
Chewco, an investment fund with approximately $400 million in capital
commitments that was established in 1997 to purchase from Enron an inter-
est in a defined pool of Enron assets.' 1 2 No one has been able to determine
how Enron paid the $35 million to Chewco and exactly how much Chewco
or Mr. Kopper benefited from the transaction in which Calpers sold its share
to Chewco for $375 million.0 3 The government has at least submitted a
chart establishing its theories on amounts and furthermore, Mr. Kopper's
97. Enron Slashes Profits, supra note 35. These and other transactions were part of a se-
ries of Star Wars-named covert partnership operations. Those in Fastow's area were proud of
their ability to keep the balance sheet healthy and the earnings rising. Whenever a successful
new SPE was launched or a transaction closed, those responsible would receive "plaques with
chrome replicas of Star Wars light sabers." Peeling Back the Layers, supra note 70. Others
received plaques with R2D2 replicas. Id.
98. John R. Emshwiller, Enron Transaction Raises New Questions, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5,
2001, at A3.
99. Id. Mr. Kopper reported to Mr. Fastow. It is believed he was chosen because no SEC
disclosures would be required regarding his role or compensation, because he was not a "16-
b" officer. See PSI REPORT supra note 58, at 34. This is the level at which stock transactions
and other reporting requirements arise under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15
U.S.C.A. § 78p (2001); PSI REPORT supra note 58, at 12 n.16.
100. Enron Transaction Raises New Questions, supra note 98.
101. Id.
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guilty plea adds a truckload of evidence to the case against Enron and cer-
tainly Fastow.1
0 4
The relationships were actually far more complex with resulting liability
exposure for Enron. Enron was advancing the funds for the outside party to
invest in the SPEs or the money being used to finance transactions with the
SPEs were borrowed from syndicates of lenders who accepted Enron stock
as security for the loan.0 5 Additionally, Enron often served as the guarantor
for loans to the SPEs and there was no disclosure in Enron's financial state-
ments about its potential exposure as a guarantor, one of the factors that did
cause some discussion between company executives and Andersen audi-
tors. °6 All of these transactions depended on Enron being able to maintain
its share price, a price that was tied directly to the volatility of prices in the
energy market.0 7
These relationships also revealed a loophole in the FASB rules on SPEs
that permitted nearly one hundred percent exposure by the company in an
SPE without the need for disclosure. For example, in the Calpers relation-
ship, Enron and Calpers formed a joint entity, an LLP, known as New
Power.0 8 Calpers would front three percent of the capital necessary for the
creation of New Power in order to give it operating funds.' 0 9 The reason
104. Editor's Ruling: Andersen Win Lifts U.S. Enron Case, supra note 9; see also Kurt
Eichenwald, Enron's Many Strands: The Overview; Ex-Enron Official Admits Payments to
Finance Chief, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 22, 2002, at Al. No one has been able to determine what the
heck was going on here generally, let alone how Chewbacca got $35 million from an underly-
ing finance guy. However, and this is not humor, the Enron executives who closed the
Chewco deal did get a life-size Chewbacca head to commemorate their success. Following the
Trail: As Enron Inquiry Intensifies, Midlevel Players Face Spotlight, supra note 71.
The author increasingly gets the feeling that Enron was ANIMAL HOUSE (Universal Studios
1978) with hedge funds and STAR WARS toys instead of beer and togas. However, Mr. Kop-
per's guilty plea is one that guarantees that he sings like a canary in exchange for leniency in
his sentencing. And Mr. Kopper is in a position to hold a great deal of information. What we
did know is that he was chosen for this particular deal because he was not at a level in the
company that required that his role with the SPE be disclosed in the SEC reporting docu-
ments. Kopper has already indicated that some of the money in these transactions went to Mr.
Fastow. Eichenwald, supra. And, implicitly from the plea terms, some of the money must
have come to him because he agreed to pay back $12 million. See id. Kopper says he and a
Mr. Dodson split $7 million from the Chewco arrangement and that Mr. Fastow's family got
at least $121,000. Id. He also maintains that he and Fastow each got $4.5 million from the
Southampton deal, with some of Fastow's distribution going to his wife and children, as theo-
rized. Id.
105. See As Inquiry Intensifies, Midlevel Players Face Spotlight, supra note 71.
106. See John R. Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Joint Venture: A 1997 Enron Meeting
Belies Officers' Claims They Were in the Dark, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2002, at Al. There were
numerous discussions about whether there was "sufficient equity at risk" in the Raptors to
permit the continuation of carrying the SPEs off the books. As Inquiry Intensifies, Midlevel
Players Face Spotlight, supra note 71.
107. See Enron Meeting Belies Officers' Claims They Were in the Dark, supra note 106.
108. See Diana B. Henriques, Enron's Many Strands: A Big Investor; Even a Watchdog
is not Always Fully Awake, N.Y. TImEs, Feb. 5, 2002, at Cl.
109. See Matt Krantz, Trouble Grew in Enron's Interlinking Partnerships, USA TODAY,
Jan. 22, 2002, at B2.
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Calpers, and others in similar joint ventures with Enron, would front only 3
percent is because under FASB Rule 125, it was the minimum requirement
for protection of the non-consolidation rule." ° In other words, an outside
party, other than lenders and particularly those who investment was guaran-
teed by the company had to own at least three percent of the SPE that their
joint venture created."' However, in some cases, Enron advanced the funds
to the outsider for the three percent investment. 12
A consortium of lenders who were given a guarantee on the loan by En-
ron was the remaining ninety-seven percent of the investment in New
Power."3 The guarantee was only of value to the extent that Enron was able
to maintain the market price of its shares." 4 Enron then used the minimal in-
110. See Dharan testimony, supra note 39, at 6.
111. See id.
112. See As Inquiry Intensifies, Midlevel Players Face Spotlight, supra note 71.
113. See Short Circuit: How Enron's Plan to Market Electricity Nationwide Fizzled, su-
pra note 86. However, Enron continued to assure analysts and investors that the loans were
non-recourse loans. Mr. Fastow did so as late as October 23, 2001, although he was fired the
next day. John R. Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Corporate Veil: Behind Enron's Fall, A Cul-
ture of Operating Outside Public's View, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2001, at Al.
114. Interestingly, litigation against the lenders focuses on their involvement in Enron
loans and the timing of their analysts' recommendations on Enron stock. For example, the
following scenario, as described in the Wall Street Journal, is included as part of the founda-
tion for a class action suit against lenders:
However, by June 2001, the lawsuit says, at least some bank executives knew of
Enron's tenuous financial situation. The lawsuit claims that CSFB managing direc-
tors were meeting with Enron executives to discuss the structure of one of Enron's
partnerships.
One CSFB manager "commented to an Enron manager, 'how can you guys keep
doing this?' referring to Enron's repeated statements to the market that its stock
was undervalued," the lawsuit states.
The CSFB manager told the Enron executives that the stock was "overvalued" at
$40; it was trading at $48.50 at the time. According to the lawsuit, the CSFB man-
ager warned the Enron executive that if the stock fell to $20 a share, "things are
going to come falling down and you guys are gonna be fed."
Despite those comments in June by one CSFB manager, a CSFB analyst came out
with a "strong buy" rating on Enron's stock on Aug. 14 with a price target of $84 a
share. There is no evidence in the lawsuit that CSFB's bankers and research ana-
lysts ever colluded or had conversations about Enron's finances, but Mr. Lerach
claims that the CSFB manager had the obligation to tell the analyst about Enron's
potential problems.
"The 13' floor had the responsibility to tell the 10"' floor that it's a fraud," Mr.
Lerach said.
Kathryn Kranhold & Jonathan Weil, Enron Holders' Suit Adds New Defendants, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 8, 2002, at A3 (quoting class-action lawsuit filed Oct. 2002). See infra notes 274-290
and accompanying discussion for issues related to the role of banks, analysts, and conflicts in
the Enron collapse.
In addition, there are some questions about how the banks such as J.P. Morgan Chase, Citi-
Group and Credit Suisse First Boston provided their loans to Enron. For example, J.P. Mor-
gan Chase made its loans to Enron through a shell company called Mahonia, a subject of liti-
gation. See Jonathan Sapsford & Anita Raghavan, Trading Charges: Lawsuit Spotlights J.P.
Morgan's Ties to the Enron Debacle, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2002, at Al. And Citigroup lent
[Vol. 39
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vestment SPEs to transfer Enron assets in exchange for cash; something that
Enron needed more and more as its share of the energy market dwindled. In
the case of Calpers, Enron created New Power, a spin off of Enron and a ve-
hicle for raising capital." 5 New Power would hold the power plant and the
problems associated with the plant while Enron would be paid the funds to
aid in the financial problems Enron was facing." 16
Knowing that it had the exposure of the loan guarantee in New Power
and other similar transactions with third parties, Mr. Fastow then developed
a process, repeated many times throughout the web, whereby it would take
warrants from New Power and sell them to yet another SPE in exchange for
cash. Not only was this secondary layer of SPEs used as means of hedging, it
was also yet another source of cash flow. 1 17 For example, in the case of New
Power, Enron created Raptor III, part of the umbrella of Hawaii 125-0, that
was utilized in order to create, without disclosure on Enron's financial
statements, this complex extra-structure that provided the cash flow and fi-
nancial faqade necessary for Enron to continue." 8
Raptor III would be financed by, again, a consortium of lenders."19 Rap-
tor III had a consortium of sixteen banks providing its financing, including a
group of Canadian banks. 12 While Enron guaranteed the Raptor III LLP, it
$2.4 billion via prepaid swaps. Daniel Altman, Enron's Many Strands: Finances; Enron Had
More Than One Way To Disguise Rapid Rise in Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, at Al. With
a prepaid swap, two parties shift their future ROIs. Id. One party pays a small amount for a
fixed return in exchange for uncertain gains another party is willing to forgo, id., and we can
assume has probably hedged anyway. Finally, Credit Suisse Boston's arrangement with Enron
was a loan tied to the price of oil. Id. The bank called it a loan while Enron called it an asset
of risk management. Id.
Congress has not been kind to the bankers in the Enron matter. An internal e-mail Congress
uncovered in J.P. Morgan Chase documents from a bank executive, George Serice, responsi-
ble for the Enron account, read, "Enron loves these deals because they are able to hide funded
debt from their equity analysts because they at the very least book it as deferred revenue or,
better yet, bury it in their trading liabilities." Lydia Adetunji & Peter Spiegel, Banks "Actively
Helped" Enron to Disguise Debt, FIN. TiMEs, July 22, 2002. The e-mail is dated November
1998. Id. The bank referred to "pre-pays" in its e-mails which apparently were complex fi-
nancial transactions with Enron (were there any other kind?) that purported to be commodities
trades but were really loans. See id. One e-mail from a Chase employee to George Serice, the
executive who wrote the "Enron loves these deals" e-mail, read, "$5 billion in prepays!!!!!!"
Serice responded, "Shutup and delete this e-mail." Paul Beckett et al., How Energy-Trading
Boom Went Bust, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Dec. 31, 2002 at A2.
115. See A Big Investor; Even a Watchdog Is not Always Fully Awake, supra note 108.
116. Senior Enron employees told a Board committee meeting in March 2001 that Mr.
Skilling was "intensely interested" in the Raptor credit problems and that solving those prob-
lems was "one of the company's highest priorities." Enron Buffed Image to a Shine Even as it
Rotted From Within, supra note 83.
117. See David Barboza, Enron Examiner Raises More Questions, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 22,
2002, at 38.
118. See id.
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did not guarantee the actual loan, Enron was not required to disclose its rela-
tionship to Raptor III in its financial statement, so it was 100 percent fi-
nanced by lenders. Hence, the three percent rule did not apply. Accordingly,




Enron benefited in other ways from this layered transaction. Fastow
served as the principal for Raptor III and when the bank consortium loaned it
$500 million, Fastow was entitled to a commission because of his success in
arranging for the funding. 12 2 New Power pledged warrants for Enron stock to
the bank consortium as security for the loan to Raptor 111.123 New Power
would then sell the warrants to Raptor III and Raptor III would turn over the
cash to New Power, which also netted officers running that SPE a commis-
sion and New Power was awash in cash that it could use to purchase more
Enron assets, which Enron would sell to maintain cash flow. 124
Realizing its exposure on this guarantee of the Raptor III LLP, Enron
then purchased total return swaps as a way of hedging and affording itself
protection in the event of changes in the stock price. 125 The following three
diagrams depict the relationships between and among Enron, Calpers, New






126. Id. There was an additional layer to the New Power/Raptor III transactions in which
Fastow created an LLP known as Porcupine, which was a hedging vehicle for New Power. Id.
For example, if New Power was to go public with an IPO, Fastow would be protected against
any share price drop in New Power with warrants sold to Porcupine. See id. Fastow protected
Enron no matter what happened to the transactions with the SPEs. However, that protection
was only as good as Enron's share price, something he was trying to buoy with the transac-
tions he was entering into with the SPEs even as he hedged the SPEs.
[Vol. 39
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As complex as these transactions were, there were still other accounting
mirages that contributed to Enron's collapse. One such venture illustrates a
combination of FASB 125 with mark-to-market accounting and was known
as the "Braveheart" transaction.1 7 In this scenario, Enron signed a contract
with Blockbuster Video to provide videos for delivery over Enron's broad-
band. 12 With only a few customers in place for the video contracts, 29 Enron
sought to find a means to obtain the cash/profits in advance of sales it ex-
pected later of this new product. The Braveheart/Blockbuster partnership fol-
lowed the classic Enron formula: a little bit of cash from outsiders for the
three percent rule and Enron stock. An investment bank fronted $115 million
to Braveheart, 130 thus Enron scored cash and was able to record as earnings
all those funds advanced because the willingness of a lender to invest that
much was a valid measure of the value of future contracts for Enron on Bra-
veheart deals. 13'
There were other partnerships in which more Enron employees became
involved. For example, in the Southampton Place Partnership, Enron lawyer
Kristina Mordaunt and corporate treasurer Ben Gilsan, invested $5,800 in
the Fastow partnership and just months later they had a little over $1 million
wired to each of their checking accounts.' 32
In sum, Enron had created a Byzantine empire of financial layers that
were impenetrable by investors until the company's collapse when all docu-
ments were made public. The documents dribbled out over a period of
months as Enron finally came to grips with the fact that it could not pay the
debts it had created via the SPEs. While Enron tried mightily to find a cash
127. Floyd Norris & Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Many Strands: The Accounting: Fuzzy
Rules of Accounting and Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at Cl. The movie theme continues
although no one has been able to discern why the name "Braveheart" was chosen for this
transaction.
128. Id.; see also Rebecca Smith, Show Business: A Blockbuster Deal Shows How Enron
Overplayed Its Hand, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2002, at Al.
129. See The Accounting: Fuzzy Rules of Accounting and Enron, supra note 127; Show
Business: A Blockbuster Deal Shows How Enron Overplayed Its Hand, supra note 128. Docu-
ments indicate only a few apartment complexes had signed up, on a test basis, for the videos
via broadband. One Enron employee said when the revenues were booked, "'1 was just
floored .... I mean, I couldn't believe it .... How can they monetize this asset when we're
still putting it together? It didn't make any sense to me."' Id. (quoting former Enron em-
ployee).
130. The Accounting: Fuzzy Rules of Accounting and Enron, supra note 127.
131. For those of you still attempting to keep score, Enron parleyed a couple of contracts
with apartment complexes into $110.9 million and did so all within accounting rules. See
Show Business: A Blockbuster Deal Shows How Enron Overplayed Its Hand, supra note 128.
Further, the Wall Street Journal reported that the lender for Braveheart's $115 million had a
guarantee from Enron. Norris The Accounting: Fuzzy Rules of Accounting and Enron, supra
note 125. Paul Brown, chair of the Accounting Department at NYU adds, "[t]hey were ex-
tremely clever." Id. One more thought to contemplate: Enron paid income taxes in only one
year from 1996-2000. David Cay Johnston, Enron's Collapse: The Havens; Enron Avoided
Income Taxes in 4 of 5 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at AI. It received a refund of $105
million in 1999 and $278 million in 2000. Id.
132. As Inquiry Intensifies, Midlevel Players Face Spotlight, supra note 71.
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infusion or buyer, any potential savior in just the beginnings of due diligence
bolted because of the revelations minimal due diligence unveiled. 133 By No-
vember 2001, Enron had been downgraded to "junk" grade.'34 Enron's CEO,
Kenneth Lay, left the company shortly after the collapse. Mr. Lay waived
any rights to his parachute payoff, reportedly worth $60 million, 3' and also
agreed to repay millions he borrowed from the company.
136
A number of Wall Street analysts complained from 1995 through 2001,
that Enron's financial statements were difficult to read and that its disclo-
sures on officer relationships were not clear.'37 Another said that Enron
managed to operate as a "giant hedge fund" without disclosing that risk in its
SEC documents. 138
The fallout from Enron's collapse has been pervasive by December 2,
2001. Enron fired 5,100 of its 7,500 employees. 139 Each employee will re-
ceive a $4,500 severance package, if the bankruptcy court approves it."40
However, the employees are more concerned about their financial futures.
Many held Enron stock and were compensated with Enron stock options.
The stock, which was valued at nearly $85 per share in the prior year, was
trading at $0.40 per share on December 3, 2001."' Enron employees' 401(k)
plans, funded with Enron stock, lost $1.2 billion as of December 3, 2001.142
"Almost everyone is gone.... Upper management is not talking. No manag-
ing directors are around, and police are on every floor. It's so unreal," said
one departing employee. 143 Another employee, Gary Kemper, a maintenance
foreman, who is part of a suit filed against Enron related to the employees'
401(k) plans, plan was once worth $225,000 and is now worth less than
133. See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Riva D. Atlas, Hobbled Enron Tries to Stay on Its Feet,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at Cl.
134. Id.
135. Visionary's Dream Led to Risky Business, supra note 35.
136. See PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 53. Mr. Skilling left the company in the summer
of 2001, just six months after becoming CEO, a departure that some find Machiavellian. See
Darth Vader. Machiavelli, Skilling Set Intense Pace, supra note 16. Others attribute it to his
true understanding of what was happening and others label his departure a bail-out. Mr. Skill-
ing was the only one of the Fastow and Lay triumvirate who did not take the Fifth Amend-
ment when subpoenaed by Congress. Stephen Labaton & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Testimony
From Enron Executives is Contradictory, N.Y. ThmES, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al. Mr. Skilling testi-
fied defiantly that he knew nothing. Id. Michael J. Kopper refused to testify. Id. Jordan Mintz,
a former Enron lawyer who worried about the Fastow conflicts, did testify. Id.
137. What Enron's Financial Reports Did and Didn't Reveal, supra note 40.
138. Id.
139. Hobbled Enron Tries to Stay on Its Feet, supra note 133.
140. Id.
141. As Investors Worry About Mideast and Enron, Shares Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2001, at CI 1.
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$10,000, said, "[h]ow am I going to retire now? Everything I've worked for
the past 25 years has been wiped out.""'
Enron had a matching plan for its employees on the 401(k). However,
sixty percent of their plan was invested in Enron stock. Between October 17
and November 19, 2001, when the issues surrounding Enron's accounting
practices and related transactions began to surface, the company put a lock
down on the plan so that employees could not sell their shares. 45
In addition to the impact on Enron, its employees, and Houston, there is
a worldwide ripple effect. Enron has large stakes in natural gas pipelines in
the United States and around the world and interests in power plants every-
where from Latin America to Venezuela. It is also a partial owner of utilities
including telecommunications networks.
Representative Billy Tauzin of Louisiana, heads the House investigation
into Enron noted through his spokesman, Ken Johnson, "[h]ow a company
can sink so far, so fast, is very troubling .... We need to find out if the com-
pany's accounting practices masked severe underlying financial prob-
lems."' 46 Senator Jeff Bingham, chairman of the Senate Energy Committee
said, "I believe that our committee is keenly aware of the need for enhanced
oversight and market monitoring."' 47
Enron's bankruptcy filing included a list of creditors fifty-four pages
long. While the bankruptcy filing showed $24.76 billion in assets and $13.15
billion in debt, these figures do not include those off-the-balance-sheet obli-
gations, estimated to be about $27 billion.'48 Among the creditors exposed in
the Enron bankruptcy, because of derivative transactions on energy contracts
are JP Morgan Chase and Chubb.
Enron's energy customers, including PepsiCo, the California State Uni-
versity system, JC Penney, Owens-Illinois, and Starwood Hotels & Resorts,
now scramble to replace energy commitments. Enron had contracts with
28,500 customers. These customers are now revisiting their contracts for
loopholes on both sides and ensuring that they have contingency plans in
place. 49 California's State Universities were in negotiations for renewal of
their 1998 contract with Enron, but those talks are now in a stalemate.' 50
Trammell Crow halted the groundbreaking ceremony for its planned con-
144. Christine Dugas, Enron Workers Sue Over Retirement Plan, USA TODAY, Nov. 27,
2001, at 3B.
145. Id.
146. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ripples Spreading from Enron's Ex-
pected Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at C1.
147. Nancy Dunne et a]., Financial Threat from Enron Failure Continues to Widen, FIN.
TIMES. (London), Dec. 1, 2001, at 1.
148. Rebecca Smith, Enron Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, Sues Dynegy, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 3, 2001, at A3.
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struction of new Enron headquarters; a building that would have been thirty-
four stories high and included offices, apartments and stores.'
5
'
The ripple effect even stretches into unrelated investments. Five major
Japanese money market funds with heavy Enron investments fell below their
face value by December 3, 2001.152 These losses will have an impact primar-
ily on retirees because the five funds were seen as "safe haven" funds for in-
vestors. The banks that financed Enron SPEs are in litigation to recoup funds
with the recovered funds also going to partners they had in their funding en-
tities. 153
Enron's collapse also appears to be raising concerns among state regula-
tors about deregulation in the utility industry. Several members of Congress
have noted that lawmakers and regulators cannot leave energy products in
the regulatory shadows if the companies involved in the industry are harm-
ing both consumers and investors.' 54 In addition, there are investigations at
several levels into Enron's energy trading practices.' 55
III. WHAT HAD TO COME TOGETHER FOR ALL OF THAT TO HAPPEN
For an Enron to occur there had to be a confluence of events and weak-
nesses."' The discussion of the factors that were required to come together
for an Enron to occur provides the keys for the prevention of another such
mighty collapse. This segment of the paper offers a discussion of those fac-
tors.
A. A Weak Board
It is important to note, particularly in light of calls for reform in corpo-
rate governance, that Enron's Board was a model judging by the standards of
those who urge strong corporate governance.'57 A business school dean, sev-
151. Allen R. Myerson, With Enron's Fall, Many Dominoes Tremble, N.Y. TIMES
(Magazine), Dec. 2, 2001, § 3, at 1.
152. Ken Belson, Enron Causes 5 Major Japanese Money Market Funds to Plunge, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at C9.
153. Mary Kelleher, J.P. Morgan Sues Enron Over $2.1 Billion, YAHOO NEWS, Dec. 11,
2001, at www.dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20011211/.
154. Joseph Kahn & Jeff Gerth, Collapse May Reshape the Battlefield of Deregulation,
N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at Cl.
155. Edward Iwata, Probe of California Power Crisis Grows, USA TODAY, July 17,
2002, at lB. Those involved in the investigation are the SEC, the Justice Department, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the
California Attorney General and several other state regulators there. Id.
156. In fact, judging from the diagrams, a confluence of arrows and boxes was also re-
quired.
157. William Powers, an Enron Board member, was assigned the task of evaluating the
performance of the Enron Board and issued, in February 2002, the so-called Powers Report,
that constituted a scathing indictment of the company's management as well as the lack of
oversight from the Board. Mr. Powers is the dean of the University of Texas School of Law
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eral CEOs from other companies, an economist, a woman (for diversity), and
limited insiders is a characterization of Enron's Board's composition. How-
ever, a closer look at the individuals illustrates not just the flaws in Enron's
Board, but the flaws in the assumptions made as governance authorities cre-
ated the ideal Board profile. Kenneth Lay handpicked Enron's Board and it
was not a Board trained in the ways of FASB 125.158 The Board members
were selected for the appearance of depth and possible connections that they
brought for Enron.'59 For example, Wendy Gramm, an economist and wife
of Senator Phil Gramm was there for political connections.160 Other mem-
bers of the Board included Dr. John Mendelsohn who not only served on the
Enron Board, but also on its audit committee.16 The other Board members
and their titles are listed below.
Kenneth L. Lay, Chair and CEO, Enron
Robert A. Belfer, CEO, Belfer Management
Norman P. Blake, Jr., Chair, President and CEO, Comdisco
Ronnie C. Chan, Chair, Hang Lung Group
John H. Duncan, Former Chair Exec. Committee, Gulf & Western
Ind.
Robert K. Jaedicke, Professor of Accounting, Stanford University
Charles A. LeMaistre, Emeritus, University of Texas MD Anderson
Cancer Ctr.
Paulo V. Ferraz Periera, Exec. Vice President, Group Bozano
William C. Powers, Jr., Dean, University of Texas, School of Law
and called the number of partnerships Enron entered into as "dizzying." David Hechler, Re-
port Critidizes V &E's Enron Work, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 11, 2002, at Al.
158. It does give one pause that an entire Board of directors found nothing odd about
partnerships named after STAR WARS, JURASSIC PARK and FASB rules. The Enron SPEs were
evidence of the frat boys running the hedge fund and the irony escaped the Board.
159. Mr. Lay was bright enough to follow corporate governance standards, but also
savvy enough to understand that Enron needed a certain deregulation strategy to survive.
160. Interestingly, Dr. Gramm owned no stock because she and Senator Gramm decided
in 1998 not to own stock as a means of avoiding conflicts of interest. She was paid some of
her Enron Board fees in stock, but it was placed in a deferral account. Reed Abelson, Enron
Board Comes Under a Storm of Criticism, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), Dec. 16, 2001, § 3, at 4.
161. Joann S. Lublin, Inside, Outside Enron, Audit Panel is Scrutinized, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 1, 2002, at CI. Mr. Mendelsohn is a leading cancer researcher and president of the Uni-
versity of Texas M.D. Andersen Cancer Center in Houston. Interestingly, Dr. Mendelsohn
also served on the Board of ImClone Systems, the company whose anti-cancer drug was not
given FDA approval, whose former CEO had been indicted and which is the subject of the
Martha Stewart insider trading investigation in which she is alleged to have sold $224,000 of
lmClone stock the day before the public announcement of the FDA rejection. Daniel Kadlec,
Sam's Club; ImClone's Waksal Is Accused of Trying to Dump Company Stock Ahead of Bad
News; Jerry Markon, Martha Stewart Sale of Stock Under Inquiry, WALL ST. J., June 14,
2002, at Cl; He Couldn't, but His Friend Martha Stewart Unloaded Hers. Did She Do a Bad
Thing? TIN4E, June 24, 2002, at 48. Jerry Markon, Martha Stewart Sale of Stock Under In-
quiry, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2002, at Cl; Andrew Pollack & David Cay Johnston, Former
Chief of lmClone Systems Is Charged with Insider Trading, N.Y. TiIES, June 13, 2002, at B1.
It is perhaps safe to conclude that Dr. Mendelsohn either lacks business savvy or is a horrible
judge of character and/or savvy in others. Id.
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Frank Savage, CEO, Savage Holdings
Raymond Troubh, Financial Consultant
John Wakeham, Chair, Press Complaints Commission
Herbert S. Winokur, Jr., Chair, CEO, Capricorn Holdings'
62
While Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, prior to his August 2001 departure,
were the only insiders on the Board, there were problems with conflicts of
interest. The first inherent conflict of interest was that Enron's directors were
the seventh highest paid directors among public companies in the U.S., with
a total compensation package of $380,619.163 The reality is that it is tough
for directors to be defiant or walk away from such an amount of money. The
other inherent conflict was that the directors were selling off their stock even
as they continued to serve and collect it as compensation. 1
64
Other conflicts existed in terms of the nature of Houston's business and
political community. The following chart shows various familial, political,
and financial connections of various Board members and others with Enron
ties. Lawyers and accountants are also included in this chart.
165
B. The Interconnection of Conflicts in Enron and Houston16 6
NAME CONNECTION ACTIVITY
Kenneth L. Lay CEO, Chairman of Board $100,000 to Bush 2000






Joseph C. Dilg Attorney with Vinson & Significant Enron stock
Elkins. Enron was his holdings; paid by Enron
162. ENRON 10-K (2000) available at www.sec.gov/Archieves/edgar.
163. Enron Board Comes Under a Storm of Criticism, supra note 160. Of course, since
85% of the compensation was in Enron stock, that "7th highest paid" comes into doubt. The
top six are Oracle, Cisco Systems, United Health Group, Sun Microsystems, Dell Computer
and GE. Id.
164. Dean Jaedicke, who sat on the audit committee, sold about $841,000 in Enron
shares, $500,000 of it in 2001. Id. Norman P. Blake, Jr. sold $1.7 million of his Enron shares
in 2000. Id. Charles A. LeMaistre, who had Dr. Mendelsohn's job and Enron Board seat prior
to his retirement, sold $842,000 in 1999 and in 2001. Id.
165. The issues surrounding the accountants and lawyers are covered infra at notes 219,
246-273 and 439.
166. Don Van Natta, Jr. et al., Enron's Collapse: Backdrop; in Houston, The Lines Di-
viding Politics, Business and Society are Especially Blurry, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), Jan. 20,
2002, § 1, at 25. The issues with the auditors and lawyers are covered infra at notes 246-273
and 439 and accompanying text.
167. But, in fairness to Dr. Gramm, she and her husband were very critical of legislation
and rules Enron put forward. Jeff Gerth & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., The Power Couple; Senate
Bill Showed Complexities of Power Couple's Ties to Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at CI.
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firm's biggest client ($30
million in revenue for
2001)
Joe B. Allen Attorney with Vinson & $100,000 to Bush cam-
Elkins (see above) paign; paid by Enron;
Also, Enron lobbyists ad- significant Enron stock
vised Board holdings
Thomas P. Marinis, Attorney with Vinson & Boyhood friend of
Jr. Elkins (see above), Ad- George W. Bush;
vised Board $100,000 to Bush cam-
paign' significant En-
ron holdings; paid by
Enron
Ray Hutchison Attorney with Vinson & Married to Senator Key
Elkins; advised Board Bailey Hutchison;
$100,000 to Bush cam-
paign; significant En-
ron stock holdings; paid
by Enron
Lawrence B. Lindsey Economic advisor to Formerly on Enron
George W. Bush payroll
Karil Rove Chief strategist for Significant Enron hold-
George W. Bush ings
Thomas E. White Secretary of the Army Significant Enron hold-
ings; formerly on Enron
payroll
Robert B.Zoellick U.S. Trade Representa- Formerly on Enron
tive payroll
James A. Baker Handled Gore v. Bush Formerly on Enron
litigation PR in Florida in payroll
November 2000
D. Stephen Goddard, Managing partner of $100,000 contributor to
Jr. Houston office of Arthur George W. Bush
Andersen ($52 million in
fees for 2001)
There were additional individual conflicts among Board members that
would not require any form of SEC disclosure, but nonetheless created the
beholden nature of the Enron Board. Mr. Mendelsohn, again a member of
the audit committee, received a donation of $ 1,5 64 ,92 8 16B for his cancer cen-
ter from Enron and $240,250 from Ken Lay and his wife Linda since joining
the Enron Board in 1999.
168. Inside, Outside Enron, Audit Panel is Scrutinized, supra note 161.
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Herbert S. Winokur, Jr., one of Enron's original directors from its
founding in 1985, serves on the Board of Natco Company, a firm that did
business with Enron subsidiaries.169 Disclosure of directorships is not re-
quired for privately held companies.
Since Enron's collapse, other conflict issues arose. For example, Frank
Savage, a senior executive at Alliance Capital Management, was a Board
member and even when investors were beginning to sell Enron stock in
droves as questions arose. Alliance was in an aggressive buying stance with
Enron.170
Lord John Wakeham, a member of the audit committee, served as a
consultant for Enron's European unit for $72,000 per year since 1996.171
Wendy Gramm, also on the audit committee, is the director of the Mercatus
Center Regulatory Studies Program at George Mason University, to which
Enron donated $50,000.172
Two audit committee members raise issues of independence with their
conduct. Ronnie C. Chan missed over one-fourth of the Enron Board and
Committee meetings in 1996, 1997 and 2000. And, Dean Robert K. Jae-
dicke, professor emeritus at Stanford, had been chair of the audit committee
since 1985.173
One-half of the audit committee members were from outside the U.S., 17 4
a category of directors that raises two issues. The first issue is the problem of
attendance, as the previous discussion indicates. International members of
Boards of U.S. companies have lower attendance rates for both Board and
committee meetings. 175 The second issue is that there are significant differ-
ences in financial report transparency and audit standards in other coun-tries. 176
Like other aspects of Enron, while the Board appeared to fit the defini-
tion of "outsiders of interdependency," the Board was, in fact, a closely con-
nected community and company, the conflicts present and the more subtle
issues of quality governance made it more difficult to Board members to
raise the issues that were percolating for some time.'77 The failure of the
Board to catch obvious "red flags" is perhaps the best evidence of its com-
169. Enron Board Comes Under a Storm of Criticism, supra note 160. The total amount
of business for Natco was $1.5 million. Id.
170. Reed Abelson & Kenneth N. Gilpin, 2 Enron Roles Raise Questions of Allegiance,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at C1.
171. Inside, Outside Enron, Audit Panel is Scrutinized, supra note 161.
172. Id.
173. Id. Such a long tenure is unusual with most governance experts in agreement that
such a long tenure impedes independence.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. The only member of the audit committee not discussed was Paulo V. Ferraz
Pereira of Group Bozano in Brazil. See id. There were no apparent conflicts here, although
there was the international factor of attendance.
177. See supra chart at 136.
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plicity. At the Senate hearings conducted by the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations (PSI), Exhibit 1 was a chart entitled "Red Flags Known to
Enron's Board."' 78 Those red flags consisted of the following:
* At the February 1999 Audit Committee Meeting, Andersen part-
ner, David Duncan, told the Board members that Enron's ac-
counting practices tended to "push limits" and were "at the
edge" of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).179
* The Board was alerted to the issue of Fastow's involvement with
the SPEs because its approval was required, but it nonetheless
agreed to waive company policy in order to facilitate not just the
company doing business with an entity headed by one of its of-
ficers (the CFO), but that it was acceptable that the CFO earn
substantial fees and returns while serving in that capacity.
180
* In September 1999, the Board approved the removal of White-
wing, an Enron affiliate, from the company's consolidated fi-
nancial statements despite that fact that $1.4 billion in White-
wing debt was guaranteed by Enron stock and that Enron had
served as financier for Whitewing's asset purchases. 8 '
* Throughout the period of 1999-2001, the Board was informed
that gross revenues had more than doubled and that these funds
were generated by the LJM SPE operated by Fastow, but the cu-
rious rise in revenues involving an off-the-books relationship
with an entity run by its CEO did not give the directors pause.' 82
The Senate Subcommittee investigating Enron's collapse found
no evidence of any director questioning these odds-defying
numbers and performances.' 83
178. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 12. See also Accountable: How a Bright Star at An-
dersen Fell Along with Enron, supra note 22 (explaining that even Mr. Duncan's pastor was
aware that Enron was pushing Mr. Duncan to go beyond his self-imposed accounting limits).
179. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 12.
180. Andrew Fastow's conflict of interest waivers were approved on June 28, 1999 and
again on October 12, 1999. Inside, Outside Enron, Audit Panel is Scrutinized, supra note 161.
The audit committee conducted the review and Chairperson, Robert Jaedicke approved the
motions. Id.
181. PSI REPORT, sup'a note 58, at 12 (explaining how these asset, debt, and guarantee
swaps worked).
182. Id.
183. Id. To paraphrase Brookings Institute Scholar Martin Mayer's take on astronomical
numbers that defy explanation (Lawrence Parks, What the President Should Know About our
Monetary System (1999), available at http://www.fame.org/HTM/ Presidentl6.htm) this
would be like your child coming home one day and saying, "Mom, I made $1 million dollars
at the lemonade stand today." Most parents would respond, "How on earth is that possible?"
and then begin a Ward and June Cleaver-like investigation into what exactly the child was
doing that day, beginning with a visit to the local video poker machines. However, Enron's
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* From October 1999 through October 2000, the Enron Board was
asked to approve all of the Raptor I, II, III, IV's4 and LJM2 and
LJM3, including two additional waivers of the conflicts of inter-
est rules for Fastow to serve as principal operating officers for
these SPEs.'85
Unlike the subcommittee's analysis of the "red flags" for the Board, it is
perhaps fair to halt the analysis there. The report includes additional "red
flags" for the Board, but, with due respect to the committee and its staff, it is
counting red flags that occurred after the horse had left the barn. 8 6 Perhaps
the Board could have spoken up earlier with the following events, but there
was little that could have been done at these junctures to save the company.
The company was too highly leveraged for recovery, even assuming the con-
tinuation of the irrational exuberance of the 1990's economy.
Bethany McLean's "Is Enron Overpriced?" article appears in the March
5, 2001 issue of Fortune magazine.187 The committee refers to the article as
"prominent" however, as noted earlier, despite the article's dead-on ques-
tions and assessments, it fell flat.'88 As will be noted in the discussion of re-
forms, Enron had become such a phenomenon that few dared question its
achievements. Ms. McLean was tilting at windmills and only she and some
short-sellers, who pocketed a handy twenty-four percent ROI on their bets
against Enron, believed in March 2001 that there was something fundamen-
tally wrong at Enron.' 89
In April 2001, the Enron Board was told that sixty-four percent of the
company's assets were "'troubled' or performing 'below expectations."""0
Prior to this report they were told that sixty-seven percent of the company's
184. Unlike Sylvester Stallone's ROCKY ( 2 0 ,h Century Fox) series, Enron never made it
to Raptor V, although it was certainly not due to any lack of financial imagination on Andrew
Fastow's part.
185. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 60.
186. The author once again mixes metaphors of flags and barn doors, but perhaps the
reader gets the point that any red flags after this point were irrelevant because Enron had al-
ready painted itself into a financial corner from which there was no salvation. This is particu-
larly evidenced by the general economic downturn followed by the post 9-11-01 fallout.
Painting into corners and salvation are two thoughts that generally do not run together, but
perhaps the reader understands what really is a critical point: once Enron went down the Rap-
tor and LJM paths, there was no turning back. Alas, a metaphor that matches.
187. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 12 n.15. See Is Enron Overpriced?, supra note 13.
188. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 12.
189. John Olson, vice president and director of research at the Houston-based Sanders
Morris Harris, publicly expressed his doubts about Enron. While every other firm and analyst
had a strong "Buy" for Enron, Olson stated that "no analyst worth his salt can seriously ana-
lyze Enron." Why John Olson Wasn't Bullish on Enron, (Feb, 2, 2002), at
http://www.knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/013002_ss3.html. Olson added that Enron was
"not very forthcoming" with information and he defied other analysts with recommendations
against Enron. John Schwartz, Man Who Doubted Enron Enjoys New Recognition, N.Y.
TtvEs, Jan. 21, 2002, at C8. For more discussion of the role of analysts, see infra notes 274-
289 and accompanying discussion.
190. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 12 (citation omitted).
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assets were "underperforming..''. The significance of the April 2001 meet-
ing is that an additional thirty-five percent of the "troubled" assets were
tossed into another ten percent of that total group to create a new subtotal of
forty-five percent of Enron's "troubled" assets. 192 For those of you still fol-
lowing along, and it is an irony that it is even difficult to understand the way
Enron computed its nonperforming and underperforming assets, forty-five
percent of the original sixty-seven percent were now totally worthless. That
figure translated to a $2.3 billion overstatement of assets on the company's
balance sheet. 93 Either March or April would have been a good time for the
Board to come clean even if it couldn't fix the problems. Indeed, by this
point there were too many Raptors for anyone to even send in Jeff Gold-
blum, Laura Dern or Sam Neill to the rescue.'94
The summer of 2001 saw things cooking with gas at Enron. The Board
was informed that Andrew Fastow transferred his interest in LJM, ending the
need for a review of financial transactions; they were not informed the trans-
fer was to former Enron employee, Michael Kopper. 9 5 The Board was also
informed of the JEDI- and CHEWCO partnerships.' 96 If the squirreling about
of company assets among employees for an international shell game involv-
ing SPEs with goofy names was not enough excitement for the Board in the
summer of '01, it soon found itself coping with the resignation of CEO Jef-
frey Skilling and the internal investigation of a whistle-blower memo sent
191. Id. at 12 n.16.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. The author here employs cinema similes again. JURASSIC PARK the original, not II or
III (Universal Studios 1993) had Jeff, Laura and Sam play the independent scientists (al-
though they were about as independent as Wall Street analysts because they came to Jurassic
Park as independent scientist whose work was going to be funded by Sir Richard Attenbor-
ough for the next ten years-Sir Richard, of course, played the creator and developer of Ju-
rassic Park) who are to certify Jurassic Park as safe for investors and insurers. Seeing as how
they were chased about the island by one too many raptors for them to handle, they decided
not to sign off on the safety and risk statements. They confront only three raptors in the final
dramatic scenes. You will recall the discussion supra lI.B.2., that Enron had four Raptors,
three LJMs, and a Fastow in the catbird seat on all of them.
195. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 34. Kopper resigned from Enron in June, 2001, be-
fore most of Enron's problems became generally known outside the company. Former Enron
Executive Pleads Guilty, at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/kopper_08-21-02.html.
Kopper has proved to be the weak link in the stonewall. The author apologizes for the mixed
metaphor, but clearly Kopper failed to stand tall when the going got tough. Fifteen years is the
maximum sentence for his two charges. U.S. v. Kopper; Cr. No. H-02-0560(S.D. Tex. filed
Aug. 21, 2002)(Cooperation Agreement). See supra note 104 and infra notes 299-334 for
more discussion of this transfer and the surrounding culture at Enron.
196. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 13. While the recommendations for reform are some
pages and footnotes away, the author believes an important safety tip for Board members is
best placed here. Should anyone ask you, as a Board member, to approve transactions involv-
ing names such as Raptor, JEDI, Chewco or anything employing the numbers of accounting
rules, refuse and run like the dickens the other way for it is certain that a perfect storm is on
its way. The PSI missed the red flag of goofy names altogether when discussing what should
have put the Board on notice.
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anonymously, and later revealed to be the work of Sherron Watkins. The
Board was assured the concerns expressed in the memo were nothing and it
formally closed as an internal investigation in October 2001."7
In their testimony before the PSI and in subsequent interviews with staff
members conducting the Enron investigation, Board members'98 insisted that
both management and Enron's outside auditor, Andersen, were not forth-
coming with information about SPEs and the company's accounting prac-
tices.' 99 However, at the February 1999 Enron Board meeting held in Lon-
don as part of a multi-city international tour that the Board was taking to
understand Enron's extensive holdings and investments, the Audit Commit-
tee minutes reveal substantial discussion by David Duncan and other Ander-
sen representatives of the nature of Enron's accounting and business prac-
tices.2"' In fact, David Duncan provided the audit committee with a one-page
summary called, "Selected Observations 1998 Financial Reporting." '' The
format of the one-page summary was one in which Duncan highlighted the
key accounting issues including "[h]ighly [s]tructured [t]ransactions,"
"[c]ommodity and [e]quity [p]ortfolio," "][p]urchase [a]ccounting," and
"[b]alance [s]heet [i]ssues."2 2 These issues were then part of a matrix in
which Duncan evaluated three categories of risk for the audit committee.
The three categories of risk were: "[a]ccounting j]udgments," "[d]isclosure
j]udgements [sic]," and "[r]ule [c]hanges. 2 °3 Duncan assigned one of three
letters to each of the three categories: "H" for High risk, "M" for Medium
risk, and "L" for Low risk.04 Each of the issues had at least one "H", mean-
197. Id. at 12. While discussion of the ethical culture issues at Enron and recommenda-
tions for future reforms among companies is forthcoming, another brief safety tip for Board
members is in order. Should you receive a memo with this language, "Skilling's abrupt depar-
ture will raise suspicions of accounting improprieties and valuation issues .... The spotlight
will be on us, the market just can't accept that Skilling is leaving his dream job" know that all
is not OK in Dodge. Id. (quoting Letter from Sherron Watkins, Vice President for Corporate
Development, Enron, to Kenneth Lay, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Enron (Aug. 15,
2001)).
198. The present and past Board members who appeared before the PSI or were ques-
tioned include: Norman P. Blake, Jr., John H. Duncan, Herbert S. Winokur, Jr., Dr. Robert K.
Jaedicke, and Dr. Charles A. LeMaistre. Id. at 1-2.
199. Id. at 14. Mr. Winokur, who served as chair of the Enron Board Finance Committee
said, "We cannot, I submit, be criticized for failing to address or remedy problems that have
been concealed from us." Id.
200. Id. at 16 (citing Hearing Exhibit 2b, Enron Audit Committee Minutes (Feb. 7,
1999)).
201. Id. at 16. This summary sheet qualified as a red flag because in early 1999, the
Board still had the opportunity to follow up on issues, halt certain transactions and prevent the
further deterioration of the company's financial position. (This deteriorating financial position
resulted from Fastow's continuing domination of financial strategy, both within and outside
the company via the SPEs, courtesy of the conflict rules waived by the Board.) Id.
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ing it was high risk.205 Apparently the reconciliation of the subcommittee's
assertion that the Board knew and did nothing, with the Board's insistence
that it did not know, is that while the Board may have been told of the risk, it
was relying on management's and auditors' judgment in permitting such risk
to continue. 2
°6
If judged by simplistic standards for good corporate governance, Enron
met and exceeded those standards.20 7 Mr. Lay and Mr. Skilling were the only
205. Id.
206. The obvious debate is whether a Board so inclined to go along with high-risk opera-
tions is performing its role of independent overseer sufficiently and whether it has satisfied its
fiduciary duty without further investigation.
Further, the question arises, in the review of the minutes from the audit committee and Board
meetings, whether the picture presented was somewhat sanitized. For example, the PSI Report
raises the following from the minutes from the Enron Audit Committee in May 2000, "Mr.
Duncan discussed the financial reporting areas that [Andersen] had determined to be high pri-
orities due to inherent risks that were present. He stated that the ongoing high priority areas
included structured transactions, the merchant portfolio, commodity trading activities, project
development activities and intercompany and related party transactions." Id. at 18 (citing
Hearing Exhibit 7c, Enron Audit Committee Minutes 2 (May 1, 2000)).
In fairness to the Board, these discussions sounded like code and/or cover for the auditor.
There is nothing in the hearings or the PSI REPORT that finds Duncan standing and screaming,
"This is a gigantic fraud. These numbers are all air and we are all going down here if baro-
metric pressure changes." See supra note 49 (more information on the role of barometric pres-
sure in Enron's collapse).
207. For a review of guidelines on corporation governance, see Statement of the Business
Roundtable on Corporate Governance Principles Relating to the Enron Bankruptcy, (Feb. 11,
2002), at http://www.brtable.org/document.cfm/650 (last visited July 24, 2002). The Business
Roundtable has issued a number of public statements calling on corporate officers to change
their ways and regularly participated in the debates on Capitol Hill over Enron. Immediately
following the President's request for a return to ethics, John T. Dillon, the chairman of the
Business Roundtable issued this statement:
The Business Roundtable actively supports the proposals put forth by the Presi-
dent to improve the transparency of corporate financial statements, to deal harshly
with corporate wrongdoers, and to promote strong and independent governance
and oversight.
In May, The Business Roundtable called for a majority of a company's directors
to be truly independent, and the audit, compensation and governance committees
to be made up entirely of independent directors. We have supported CEO certifica-
tion of financial statements, and endorse the President's proposal for personal cer-
tification of true and transparent reporting in annual reports. And we have urged
that violators of the law must be prosecuted immediately and severely.
John T. Dillon, The Business Roundtable Statement Following The President's Call For A
"New Ethic of Responsibility," at http://www.brtable.org/press.cfm/734 (last visited July 9,
2002).
While its guidelines on corporate governance are extensive, the Business Roundtable issued
the following summary in a press release (the full guidelines are available at its Website):
"Independence: Boards of directors must exercise independent judgment and a substantial
majority of Board members must be independent of management, as advocated in our Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance. The three key committees of the Board-the audit, compensa-
tion and governance committees-must be made up entirely of independent directors." The
Business Roundtable Statement on Restoring Investor Trust, available at
http://www.brtable.org/press.cfm/728 (last visited July 8, 2002). The statement was also pub-
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insiders on the Board. Directors were independent on the surface; by a paper
examination of credentials they all appeared to be independent. And qualifi-
cations such as a former business school dean did not appear to be lacking. 0 8
However, as noted earlier, they had significant indirect conflicts that created
a beholden type of atmosphere among Board members. At least one member
of the audit committee, Dr. Mendelsohn, had limited familiarity with ac-
counting principles, along with the substantial conflict with receiving dona-
tions to his cancer center from the Enron Foundation, as well as from Ken
and Linda Lay. 209
It is perhaps impossible to know what the directors really understood
about Enron's situation. But, it is clear that the Board had given fairly wide
latitude and carte blanche supervisory controls to a financially sophisticated
team of managers. Those sophisticated business people on the Board, who
might have had the insight and ability to raise issues and questions about the
extensive SPEs and the accounting for such, were not always full partici-
pants in Board meetings and discussions because of travel issues.
The Board appeared to be well informed with regard to the rules that
applied to Enron's approach to accounting for those vulnerable areas noted
in the Duncan one-page memo.210 However, it was in the recognition of the
level of risk, where the auditors and directors may have had a breakdown in
communications, which may or may not have been attributable to manage-
ment. The Board accepted assurances from the auditor that it was within ac-
counting rules, albeit aggressive in its approach.21' It is possible that the en-
tire interconnected aspects of the Raptor and LJM SPEs may not have been
clear, even as Duncan provided the technical language and briefing. The
scope and magnitude of the off-the-books debt plus the extent of the quality
of Enron's assets may not have been brought together into one global view
until it was too late for Enron's salvation. 212 This acknowledgment of per-
lished in major newspapers around the country as a full-page ad on July 8, 2002. See, e.g.
WALL ST. J., July 8, 2002, at A5. For a summary of the judicial view on corporate govern-
ance, see Gearheart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, 741 F.2d 707,720 (5th Cir. 1984) (including the duty
of care as part of a director's fiduciary duty. The court defined due care as exercising dili-
gence and prudence in "managing the corporation's affairs"). For discussion of more recent
theories on management and director liability when there is deepening insolvency, see Offi-
cial Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc., 267 F.3d 340 (31 Cir. 2001).
208. ENRON ANNUAL REPORT 2000, at 54-55, at http://www.enron.comlcorp/ inves-
tors/annuals/2000/board.html.
209. David Lawrence, Enron Doctor, PEOPLE'S WEEKLY WORLD NEWSPAPER (Mar. 2,
2002), at http://www.pww.org/article/articleprint/712.
210. See supra note 201 and accompanying discussion.
211. Lord Wakeham is what is known as a "chartered accountant" in Great Britain, the
equivalent of a CPA, and the chair of an audit committee at another publicly held company.
He referred to Enron's structure as "relatively new" and "not done by many companies in the
world," but within the bounds of accepted accounting principles, something Lord Wakeham
says he obtained in the form of assurance from Arthur Andersen. PSI REPORT, supra note 58,
at 20 (discussing and quoting interviews conducted by the PSI staff).
212. As noted earlier, it was not until the spring of 2001 that the Board was informed of
the poor asset quality, something that followed within two months of the March 2001, Beth-
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haps some merit in the directors' claims is critical because meaningful re-
form mandates that those reforms be effective even in the face of a diabolical
management team.21 3
However, having noted that the directors' claims may have some merit,
however, it is critical to note an overarching problem in the directors' con-
duct as to why they did not have full information from the management team
about the nature of these transactions; it is in answering the "why" question
that the directors may be liable for the breach of their fiduciary duties. For
example, all the directors signed Enron's 10-K filings for 1999 and 2000.214
In both years, there were nearly 3,000 separate entities listed, including some
600 entities with the same PO Box address in the Cayman Islands.215
The continuing laxity in the approval of the waiver of the conflicts of in-
terest policy for Mr. Fastow, so that he could operate the SPEs, is a critical
issue in the ability of Enron management to continue its operations as a
highly leveraged and complex hedge fund. Under Enron's "Code of Ethics,"
the CEO could waive the company's conflict of interest rules, so that an em-
ployee could obtain personal financial gain from dealing with the company.
The Enron Code of Ethics has both a general and a specific policy on con-
flicts of interest. The general ethical principle provides as follows:
Employees of Enron Corp., its subsidiaries, and its affiliated companies
(collectively the "Company") are charged with conducting their business
affairs in accordance with the highest ethical standards. An employee shall
not conduct himself or herself in a manner which directly or indirectly
would be detrimental to the best interests of the Company or in a manner
which would bring to the employee financial gain separately derived as a
direct consequence of his or her employment with the company. 216
any McLean article, Is Enron Overpriced?. Again, the horse may have already been out of the
barn by the time the directors were able to put two and two together. The author recognizes
that we have come to expect more of directors than the simple task of adding two and two to-
gether. However, the sheer complexity of Enron's Byzantine finances (see supra Figures and
accompanying notes 65-126) may not have been presented with sufficient clarity or with a
global view. The Board deserves criticism for its cavalier waiver of the conflicts of interest
rules. However, the Board's defense that it neither knew nor could know of the events at the
company until it was too late for salvaging may have a kernel of truth. Now, whether the di-
rectors should have known is a question juries will grapple with in the numerous suits pend-
ing by shareholders, pension holders and just about everyone in the Houston area.
213. Enron's management team may have been sorely lacking in ethics and now appear
to be a taciturn crowd, but we are forced to acknowledge that they were positively brilliant in
their financial structuring and exploitation of loopholes in FASB and the law. Knaves and
rogues they may have been, but they did know their FASBs, SLOBS, SPEs, swaps, leverage
and, apparently, popular movies.
214. ENRON 1 O-Ks (1999,2000) available at www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar.
215. Id. In fairness to the directors, however, it is possible that they would have only
been given the body of the 10-K reports and not the extensive exhibits that companies must
attach to the 10-K.
216. ENRON, CODE OF ETHICS, EXECUTIVE AND MANAGEMENT 12 (July 2000). Author in
possession of this code (which, by the way, she was able to obtain unopened from e-Bay for a
none-of-your-business price; the author viewed it as a donation to the pitiful retirement plan
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The specific provisions that appear later in the code provide:
[T]he employer is entitled to expect of such person complete loyalty to the
best interests of the Company .... Therefore, it follows that no full-time
officer or employee should:
(c) Own an interest in or participate, directly or indirectly, in the profits of
another entity which does business with or is a competitor of the Com-
pany, unless such ownership or participation has been previously dis-
closed in writing to the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Offi-
cer of Enron Corp. and such officer has determined that such interest or
participation does not adversely affect the best interests of the Com-
pany. 2 
7
While the CEO could approve a waiver of the policy for everyone ex-
cept himself, the Board nonetheless, ran the waiver for Fastow at least three
times. 218 Despite this knowledge, that the Board members did not dispute, no
one on the Board hesitated in his or her approval for the waiver of the con-
flicts rule, as well as the increasing role of Andrew Fastow in SPEs. 219 Even
as it was approving the waiver of the conflict policies for Fastow, the Board
was not devoting a great deal of time to understanding the underlying trans-
action that found Fastow in need of a waiver of the conflicts policy. 22° At the
first meeting on the LJM1 partnership, the Board approved the conflicts
waiver, authorized a major stock split for Enron, voted to increase the num-
ber of shares for employees in the company's stock compensation program,
approved the purchase of a new corporate jet, authorized an investment in a
of the Enron employee who was quite industriously auctioning off codes of his failed com-
pany)(on file with California Western Law Review).
217. Id. at 57.
218. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 24. Technically, the Board Minutes provide that the
Board was asked to ratify the waiver that Mr. Lay had already granted to Mr. Fastow. Dr.
Jaedicke said that the ratification was not actually a waiver but an enforcement of the Code of
Ethics. This is because the Code permitted the waiver in the discretion of the CEO and the
effect of the Board's ratification was simply to state unequivocally that the conflicts policy
and the waiver policy were valid. Id. at 25 n.59. There are those who theorize that the Board
ratification was at the suggestion of Andersen and David Duncan. In a May 28, 1999 e-mail to
David Duncan, Benjamin Neuhausen, a member based out of Chicago of Andersen's Profes-
sional Standards Group, wrote, "[s]etting aside the accounting, idea of a venture entity man-
aged by CFO is terrible from a business point of view. Conflicts galore. Why would any di-
rector in his or her right mind ever approve such a scheme?" Id. at 25. David Duncan replied
on June 1, 1999, "[O]n your point 1 (i.e., the whole thing is a bad idea), I really couldn't agree
more. Rest assured that I have already communicated and it has been agreed to by Andy that
CEO, General [Counsel], and Board discussion and approval will be a requirement, on our
part, for acceptance of a venture similar to what we have been discussing." Id. at 25-26 (alter-
nations in original). Andersen appeared to be counting on the Board catching it and saving
them, but the Board either saw the request differently or did not see its significance or the po-
tential conflicts, three times into the ratification. Id. at 25 n.59. Yet another important safety
tip for directors emerges: if the CEO asks you to waive provisions in the Code of Ethics, you
perhaps, have a problem.
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Middle Eastern power plant, discussed a reorganization/restructuring at En-
ron that Mr. Lay had planned, and approved the LJM1 creation.221 The min-
utes of the meeting show that the meeting lasted one hour, that there was lit-
tle discussion or debate, and that the directors had received the information
on LJM only three days prior to the meeting.222 In terms of fiduciary respon-
sibility, the argument can be made, that the breach of duty is the Board's
failure to devote the time necessary for understanding and debating the LJM
plan.223 This was a timid Board pitted against aggressive accounting manag-
ers, a volatile combination.
There were moments, however, when the Board perhaps realized that
there were issues in and among Fastow, his initialed LLPs, and the Raptors.
By October 1999, when additional approvals for LJM2 and Fastow waivers
were requested, the proposals were first presented to the Finance Commit-
tee.224 Board members agree that the committee held a "vigorous discus-
sion.,, 22' No one on the Finance Committee or the Board asked to see or ever
read the private placement memoranda for the LJM series.226 In fact, one
Board member received information on the LJM2 series as a potential inves-
tor, but confessed that he tossed it before even reading it.227 In an indication
of how powerless Enron management perceived the Board, Mr. Fastow,
prior to the October Board meeting in which LJM2 was approved, had al-
ready completed negotiations with Merrill Lynch for the marketing of the
LJM2 partnerships.228
The LJM3 partnership was approved in October 2000 in a perfunctory
fashion. The approval was requested at the same time LJM issued its first
annual report, but the Board neither requested the report nor did manage-
ment offer it.229 In addition, the Board received assurances that that there
would be sufficient internal controls in place to manage the potential con-
221. Id. at 27 (citing ENRON BD. OFDIRs., MIN. (6/28/99)).
222. Id. at 27.
223. Some Board members indicated in interviews with staff members that their approval
of UM and the Fastow waiver was based on their understanding that they were approving a
one-time transaction, not a steady stream of asset movements and manipulations. Id. at 26
n.63. However, it is interesting to note that these approvals took place via conference call, in
an emergency meeting called just two days before the end of the reporting period for that
quarter (June 28, 1999). Id. at 26-27.
224. Id. at 28.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. The Board members also never reviewed the Annual Reports from UM that in-
cluded the compensation paid to Mr. Fastow and others in their roles as principals of those
companies. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. Many Board members expressed the view that they were relying on the opinions
of both Andersen and Enron's legal counsel, Vinson & Elkins, in permitting such a smooth
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flicts of interest. With each requested LJM approval, there were additional
controls. 231' By the time the Board faced LJM3, it had assurances that all En-
ron and LJM transactions would be approved by Causey, Mr. Skilling, and
that the Audit Committee would conduct an annual review of all of the
transactions involving, among, and, as we now know, between the firms.2 32
By the request for LJM3 in October 2000, the Board was getting testy
and imposed a requirement of quarterly reviews of LJM transactions and a
one-time look at Mr. Fastow's compensation, with the Finance Committee
conducting the transaction review and the Compensation Committee con-
ducting the Fastow review. 233 The Finance Committee reviews, as well as
the standing reviews by the Audit Committee proved to be cursory.234 Man-
agement furnished all the information; it consisted solely of a list of the En-
ron/LJM transactions and did not include supporting documentation. The
presentation and lasted from 15-30 minutes in terms of committee and Board
discussion time. 235 No director was struck, then or when interviewed by the
Congressional staff members, by the sheer magnitude of the LJM deals.236 In
the 1999 report on LJM transactions, the Board was told that LJM had gen-
erated $200 million in earnings in eight days and had an internal rate of re-
turn of eighteen percent.237
230. In the original LJM proposal, the Board was told that Richard Causey, the com-
pany's Chief Accounting Officer, would be required to approve all transactions between En-
ron and IJM. Id. at 29. However, we now know that Mr. Causey and Mr. Duncan were very
cozy. See supra note 23.
231. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 30.
232. Id. at 29-30. In the special report commissioned by the Enron Board (again, after the
horse was out of the barn), there was a finding that there was a failure of the proposed internal
controls in that LJM transactions occurred without the necessary routing and approvals that
had been promised to the Board. Id. at 30. For example, the process required that a Deal Ap-
proval Sheet (DASH) be completed and circulated among the necessary officers for approval
of UM transactions. Id. There were some transactions with no DASH sheets, some with
DASH sheets without signatures and some transactions were completed before the DASH
sheets had the authorized signatures. Id. There is testimony from staff members that they ex-
perienced pressure from Mr. Fastow on these deals to get better terms for LJM. The PSI found
internal memos expressing concern about lax compliance with the DASH policies. Enron le-
gal counsel Jordan Mintz wrote, "[T]he Company needs to improve both the process it fol-
lows in executing such transactions and implement improved procedures regarding written
substantiation supporting and memorializing the Enron/ILJM transactions." Id. at 30 n.81 (al-
teration and emphasis in original). Mr. Mintz also emphasized the need for "more rigorous
testing of the fairness and benefits" of these transactions. Id.
233. Id. at 30.
234. Id. at 32.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 33.
237. Id. The PSI REPORT notes that during 2001, the Finance Committee did not ask any
questions when informed that Fastow had sold his interest in LJM and did not inquire as to
why the quarterly reports had ended. Id. (citing Hearing Record at 175, 179). These lapses
can be viewed as evidence of breach of fiduciary duty. Well, that may be, but in August 2001,
when the Fastow sale occurred, there was nothing the Board could have done to save the com-
pany. Back when Fastow asked for LJM was when the Board should have been proactive.
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It is on the issue of Fastow's compensation that the Board has its great-
est vulnerability and is evidence of the deferential nature of the Enron
Board. When the one-time review of Fastow's compensation was announced
as a precondition for approval of another LJM transaction, Dr. LeMaistre, as
head of the Compensation Committee requested information on his compen-
sation from Mary Joyce, Enron's senior Compensation Officer.238 His re-
quest applied to all "16(b)" officers.239 One year would pass and he would
still not have the information from Ms. Joyce. 2' At this point the Board di-
rected Dr. LeMaistre and John Duncan to personally approach Mr. Fastow,
to obtain the information.24' Understanding the fearful task ahead, of actually
confronting the CFO of a company on whose Board they sit, these two direc-
tors asked legal counsel for Enron to draft a set of questions that they could
take with them to meet Mr. Fastow. 42 For those of you still keeping score,
this was a Board that had to send a delegation with a script from legal coun-
sel to get information from the company's Chief Financial Officer about
how much money he was making from deals with the company and how
much his family members were also making from these deals.
The directors did get some information from Mr. Fastow, that he had
made $45 million from LJM 1 and 2, but Mr. Fastow never did return phone
calls providing the directors with his return on investment.243 When Dr. Le-
Maistre and Mr. Duncan asked Mr. Fastow whether any other Enron em-
ployees were involved in financial relationships and transactions with the
238. Id. at 34-35.
239. "16(b)" refers to those levels of officers in a company to whom Section 16 of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act applies. Securities Exchange Act, § 16(b), 73 P.L. 291, 73
Cong. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934). These are the officers subject to the six-month, in effect,
holding period on their company shares, a timing prohibition to curb acting on inside informa-
tion. 15 U.S.C. A. § 78p(b) (West 2003).
240. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 35.
241. Id. The rich comedic possibilities here abound. One Board member approaches a
staff member and asks for all full compensation disclosures on all Officers so as not to irritate
Mr. Fastow. Nothing happens for a year so the Board, timidity abounding, sends two Direc-
tors to meet the troll to find out money figures.
242. Id. The film OLIVER (RCA COLUMBIA 1968) comes to mind with the two directors
approaching Mr. Bumble, "Please, sir, could I have some more information?" Could this
Board have been any more obsequious? Take a gander at the script legal counsel drafted for
these two directors and keep this deferential tone in mind as we explore the culture of Enron
infra at notes 299-323 and accompanying text:
We very much appreciate your willingness to visit with us. Andy, because of the
current controversy surrounding LJM I and LJM 11, we believe it would be helpful
for the Board to have a general understanding of the amount of your investment
and of your return on investment in the UM entities. We understand that a detailed
accounting of these matters will be done in connection with the response to the
SEC inquiry. In responding to our questions with respect to your interest in the
LJM entities, we would appreciate your including any interest.., that the mem-
bers of your family may have had in the entities.
PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 36 (citation omitted).
243. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 36.
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company, he responded that there were not.2 " A short time later, during the
Powers investigation that the Board commissioned, they discovered that Fas-
tow and other employees had created the Southampton partnership, which
consisted of a group of employees investing in LJM.245
While it is possible that the Board did not understand the scope of extent
of these off-the-books companies and the transactions, their lapse occurred
in the failure to ask for more information despite a series of "red flags." The
question for their liability as well as the focus of reforms is not whether they
knew, but whether they should have known and how they could have found
out.
C. Auditors, Analysts and Business Press
Leg two of the three-legged perfect stor" that allowed an Enron to hap-
pen, is best characterized by failure of external controls. Auditors, analysts,
and the business press are, at least in theory, independent outsiders who
should be able to detect an Enron house of cards, and then say so publicly.
However, Enron was able to create its complex financial scheme, only with a
complicit Board accompanied by complicit auditors, complicit analysts, and
a complicit business press. Any one of these four groups, the outsiders plus
the Board could have brought the Enron train to a screeching halt. That none
did, or even raised sufficient questions to cause the investing public to with-
draw its support, also warrants examination if meaningful reforms are to take
hold. Even with Board weaknesses or failures, investors have traditionally
had the resource of third parties to turn to for candid evaluation of a com-
pany's performance and the veracity of its financial statements and claims.
In this perfect storm, the auditors, analysts, and business press joined Enron,
as a sort of cheering section for its ongoing, odds-defying success.
1. Weak Auditors
One of the first weaknesses that consumed the auditors in Enron and
other companies was the issue of conflicts of interest. Enron paid Arthur
Andersen $25 million for its audit work and $27 million for non-audit work,
including both tax and consulting services.246 Andersen indicated that it did
not feel its audits were compromised by the consulting work and Andersen
244. Id.
245. Id. at 36-37. Southampton was quite a deal for employees. They pumped in $5,800
and received $1 million in immediate returns. Not bad work if you can get it without going to
jail. Bill Saparito, Speak No Evil, TIME, Feb. 18, 2002, at 34. The estimated total return to
Fastow and fellow employees who invested was $43 million. Id.
246. Deborah Solomon, After Enron, a Push to Limit Accountants to... Accounting,
WALL ST. I., Jan. 25, 2002, at C1.
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joins all of the other accounting firms in their assurances that consulting and
auditing do mix.247
But, Andersen had more subtle conflicts. The staffs of Enron and An-
dersen were inextricably intertwined. As noted earlier, David Duncan was a
close friend with Mr. Causey, the company's Chief Accounting Officer and
the man responsible for approving the SPE transactions that Mr. Fastow
handled as both CFO and principal in the off-the-books entities. 248 Further,
the employees at Enron were not sure who the Andersen employees were
and who worked for Enron; because many Andersen staff had permanent of-
fices at Enron, were often then hired by Enron, and also were beneficiaries
of office parties, just as Enron employees were.249
One of the reasons for the staffs of the auditor and the client to be so in-
extricably intertwined is that Andersen performed and reviewed both the in-
ternal and external audit functions.2" The two were originally separated be-
cause independence is compromised when those reviewing the work and
judgment calls, did the work and made the calls.251
In addition, for Enron to continue for as long as it did with so many in-
tricate accounting issues, the auditoi's had to buy into "aggressive account-
"1252 Aing. While Andersen has used its employees since the fall of Enron as a
247. Id. The Council of Institutional Investors does, however, beg to differ. Press Re-
lease, Council of Institutional Investors, Council of Institutional Investors Calls for Auditor
Reforms, (Feb. 4, 2002), at http://www.cii.org/pressreleases/pressrelease1.asp. It is aiding un-
ions and other investors in their shareholder proposals at the following corporations to urge
companies to voluntarily adopt conflict-of-interest policies that restrict the companies' audit
firms to performing either audit services or consulting services, but not both. Id. Following
each company's name is a number in parenthesis that indicates the ratio of the company's
non-audit fees to its audit fees: Allegheny Energy (3.1:1); Ameren (2.3:1); American Power
Conversion (5.1:1); Apple Computer (12.6:1); Avon (2.9:1); Best Buy (4.4:1); Boston Proper-
ties (4.8:1); Bristol Myers Squibb (4.5:1); Constellation Energy Group (4.1:1); Delphi Auto-
motive Systems (7.7:1); Dominion Resources (1.2:1); Duke Energy (3.5:1); Equitable Re-
sources (3.9:1); First Energy (5.9:1); Gap (13.5:1); Halliburton (1.1:1); John Hancock
Financial (9.75:1); Johnson & Johnson (4.6:1); Kmart (10.4:1); Lafarge North America
(3.1:1); Liz Claiborne (2.2:1); Manpower (3.6:1); Marriott International (4.7:1); McGraw-Hill
(2.2:1); Motorola (16:1); PG&E (3.6:1); Reliant (5.1:1); TXU (3:1); VF (5.2:1); and Walt
Disney (4. 1: 1). ED DURKIN, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS PENSION FUND, ANALYSIS
OF COMPANY PROXY STATEMENTS (2001). Some companies, such as Disney, have already
halted the dual relationship. Disney dropped PricewaterhouseCoopers from its dual role with
the company. Gary Strauss, Companies Take Action to Regain Investor Trust, USA TODAY,
July 17, 2002, at lB.
248. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 8, 29.
249. Thaddeus Herrick & Alexei Barrionuevo, Were Auditor and Client Too Close-
Knit?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2002, at C1. Seven former Andersen accountants became Enron
employees in 2000 alone. John Schwartz & Reed Abelson, Enron's Collapse: The Partner;
Auditor Struck Many as Smart and Upright, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at C 11.
250. Burton Malkiel, Watchdogs and Lapdogs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2002, at A16.
251. Id. Professor Malkiel likens giving the internal and external audit functions to the
same firm as akin to having the students grade their own papers and then handle appeals on
their grades. Id.
252. Id. Continuing long-standing tradition in law and ethics, accountants refer to "cook-
ing the books" as "earnings management" or "aggressive accounting." Shantan Pesaru, Tech
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sympathetic public relations campaign to save the company and there are in-
deed employees at Andersen who were not involved in cooking books, the
hard facts illustrate that Andersen developed a reputation and peculiar skill
for "aggressive accounting." In addition to Enron, Andersen's audit clients
include: Global Crossing (in bankruptcy with questions about its accounting
practices), 3 WorldCom (in bankruptcy with the admission that it under-
stated expenses by $4 billion), Qwest Communications (now the subject of
an SEC inquiry), Level 3 Communications (issues with restatements of fi-
nancial information),254 Waste Management (just now recovering from is-
sues surrounding its financial reports), Baptist Foundation of Arizona (in
bankruptcy with Andersen recently settling suit with investors for $100 mil-
lion), and Sunbeam (in litigation over accounting and restatement issues).255
The audit rules themselves permit the complicity that David Duncan and
Andersen provided Enron, because they were able to take the approach of
absolute compliance with the letter of the auditing laws while failing to ac-
knowledge the overall financial picture of the company, as presented in their
certified statements for the company, was not accurately portrayed.2 6 In
other words, Andersen was able to sign off on the Raptors I, II, III, IV and V
and other SPEs because, technically, Enron was in compliance with account-
ing rules. The question that now emerges is whether those accounting rules
are fundamentally flawed and require modification, to a less detailed and
Profs Expose Fuzzy Accounting, (Aug. 23, 2002), at http://www.cyberbuzz.gatech.edu/ tech-
nique/issues/fa12002/2002-08-23/21.html. But accountants' creative labeling in order to
avoid addressing the fundamental ethical or legal issue involved is not unique to accountants.
For example, the youngsters who download music from the Internet do not refer to it as
"copyright infringement," it is "peer-to-peer file-sharing." Simon Lim, Share No More,
NANYANG CHRONICLE (2002), at http://www.ntu.edu.sg/studorgn/chronicle/digita3.htm.
Taking the answers into an exam is not "cheating," it is "using memory pegs." Marianne M.
Jennings, Morality beyond the Excuses, MERIDIAN (Jan. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.meridianmagazine.com/ideas/991231moralexcuse.html. One of the non-
quantifiable causes of Enron and other companies' collapse is the unwillingness of those in-
volved to place a bright light of reality on the practices, decisions and financial reports of the
company.
253. Dennis K. Berman, et al., Global Crossing Ltd. Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 29, 2002 at A3; Dennis K. Berman & Deborah Solomon, Questioning the Books: Ana-
lysts Fault the Accounting at Global Crossing, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2002, at A8.
254. Deborah Solomon, Accounting for Enron: Andersen Also Audited Qwest, Account-
ing Questions Surfaced, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2002, at C7.
255. Ken Brown, Andersen Memo Urged Caution with Risky Clients, WALL ST. J., Apr.
12, 2002, at A14. The issues in Global Crossing and WorldCom are the same--cooking the
books.
256. See Andy Serwer, Dirty Rotten Numbers; Enron has Made us Shine a Light on the
Books of America's Public Companies, FORTUNE, Feb. 18, 2002, at 74 (auditor's compliance
with letter of the law can be misleading); and Steve Liesman, et al., When Rules Keep Debt
Off the Books: Enron Crisis Puts Spotlight on the FASB, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2002, at Cl
(inaccurate representation of financial condition).
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more British approach of the overall accuracy of the financial statements, not
compliance with individual and highly technical rules.2 57
However, in addition to the rules and the conflicts, there is the reality
that David Duncan and Andersen were willing to accommodate Enron and
its executives with their desires when it came to accounting for both the
company's contracts, the SPEs, and the related debt."' While Mr. Duncan
regularly met with the Audit Committee and pointed out, Enron was embark-
ing into uncharted accounting territory because of the nature of its business,
and that management had a great deal of discretion in its reporting of the
numbers, in areas such as Enron's energy contracts; he did not halt the steam
engine's progress toward the brick wall. 9 In fact, on one single sheet of pa-
per used as Mr. Duncan's briefing paper for the February 1999 Enron Audit
Committee meeting, Mr. Duncan wrote, "[o]bviously, we are on Board with
all of these, but many push limits and have a high 'others could have a dif-
ferent view' risk profile."26 Mr. Duncan conveyed the message of risk at the
insistence of Andersen legal counsel.26" ' While Mr. Duncan pled the Fifth
Amendment and declined to testify at the Congressional hearings on Enron
and Andersen's role,262 Andersen's legal counsel confirmed that Mr. Duncan
had, in fact, communicated what was written on his one page of briefing
notes to the Enron Audit Committee in February of 1999.263
257. Cf Serwer, supra note 256, at 74 (mentioning differences in British accounting
regulations).
258. See Ken Brown & Henny Sender, When Rules Keep Debt Off the Books: Did An-
dersen Act Properly? Firm is Fired, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2002, at Cl. Enron fired Andersen
as its auditor on Jan. 17, 2002. Andersen had fired Duncan two days earlier because he led an
expedited shredding of documents related to Andersen's engagement work with Enron, Id.
259. The author has mixed metaphors again, uncharted waters being coupled with steam
engines and train tracks. However, the mixed metaphor makes the point that David Duncan
was not exactly falling on his sword at the audit committee meetings. Now the author has in-
jected the battlefield into the mix. Perhaps it would serve literature better if we said that
David Duncan did not lie down on the tracks to stop the train. Perhaps it would be better for
literature if the author would wrap this up, at 200 or so footnotes or sooner. The documenta-
tion on the non-sword audit committee meetings can be found at PSI REPORT, supra note 58,
at 15-18. See also supra note 200 for a discussion of Mr. Duncan's matrix analysis of risks
and issues related to Enron's accounting.
260. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 17.
261. See id. This was different legal counsel than Nancy Temple, the Andersen lawyer
whose e-mail to David Duncan about document destruction policies that was the "smoking
gun" in the verdict against Andersen for impeding justice. Peter Martin, Subject: Wrecking
the Company: The Andersen Verdict Shows that Even an E-mail that Seems Innocuous May
End up Destroying a Business, FiN. TIMES (LONDON), June 18, 2002, at 23. And here also is
another important safety tip: If the company you are auditing is the subject of an SEC investi-
gation, is having difficulty securing loans, and has a share price hovering around nine cents,
you may want to look into it when the audit partner assigned to the client company calls and
asks about document destruction. Just another safety tip.
262. John R. Wilke & Richard B. Schmitt, Andersen Ex-Partner Might Aid U.S. Case:
Fired and Blamed in January, Enron Auditor Duncan Meets With Prosecutors, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 25, 2002, at A3.
263. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 17. Legal counsel for Tom Bauer at Arthur Andersen
wrote to the committee:
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Internal Andersen documents also reveal that the auditor was concerned.
In 2000, Mr. Duncan and four other Andersen partners prepared what they
referred to as the "[r]isk [d]rivers" for Enron.264 Included in their list were
"[mlanagement [p]ressures" and "[a]ccounting and [fWinancial [r]porting
[r]isk," with the following comments about these drivers:
" "Enron has aggressive earnings targets and enters into numerous
complex transactions to achieve those targets. 265
* "The Company's personnel are very sophisticated and enter into
numerous complex transactions and are often aggressive in
structuring transactions to achieve derived financial reporting
objectives. 266
• "Form over substance transactions. ' '267
Despite clear recognition of the accounting issues and concerns, neither
Duncan nor anyone at Andersen chose to offer Enron an ultimatum or allow
the media to resolve the issue.268 Andersen and Duncan saw the issues in ac-
counting at Enron, reviewed their substantial risk, but still refused to take the
steps necessary to reveal the issues to the auditor. 69 It was not until October
of 2001 that this admission came, when Enron was just two months away
from bankruptcy, that Duncan says he realized that the way and structure had
been created violated GAAP.27° Andersen served as Enron's auditor through-
As you requested, on behalf of Tom Bauer, a partner in Arthur Andersen, I am re-
sponding to your inquiries .... To the best of Mr. Bauer's knowledge, the hand-
writing on the document.., is the handwriting of David Duncan. It reflects what
Mr. Duncan and others discussed at an Enron Audit Committee meeting held on
February 7, 1999 .... The risk profile of Enron as reflected in the document was
discussed at that meeting with and among the members of the Audit Committee
and the representatives of the Company who attended .... Certain risk areas were
described as "pushing the limits," [sic] as reflected in Mr. Duncan's notes, or as
being "at the edge."
PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 17 (omissions in original) (citing Hearing Exhibit 3, Selected
Observations 1998 Financial Reporting (David Duncan talking points or Audit Committee
Presentation, Feb. 7, 1999)). The minutes of a May 2000 Audit Committee meeting provide:
"Mr. Duncan discussed the financial reporting areas that [Andersen] had determined to be
high priorities due to inherent risks that were present. He stated that the ongoing high priority
areas included structured transactions, the merchant portfolio, commodity trading activities,
project development activities and intercompany and related party transactions." PSI REPORT,
supra note 58, at 17 (alteration in original) (quoting Hearing Exhibit 7c (Audit Committee
Minutes from May 1, 2000) at 2).
264. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 18.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. The clear communication in these documents is that Andersen believed that En-
ron was pushing limits, engaged in aggressive accounting and constituted a risk for the com-
pany.
268. Id. at 19.
269. Id.
270. Tom Fowler & Todd Ackerman, The Andersen Verdict; Andersen Guilty; Outcome
Viewed as Final Blow for Firm, Hous. CHRON., June 16, 2002, at Al.
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throughout its evolution and, despite briefings to the Audit Committee, it
could not bring itself to veto any new partnership, book revenues differently
or simply admit that Enron may have pushed the envelope too far.2 71 Foren-
sic accountant, Howard Schilit, has noted that Andersen's relationship with
Enron represented the worst of complicity "[a]uditors should be like referees
in football. Sometimes you don't like the zebras, but that's just too bad." '272
A cartoon in the Wall Street Journal in early 2002, showed two executives
sitting in a prison cell with one saying to the other, "[1let's just say, with ac-
counting, it's best to think inside the box." 273
2. Analysts Who Said Nothing or the Opposite of
What They Knew to be True
Even if the Board and the auditors failed in their roles of outsiders, with
the ability to change the practices, and hence destiny of a company and its
shareholders, there should have been the presence of analysts with sufficient
skills to point out the deficiencies in Enron's financial statements and its
levels of disclosure. The analysts during this era, however, were also suffer-
ing from conflicts of interest issues.
In the four-month period following Enron's bankruptcy, there were sig-
nificant questions raised about why analysts had been "go-go" on Enron
when there were, fundamentally, so many problems with it. At least a partial
answer came through the revelations in an investigation by New York's At-
torney General, Eliot Spitzer.274 In April 2002, Mr. Spitzer announced that
he conducted a ten month investigation into the practices of Wall Street ana-
lysts and charged Merrill Lynch with several violations of New York laws
that focused on a series of e-mails his office had uncovered.275
271. PSI REPORT, supra note 58, at 19.
272. Dirty Rotten Numbers, supra note 256, at 80.
273. Pepper... and Salt, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2002, at A2 1. Because of the felony con-
viction on the obstruction of justice charge, Andersen can no longer serve as an auditor. An-
dersen Case Conviction, SEC Statement No. 2002-89 (June 15, 2002). It is banished from
government contracts. Id. The litigation settlement talks with Enron shareholders have not
gone well. Andersen initially proposed $750 million as a settlement in February, which the
shareholders rejected. Mitchell Pacelle & Cassell Bryan-Low, Andersen Worldwide Sets
Likely Deal: Under Tentative Settlement, Parent of U.S. Partnership is to Pay $60 Million in
Enron Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at C1. That offer decreased slowly, but steadily,
because as Andersen explained, it doubted its viability. Id. Its last offer was in April 2002 for
$300 million and the settlement negotiation talks were declared dead in May 2002. Id. A ten-
tative settlement was, however, reached on August 27, 2002, for $60 million. Id. The share-
holders agreed to the settlement amount because an examination of Andersen's books re-
vealed that the American operation of Andersen is completely shut down and that there is no
revenue. Id.
274. Charles Gasparino, New York Attorney General Turns up Heat on Wall Street,
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The e-mails revealed that analysts for Merrill Lynch often felt very dif-
ferently in private about the companies that they were recommended to cli-
ents, but made the recommendations publicly because either their compensa-
tion was tied to the success of an offering or company that was a Merrill
client or they were prohibited from candidly discussing any Merrill cli-
ents. 27 6 Following a $100 million settlement with Merrill, Mr. Spitzer con-
tinued his pursuit of the conflicts issues among analysts, 277 which offers a
partial explanation, as to their taciturn behavior on certain stocks such as En-
ron, which were clearly courting disaster in terms of their share prices vis-A-
vis performance and actual cash flow.
Mr. Spitzer was able to uncover yet another source of conflicts for ana-
lysts, the so-called "bonus memo." The "bonus memo" is written by analysts
at the end of the year and is used as a means of touting for management, as it
makes its bonus determination for analysts, the achievements of the analyst
over the past year.278 Mr. Spitzer found evidence that in the bonus memos,
analysts revealed that their positive recommendations were the impetus for
obtaining and retaining certain clients for purposes of public offering busi-
ness.27 9 The year-end memos, according to initial disclosures from Spitzer's
investigations, reveal that:
[M]any of the major firms on Wall Street during the bull market of the late
1990s wooed analysts with multimillion-dollar contracts based on their
ability to generate investment-banking fees. And many firms, in evaluat-
ing analysts during bonus time, scrutinized the analysts' roles in helping
their firms win banking business. 28
0
There is other evidence of significant ties and conflicts between firms
that are brokers, investment bankers, and the resulting relationship conflicts
of their in-house analysts, to the buying and consulting/investing side of the
house. For example, Salomon Smith Barney is under scrutiny for its rela-
276. Patrick McGeehan, Merrill Chief is Apologetic Over Analysts; One Dismissed, N.Y.
TiMEs, Apr. 27, 2002, at Cl. The initial investigation focused on Henry Blodget, Merrill
Lynch's Internet analyst. New York Attorney General Turns up Heat on Wall Street, supra
note 273. While issuing buy-buy recommendations publicly on certain Internet stocks that
were Merrill clients, Mr. Blodget said privately in e-mails that those same stocks were a
"dog," or "crap." Id. In July 2000, one Merrill analyst called InfoSpace stock "a piece of
junk" to friends even though he had given it the firm's highest rating publicly. Merrill Lynch
Deal Won't Restore Investors' Trust, USA TODAY, May 23, 2002, at AI0. Merrill settled one
case brought by an investor who followed the recommendation on InfoSpace because the ana-
lyst said the stock would reach a target of $100 per share. New York Attorney General Turns
up Heat on Wall Street, supra note 274. Shortly after the investor purchased, the stock plum-
meted to $1.45 per share. Id.
277. Charles Gasparino, Latest Fuel in Analyst Probe: 'Bonus' Memos, WALL ST. J.,
May 30, 2002, at Cl. Mr. Spitzer also extracted a significant number of promises from
Merrill. Those promises are covered as part of the reform discussions in Section IV infra.
278. Id.
279. New York Attorney General Turns up Heat on Wall Street, supra note 274.
280. Latest Fuel in Analyst Probe: 'Bonus' Memos, supra note 277.
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tionship with WorldCom because it was so intertwined with the company
that its employees attended Board meetings of WorldCom and offered ideas,
as it was offering the company its highest rating, knowing the issues of debt
and accounting that ultimately were the company's demise.28 Salomon's
Jack Grubman was asked to appear before a House committee conducting an
investigation into WorldCom to discuss his role in WorldCom and hesitation
to downgrade the stock despite clear and evolving troubles.282
Another conflict issue that arose also with Salomon is the possibility
that firms and analysts were allocating shares of IPOs to certain individuals
in order to win their business in the future. 83 This activity involved holding
back IPO stock for favored clients such as Bernard Ebbers, formerly the
CEO of WorldCom, with the hope that their investments in lucrative dot-
com shares that Salomon was handling would win future WorldCom busi-
ness for Salomon.284
Apart from the conflicts that existed with regard to client and customer
relations, Enron appeared to enjoy a sort of deference from analysts for there
seemed to be an unwillingness to point to any chinks in the armor or declare
that the emperor had no clothes, despite odds-defying performance by the
company and incongruent financial statistics. 85 Why analysts were so dif-
ferential and unwilling to buck the trend toward Enron worship remains un-
clear. Some have attributed it to the distance that Andrew Fastow kept be-
tween himself and Wall Street: "It]he CFO never came to analyst
conferences; he'd always be buried somewhere with his financiers. Analysts
were duped. They were never able to see the off-the-balance-sheet partner-
ships; they never saw how earnings were being puffed up by mark-to-market
accounting. 286 One analyst who did see and state the Enron problem long
before its collapse, John Olson, gleaned his information from talking with
former employees who described the company as doing everything "on the
edge."2 87
Interestingly, executives from Enron quickly dogged those who did
voice concerns. When Mr. Olson issued his cautions to clients about Enron,
Ken Lay wrote a letter to Mr. Olson's employer saying, "John Olson has
been wrong about Enron for over 10 years and is still wrong. [B]ut he is con-
281. Andrew Backover & Jayne O'Donnell, WorldCom Scrutiny Touches on E-mail,
USA TODAY, July 8, 2002, at lB.
282. Id.
283. Charles Gasparino, et al., Salomon Faces Questions on PO: Two Congressmen
Want to Know if WorldCom Executives Received Hot Shares in Bid to Curry Favor, WALL ST.
J., July 10, 2002, at C1.
284. Id.
285. See supra III.A. for discussion of the surface clues that should have been obvious to
those with just minimal financial reading skills.
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sistant [sic]. '288 Mr. Olson maintains that too many Wall Street analysts in
search of the fame and glory are "schnuckels," a Yiddish word for dupe.289
Olsen, like Bush, may have limited understanding of foreign languages; the
Yiddish word is likely "schnook. 29 °
3. The Business Press
If the Board, auditors, and analysts failed in their role as outsiders, with
the responsibility of examining companies and their practices thoroughly
and with skepticism, there still remained the possibility that an independent
business media could offer insight and revelations on a company like Enron.
Again, however, there were conflicts. It was not until well into the bull mar-
ket that networks such as CNBC, CNN and MSNBC adopted conflicts poli-
cies for their on-air talent and for guests appearing on their shows. Many
were using the media outlets for purposes of pumping and dumping shares,
which they held even as they appeared on the shows, to tout their excellence
as an investment. 29' Even following the Enron collapse, Lou Dobbs of
CNN's Moneyline failed to disclose, even as he adamantly defended Ander-
sen, that it was the auditor for a company in which he holds a substantial in-
terest.292
Even when conflicts did not exist, the business media were not particu-
larly aggressive in picking up issues or stories. For example, the issues sur-
rounding Enron should have been obvious using just basic financial analysis,
but only one reporter picked up on these issues, and her story fell flat.293 Pe-
ter Eavis of TheStreet.com also raised questions about Enron, including that
of how Enron's profit may have been added by deals related to LJM.294 He
288. John Schwartz, Enron's Collapse: The Analyst; Man Who Doubted Enron Enjoys
New Recognition, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 21, 2002, at C8. Mr. Olson explains that when his boss
showed him the note from Lay, he responded, "[y]ou know that I'm old and worthless, but at
least I can spell 'consistent."' Why John Olson Wasn't Bullish on Enron, supra note 188.
289. Enron's Collapse: The Analyst; Man Who Doubted Enron Enjoys New Recognition,
supra note 288. Mr. Olson adds that too many analysts were not kicking the tires and really
trying to find out what was going on at Enron.
290. Id.
291. Noelle Knox, TV Stock Analysts May Soon Need Disclaimer, USA TODAY, Dec. 8,
2000, at 3B.
292. Mr. Dobbs defended Andersen on his show as he maligned its indictment. Matthew
Rose, Lou Dobbs Defends Andersen and Raises Eyebrows, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2002, at B1.
He has accepted speaking fees in the past from the company and was promised an exclusive
interview with Joseph Berardino, the. former Andersen CEO. Id. Andersen has also been a
CNN sponsor in the past. Id.
293. Felicity Barringer, Enron's Many Strands: Early Scrutiny; 10 Months Ago, Ques-
tions on Enron Came and Went with Little Notice, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 2002, at All. For-
tune's managing editor, Rik Kirkland said Bethany McLean's March 2001 story on Enron
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wrote of his concerns about Fastow's dual roles, but no mainstream media
outlets picked up on his observations or questions. 295
One observer explained that the reason the story was ignored was, "[t]he
whole thing was so opaque and so difficult to conceive and so well hidden
that it was just beyond the tools of journalism." '296 Inasmuch as Ms. McLean
gained her insight and story from a short seller,297 there is perhaps a safety
and prevention tip for the future-check with the shortsellers to see what's
really going on in the market.298
D. The Enron Culture
When all else fails, meaning the Board, auditors, analysts, and press
have not taken hold of a company and questions surrounding it; there is the
possibility that an employee or former employee might take the issues
affecting the company to the public. The Enron culture was not one that was
conducive to open feedback. In fact, the Enron culture was a contributing
cause to the ethical collapse of the company.
1. A Culture of Conflicts
As noted earlier in the discussions regarding Mr. Fastow's role in the
SPEs, the issue of conflicts of interest took a bit of a back seat at Enron. Fur-
ther, the Fastow issues were not the only conflicts problems. Mr. Lay's son,
Mark, with his father's help, created two privately held technology firms,
and within months after the companies were created, Enron signed contracts
to do business with both of these Lay companies and even invested in one of
295. Id.
296. Id. Still, as Enron's stock price was plummeting, the analyses did not improve and
there was little additional coverage of these questions raised by a few reporters who were
clearly not in the mainstream business popular press.
297. Id.
298. And another important safety tip: If the CEO of the company leaves suddenly, as
Jeffrey Skilling did in August 2001, and the share price is dropping, it is a good time to begin
asking questions. There were similar lapses of coverage with regard to WorldCom. A federal
judge dismissed a shareholder lawsuit against WorldCom filed on June 1, 2001 on March 29,
2002. The lawsuit included affidavits from 100 employees describing the aggressive account-
ing practices that they had witnessed at WorldCom. Despite the suit appearing in newspapers
and the complaint available for anyone to examine along with the list of affiants and their ad-
dresses, no members of the press pursued the issue. Neil Weinberg, Asleep at the Switch:
WorldCom Book-Cooking was Laid Out a Year Ago: Too Bad No One Listened, FORBES,
July 22, 2002, at 38. In dismissing the suit, the federal judge noted that the numbers are so
large and the magnitude of the alleged fraud so expansive that it was impossible to believe. Id.
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them. 299 In addition, Enron hired Mark Lay as a consultant for a salary of
$1,000,000 for a three-year contract and 20,000 options for Enron stock.3 °°
Enron used an agency that was co-owned by Mr. Lay's sister as its
travel agent.3 ' Sharon Lay was an owner of Alliance Worldwide Travel
which booked more than $10 million in travel for Enron and its employees.
302
2. The "Culture of Arrogance:" Sycophants, Autocrats and Fear
A sense of the Enron culture emerges through the testimony of the
anonymous internal memo, later found to have been authored by Vice Presi-
dent for Corporate Development, Sherron Watkins.3 3 Ms. Watkins used the
term "arrogance" in her testimony as well as "intimidating. '"304 The arro-
gance that Ms. Watkins referred to was manifest in the spending. At the ex-
ecutive meeting in January 2001 at the Hyatt Regency Hill Country Resort in
San Antonio, there was flowing champagne, an open bar, fistfuls of free ci-
gars, a company-sponsored racecar, and executives boasting three Ferraris in
their garages.305
What she documents in that memo and later testified regarding in the
Congressional hearings is an ongoing pattern among companies involved in
complete ethical collapse. When companies implode, generally because of
financial reporting issues undertaken because of an inability to sustain out-
standing financial performance, there is a clear pattern in terms of the culture
that consists of: an autocratic CEO, and perhaps many of his or her immedi-
ate reports; fear among employees so expansive that they will not raise even
the most obvious issues; and punishment for employees who question com-
pany processes or procedures. 3
06
299. David Barboza & Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Many Strands: Ex-Chief's Family; Son




303. Michael Duffy, What Did They Know and.. .When Did They Know It?, TIME, Jan.
28, 2002 at 16.
304. Tom Hamburger, Enron's Watkins Describes "Arrogant" Culture; Hearing Pro-
vides New Details on Efforts to Warn Lay; That is the Smoking Gun, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15,
2002, at A3.
305. Enron Buffed Image to a Shine Even as It Rotted From Within, supra note 83. The
picture of Enron's internal culture emerges in dribs and drabs. The chief of Enron Broadband
Services drove his car in Ferrari Challenge races. Anita Raghavan, et al., Full Speed Ahead:
How Enron Odd Bosses Created a Culture of Pushing Limits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2002, at
Al. Even local strippers benefited, with one noting that she made $1,200 in one afternoon
from Enron executives celebrating closing a deal. Id.
306. For background on these companies, see MARIANNE M. JENNINGS, BuSINESs ETHICS
249-61 (4th ed). For information on Charles Keating, see infra note 346.
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Ms. Watkins was a former Andersen employee who had been hired into
the executive ranks by Enron.30 7 Ms. Watkins wrote a letter to Kenneth Lay
on August 15, 2001, that included the following,
I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting
scandals. I have heard from one manager-level employee from the princi-
pal investments group say, "I know it would be devastating to all of us, but
I wish we would get caught. We're such a crooked company."
308
While she zeroed in on Mr. Skilling and Mr. Fastow as responsible for
the accounting improprieties she believed existed, she also warned that Mr.
Skilling's swift departure would raise questions.30 9 She urged Mr. Lay to
simply "come clean" and "point the finger" at these two, describing them as
follows, "[t]here were swindlers in the emperor's new clothes discussing the
fine materials that they were weaving."31 She concluded that because of the
accounting improprieties, "[I]t sure looks to the layman on the street that we
are hiding losses in a related company.3
In her memo, she listed Cliff Baxter as someone Mr. Lay could talk to
in order to verify her facts and that her concerns about the company were le-
gitimate. 312 Ms. Watkins wrote the memo anonymously, on August 15, 2001,
because she feared repercussions from raising the issues.313 However, by
August 22, and after discussing the memo with former colleagues at Ander-
sen, she told her bosses that she was the one who wrote the memo.3"4 Ms.
307. What Did They Know and... When Did They Know It?, supra note 303, at 16-27.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Enron's Watkins Describes "Arrogant" Culture, supra note 304.
311. Text of Letter to Enron's Chairman After Departure of Chief Executive, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002 at C6.
312. Mr. Baxter left the company shortly thereafter and sold most of his Enron stock. Mr.
Baxter sold 577,000 shares of Enron stock between October 1998 and early 2001, for a total
of $35.2 million. Mark Babineck, Deceased Enron Executive Earned Respect in the Ranks,
Hous. CHRON.COM Jan. 26, 2002, at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/printstory.hts/special/
enron/1228097.
The company indicated he had taken early retirement to spend more time with his family.
However, Mr. Baxter was found dead in his 2001 Mercedes of a self-inflicted gun wound to
the head at an area just a few miles from his suburban Houston home. Jim Yardley, Enron's
Many Strands: An Executive's Death; Critic Who Quit Top Enron Post Is Found Dead, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at Al.
313. What Did They Know and. . .When Did They Know It?,, supra note 303, at 16.
314. Ms. Watkins had obtained a briefing from Rick Buy, Enron's Chief Risk Officer.
Enron's Watkins Describes "Arrogant" Culture, supra note 303. And isn't Buy a great last
name for a risk officer? She focused on the Raptor partnerships and wrote in the margins next
to her description of the Raptors, "There it is! That is the smoking gun. You cannot do this!
My understanding as an accountant is that a company can never use its own stock to generate
a gain or avoid a loss on its income statement." Id. At her Congressional testimony, Ms. Wat-
kins indicated that she believed Mr. Lay really did not understand clearly the problems with
the Raptors and the other accounting issues. After Vinson & Elkins, the law firm for Enron,
conducted its investigation into the allegations it concluded, "[b]ased on the findings and con-
clusions set forth with respect to each of the four areas of primary concern discussed above,
[Vol. 39
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Watkins testified before Congress that she did not turn to Mr. Skilling or Mr.
Fastow because she said, "[i]t would have been a job-terminating move." 315
Other employees within the company were also trying to alert manage-
ment and others to pending problems. For example, Margaret Ceconi, an
employee with Enron Energy Services, wrote a five-page memo to Kenneth
Lay on August 28, 2001, stating that losses from Enron Energy Services
were being moved to another sector in Enron in order to make the Energy
Service arm look profitable.3"6 One line from her memo read, "[s]ome would
say the house of cards are falling." '317 Mr. Lay did not meet with Ms. Ceconi,
but she was contacted by Enron Human Resources and counseled on em-
ployee morale.318 When she raised the accounting issues in her meeting with
HR managers, she was told they would be investigated and taken very seri-
ously, but she was never contacted by anyone about her memo.31 9 Her memo
remained dormant until January 2002, when she sent it to the U.S. House of
Representatives' Energy and Commerce Committee,32 the body conducting
a series of hearings on the Enron collapse.
Even after Enron's travails began to trickle out to the public, employees
remained in a culture of intimidation and fear. Clayton Vernon was fired af-
ter he posted a question on company internal online discussion that was di-
rected at Mr. Lay and asked whether Enron had used aggressive accounting
to overstate its profits.32' Another employee was fired for questioning the
payment of $55 million in retention bonuses paid to officers in early Decem-
ber 2001.322 Both employees were fired for postings that were deemed "of-
fensive. 323
the facts disclosed through our preliminary investigation do not, in our judgment, warrant a
further widespread investigation by independent counsel and auditors." The report by the law
firm was issued in the fall of 2001. Peter Behr & April Witt, Concerns Grow Amid Conflicts;
Officials Seek to Limit Probe, Fallout of Deals, WASH. POST, July 30, 2002 at Al.
315. Enron's Watkins Describes "Arrogant" Culture, supra note 303. While there was
no evidence beyond her testimony, Ms. Watkins indicated that once Mr. Fastow heard of her
memo, he wanted her fired and her computer seized. Id. However, additional documents do
reveal that Fastow felt that the criticisms in the memo were an attempt by Watkins to get his
job. Rebecca Smith, Fastow Memo Defends Enron Partnerships and Sees Criticism as Ploy to
Get His Job, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2002, at A3. Mr. Fastow was not a friendly sort. On his
desk was a cube with the company's values, one of which was communication. Inscribed be-
neath the "communication" value was the following: "[w]hen Enron says it's going to 'rip
your face off,' it will 'rip your face off."' Raghavan, Full Speed Ahead: How Enron Odd
Bosses Created a Culture of Pushing Limits, supra note 305.





321. Alex Berenson, Enron Fired Workers for Complaining Online, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2002, at C 1.
322. Id.
323. Id. Mr. Vernon acknowledges that he got carried away with his language in the note
and says he will not litigate: "I was using their equipment. I was in their building, and it was a
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3. A Culture of Wizards and Hubris324
In addition to the other cultural factors at Enron, there was an underly-
ing cultural profile that perhaps contributed to those factors. The senior offi-
cer group of Enron was a collection of well-trained MBAs, given the hyper-
technical tools typical of financial education in MBA programs in the 1980s.
The credentials for the Enron executive team were as follows: Jeffrey K.
Skilling, the former CEO of Enron, held an MBA from Harvard;3 25 Andrew
Fastow, the former CFO, held a Northwestern MBA;3 26 Clifford Baxter, a
former vice chairman, who killed himself shortly after the Enron revelations
became a daily media event, was a Columbia MBA.
3 27
The MBA curriculum since the 1980s has focused on financial models
designed to smooth earnings and produce double-digit returns for intermina-
ble stretches, things history tells us are not possible.3 28 The mandates of the
curriculum contain no specific references to issues such as honesty, disclo-
sure and fairness. To the extent ethics is a part of the curriculum it is consid-
ered to be social responsibility and a focus on issues such as environmental,
health and safety issues and corporate philanthropy. Mssrs. Skilling, Fastow,
and Baxter emerged as well trained in financial models from MBA programs
and equally well trained in terms of social responsibility, particularly with
regard to their roles in the philanthropic community. All had extensive pres-
ence in the Houston community with regard to philanthropic activities.329
flagrant violation of company policy to do what I did. I'm not going to litigate it. I don't think
it was unfair." He indicated that the cancellation of the company Christmas party, coupled
with the loss of value in his stock and the lack of any work to do at the office were the con-
tributing factors for his messages and use of vulgarity therein. Id.
324. The author understands that she runs the risk of sounding a bit Harry Potterish here,
but she is referring to financial wizardry and pride, not non-muggles and Hogwarts. See gen-
erally, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER'S STONE (Warner Bros. 2000).
325. Darth Vader. Machiavelli. Skilling Set Intense Pace, supra note 16.
326. The Financial Wizard Tied to Enron's Fall, supra note 83. Mr. Fastow graduated
from Tufts University and then the Kellogg School of Management of Northwestern Univer-
sity. Id. He began his work at Enron at age 29 and quickly rose through the ranks to become
the CFO at age 36; although he functioned as second in command from the time he was 31.
David Ivanovich, Center of the Storm: Aggressive, Driven, Fastow has Many Faces, Hous.
CHRON., Jan. 20, 2002 at Al. After being fired, Mr. Fastow and his wife, an heiress, contin-
ued to build their 11,500-square foot home and his friends say that the amount of money
someone made was his only measure of a person's worth and success. The Financial Wizard
Tied to Enron's Fall, supra note 83.
327. Jim Yardley & Shelia K. Dewan, Enron's Many Strands: The Suicide; Despite His
Qualms, Scandal Engulfed Executive, N.Y. Tumis, Jan. 27, 2003, at Mr. Baxter's undergradu-
ate degree was from NYU and his MBA was from Columbia. Id.
328. See infra notes 335-344 and accompanying discussion for more information on
business school curricula.
329. For example, in 2000, Enron raised $525,000 in a Houston bike race to raise money
for Multiple Sclerosis research and sponsored a race to raise money for the Holocaust Mu-
seum, Houston. ENRON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY ANNUAL REPORT 26 (2000), available at
http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/responsibility/CRANNUAL.pdf. The report also high-
lights Enron's employee giving and matching gift programs. Id. at 26-27.
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Mr. Fastow, for example, was prominent in Houston's Jewish community,
active in the art museum, and had been a voracious fundraiser for the city's
Holocaust museum. 3  One friend who knew Mr. Fastow personally for years
and worked with him on community projects said, "[t]he person I know
bears absolutely no relation to the person who has been characterized in
some reports within the walls of Enron." 331 Mr. Baxter was involved in Jun-
ior Achievement, a friend said ironically, to help make sure that young peo-
ple "understood the values of the free enterprise system." '332 Enron paralleled
FINOVA, American Continental Corporation (Charles Keating) and now
WorldCom with regard to philanthropic activity. All of these companies had
officers heavily involved in community and philanthropic activity, yet all of
these companies imploded from accounting improprieties.333 In their minds,
and based on their training it was quite easy for them to conclude, as Jeffrey
Skilling did that, "we are on the side of angels. 334
The following paraphrased excerpt from an analysis by Across the
Board, the magazine of the Conference Board, provides a view of the MBA
curriculum:
335
4. The Curriculum as Mandated by the AACSB
The American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) is
the national accrediting body for business schools. In an attempt to escape
the academic stigma of being the least scholarly units on campus, business
schools created an accrediting body to dictate courses, content and rigor.
The AACSB has been an active regulatory body for colleges of busi-
ness. It has also managed to change the atmosphere and philosophy of busi-
ness schools in the process. When one thinks of business school curriculum,
one thinks of accounting, marketing, management, finance and business law.
But the AACSB guidelines set a rain forest tone with the preamble to the
guidelines offering the following as the four significant challenges busi-
nesses face:
* Strong and growing economic global forces
* Conflicting values
" Changing technology in products and processes; and
" Demographic diversity among the employees and customers
330. The Financial Wizard Tied to Enron's Fall, supra note 83.
331. Id.
332. The Suicide; Despite His Qualms, Scandal Engulfed Executive, supra note 327.
333. See supra notes 331-32 and accompanying text.
334. Enron Buffed Image to a Shine Even as It Rotted From Within, supra note 83. Mr.
Skilling's full quote was, "[wie are the good guys. We are on the side of angels." Id.
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The preamble goes on to add, "In this environment, management educa-
tion must prepare students to contribute to their organizations and the larger
society and to grow personally and professionally through their careers."
There is a slight subversiveness to that simple preamble and the stated
goals for business education. Those goals represent a philosophy that busi-
nesses exist to serve larger society. While all good Adam Smith apostles un-
derstand that economic self-interest does, indeed, benefit society, the issue
of whether such a goal supercedes responsibility to shareholders is a topic of
debate. Milton Friedman has questioned this premise of businesses serving
society since 1970 and there are those of us who adhere to his theory that no
one is well served if businesses fail to concentrate on business, not social
goals.
Even the description of an appropriate curriculum reflects a newfound
focus:
* Ethical and global issues
* The influences of political, social, legal and regulatory, envi-
ronmental and technological issues; and
" The impact of demographic diversity on organizations
If it sounds a bit like the school of sociology, it is perhaps because there
has been so much influence by social scientists. Management departments
hire from schools of psychology and increasingly those from other areas of
the campus are hired for business faculty positions because although those
from around the campus may be anti-business, they are not anti-maximizers
and they know where the highest salaries abound. At a recent meeting of the
Society for Business Ethics, one of the professors lamented, "Let's face it.
We are all in colleges of business because we wanted more money. We sold
out years ago."
Only as a subset of these listed content areas do the guidelines mention
the topics of accounting, behavioral science, economics, mathematics and
statistics. Only at the MBA level are the topics of financial reporting, market
analysis and human behavior in organizations mentioned.... The lack of
practical skills for business or even business history and operations is strik-
ing. One finance syllabus described the goal of the course as follows: "In
microeconomics we rely heavily on optimization-specifically: maximizing
utility subject to a production possibilities frontier an subject to budget con-
straint." 336
The MBA curriculum is a sterile curriculum with an emphasis on finan-
cial models and doing well through volunteer work. However, there is a dis-
connect in the curriculum between the financial skills and ethics and in un-
derstanding that social contributions are not a substitute for candor in
financial reports and honesty in company transactions. Enron is not unique
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pie, WorldCom's CFO, Scott Sullivan, is not an MBA,337 but a business
school graduate with a penchant for the deal that piloted a multinational cor-
poration into new waters with regard to financial reporting.338 Following
WorldCom's phenomenal earnings restatement that staggered even an En-
ron-jaded Wall Street, Mr. Sullivan along with WorldCom's controller,
David Myers were charged with securities fraud, conspiracy to commit secu-
rities fraud, and making false filing with the SEC.339
The MBA curriculum that produced these Enron executives and many
other ticking bombs out there carries a certain disdain for traditional busi-
ness principles of low cost, quality, service and real profits. It is a curriculum
that convinces its charges that they are better, smarter, and above the prole-
tarian notion of reporting debt and expenses. Managing earnings is taught as
a means of delivering shareholder value.34 °
The notion of spinning debt off the balance sheets is neither new nor
unique to Enron. Most MBAs will study the Harvard Business School case
on Marriott Corporation in which Marriott split itself into two pieces, spin-
ning off its debt and bondholders into one corporation, with a resulting
337. High Profiles in Hot Water, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2002, at BI.
338. Deborah Solomon & Susan Pulliam, U.S., Pushing WorldCom Case, Indicts Ex-
CFO and His Aide, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2002, at Al.
339. Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says it Hid Expenses, Inflating Cash
Flow $3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMEs, June 26, 2002, at Al; Kevin Maney & Jon Swartz, "A Stellar
Reputation" Shattered, USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 2002, at 1B. Interestingly, Mr. Sullivan not only
served as CFO, he was on the Board and served as secretary of the corporation. A bit of a rec-
ipe for disaster with one person having that much executive and Board control. WORLDCOM,
INC., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 77-78 (2002), http://www.worldcom.comglobal/ inves-
torrelations/annualreports/2001/2001annual.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2002); WORLDCOM,
INC., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 145 (2000). http://www.worldcom.com/global/ inves-
torjrelations/annualreports/2000/2000annual report+proxy.pdf(last visited Nov. 19, 2002);
WORLDCOM, INC., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 65 (2000), http://www.worldcom.com/
global/investor relations/annual-reports/1999/1999_wcomannual.pdf (last visited Nov. 19,
2002). The two were also indicted along with Buford Yates, the former director of general
accounting at WorldCom. At the time the indictments were announced, the Justice Depart-
ment also announced the cooperation of Betty Vinson, an accounting employee who made the
changes on the expenses, and Troy Normand, a former accounting employee who gave direc-
tions to property accounting to make the changes related to the capital expenses. Mr. Yates
was charged with the same charges as Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Myers is said to be cooperating with
investigators and expected to enter a guilty plea. All four are business school graduates. U.S.,
Pushing WorldCom Case, Indicts Ex-CFO and his Aide, supra note 338.
340. Charles A. Nichols, III & Lynn Sharp Paine, MARRIOTT CORPORATION (A), 9-394-
085 (Harvard Business School 1997) (1993). Professors James Steams of Miami University
and Shaheen Boma of Ball State University interviewed 300 incarcerated inmates at three
minimum security prisons and compared their responses with those of students at 11 MBA
programs. The inmates showed just as much integrity, or more, when presented with ethical
dilemmas. Inmates were more concerned about customer service while MBAs were more
concerned about pleasing shareholders. Inmates were also less likely to pirate employees from
other companies than the MBAs. Study available from THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION, Feb. 9, 1999 at www.chronicle.com.
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ninety percent debt-to-equity ratio.34' The executives landed safely in the
other corporation with its boosted stock price because, well, it had no debt.
They endured some squawking and litigation from bondholders, but lived to
tell about it.
There are generally three reactions to the Marriott case among MBA
students. Reaction one is, "What exactly is the ethical issue here?" Reaction
two is: "So, they screwed the bondholders. It's the shareholders who count."
Reaction three comes from the poor souls who raise the issues of reputation,
fairness, and the long-term. If not hooted from the room, they are overpow-
ered by those who assure them that these brilliant financial techniques are
why they are earning an MBA.
This environment and the types of executives in Enron run parallel to
other organizations that have met similar fates in an implosion sense.
Charles Keating was surrounded by an executive team a full generation
younger, with some of the executives being Keating's sons or sons-in-law.
FINOVA and WorldCom also had their youthful MBA profiles at the top of
the company. While it is impossible to know cause and effect on these acts
of earnings manipulation, management and fraud, it is clear that the presence
of MBAs at the top of an organization does not provide any checks and bal-
ances for bringing a halt to the "aggressive accounting."
The problem may be much more insidious. Again, as. noted in the Con-
ference Board review of business school curricula:
There is a feeling among these students that they have sold their souls by
going into business. So indoctrinated are they upon arriving from their un-
dergraduate programs that they are convinced that they have chosen a path
of wrongdoing by even being associated with business. Some will be con-
vinced otherwise during the course of the semester, but many will not and
they become a particularly dangerous combination. They combine their
having sold their soul theory with an odd sort of nihilism and the result is
an ethically toxic group headed out into business.
Worse, the notions from the rest of the campus on moral relativism and
there being no absolute truth have invaded business ethics discussions as
well as courses in management and marketing. The prevailing ethical the-
ory of stakeholderism is not an ethical theory at all but a convenient tool
of analysis that permits the justification and rationalization of any business
decision so long as the business is acting in the best interest of some stake-
holder group. Teaching a value system with shifting accountability could
not be more subversive. These students are sent out with theories that
teach them that the shareholder is but one group to whom they are ac-
countable. They must use their power in business to improve communi-
ties, make charitable contributions, change public policy and advance civi-
341. The author has been harping on earnings management since 1996. See generally
Marianne M. Jennings, The Slippery Slope From "Hold to Pay in 45 Days" to Phantom In-
ventory, 1 CORPORATE FINANCE REV. 39 (1996); Marianne M. Jennings, Earnings Manage-
ment: The Ethical Issues Remain, 3 CORPORATE FIN. REV. 39 (1999).
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lization. The goals are lofty. It's just that corporations are perhaps not
equipped to do all of that and meet quarterly sales goals. 342
A recent study demonstrates the impact of the MBA on judgment. Sev-
enty-five percent of MBAs said the primary role of a company is maximiz-
ing shareholder value, 71% said satisfying customers was the goal of a busi-
ness and only 33% said producing a quality product was the goal of a
company. Those numbers differ prior to business school as 68%, 75% and
43% respectively demonstrating that there is some change brought about by
business school training.343
Without definitive rules, the judgment to spin the debt of Enron off the
books was quite an easy one to justify because the end result was, that at
least for time, shareholders were pleased, employees were treated well,
Houston and other communities benefited from Enron's generosity and a
general feeling of euphoria overcame the officers as they realized their com-
plex financial models were ideal for serving stakeholders."
IV. PREVENTION OF ANOTHER ENRON: TOOLS FOR COMPANIES TO USE TO
HALT ETHICAL IMPLOSION AND RESOLVE THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE
The prevention tools and fixes are self-evident because of the detailed
discussion of what happened at Enron. Despite the inherent obvious correc-
tions that might have prevented the perfect storm at Enron, the reforms to
date are neither well thought out nor directed at the root causes. This section
reviews the reforms established presently at both the public and private lev-
els and then provides suggestions for voluntary actions on the part of busi-
nesses that would be more effective in addressing the gaps and the failures in
checks and balances that led to the Enron perfect storm.
A. The Reforms
Perhaps the easiest reform proposal to cover is that of the Wall Street
Journal and other free-market disciples who believe that the decline in the
market is not due to a loss of trust, Enron or any other scandal, and that the
market is capable of adjusting without any type of regulatory reform. Leave
them alone and they will take care of things themselves. To some extent
there is some merit in their approach, for this is the third great reform effort
of one score and two years. There were the prison terms and reforms follow-
ing Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken's insider trading and "junk" bond fi-
342. Jennings, supra note 335, at 39; see also Marianne M. Jennings, What's Happening
in Business Schools?, 137 THE PUB. INT. 25 (1999).
343. Mica Schneider, How An MBA Can Bend Your Mind, Bus. WK., Apr. 1, 2002, at
12.
344. Marianne M. Jennings, Teaching Stakeholder Theory: It's For Strategy, Not Busi-
ness Ethics, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 203 (1998).
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nancing on Wall Street.345 Then there were the prison terms and reforms
following the savings and loans crisis and Charles Keating.346 Presently there
are similar cries for prison terms, greater penalties, and reforms from the En-
ron and WorldCom debacles.
However, the resistance from the business community to any type of
change or reform is not helpful in the restoration of trust. Several of the
opinion pieces on Enron are of the type that induce flinching in their cal-
lousness toward the scope of the problem.347 On the day following World-
Corn's declaration of bankruptcy, rumor had to be the largest bankruptcy in
the history of the United States, depending of course, on the testimony of
three former accounting department employees at WorldCom who have been
singing like canaries, Ben Stein wrote in the Wall Street Journal of the need
for recognizing how good and honest the vast majority of businesses and
CEOs are.348 Mr. Stein may be absolutely correct, but perception is every-
thing, and the failure to recognize the need for change and take steps in that
direction is not helpful for restorating public trust. A look at the year in re-
view gives an indication of how pervasive the issues related to ethics in
business are.
345. Janet Novack, Almost Makes Boesky a Saint, FORBES, Dec. 10, 2001, at 54; Gary
Strauss, How Did Business Get so Darn Dirty?, USA TODAY, June 12, 2002, at IB.
346. Kathleen Kerwin, For Charlie Keating, The Best Defense is a Lawsuit, Bus. WK.,
May 1, 1989. See also Richard W. Stevenson, The Justice Department's S. & L. Learning
Curve, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 15, 1991, at E4. For information on his prison sentence, see Eric
Schine, Charlie Keating Gets A Taste of LA: Law, Bus. WK., Oct. 8, 1990, at 46. Some trivia
for you: Lance Ito was the trial judge in the state prosecution of Mr. Keating in California. Id.
347. For example, The Wall Street Journal has had pieces entitled, "What Enron Did
Right," "Enron May be Dead but the New Economy Isn't," and "Enron: A Wake-Up Call," a
piece by Andersen's CEO that seems to be a justification for its conduct and not seeing it
coming. Samuel Bodily & Robert Bruner, What Enron Did Right, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19,
2001, at A20; Joe Berardino, Enron: A Wake-Up Call, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2001, at A18;
Don Tapscott, Enron May be Dead but the New Economy Isn't, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at
A18. And then there are those who accuse New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, of car-
ing only about politics in finding out that analysts were lying to their companies' clients. Rob
Norton, The Problem with Eliot Spitzer, FORTUNE, July 8, 2002, at 44. I daresay that the prob-
lem does not lie with Mr. Spitzer. If he makes a little political hay, more power to him. He
was the only public official in the country willing to say aloud what analysts were really do-
ing. Bully!
348. Ben Stein, They're Not All Crooks, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2002, at A14. One phrase
that was particularly irritating is, "I keep thinking that if we subjected journalists or actors or
producers to the temptations we offer to CEOs, with as little supervision as they get, how
many of us would be able to keep our paws out of the cookie jar as well as most CEOs." And
the point is that we can't blame them because they had the opportunity to steal??? With this
type of editorial in the Wall Street Journal, there appears to be little hope for the self-reform
and control needed. Indeed, Thomas E. White, the secretary of the Army, and formerly the
vice chairman of Enron Energy Services, is a millionaire many times over because of his ser-
vice at the company and seventy-seven calls from government phones to former Enron col-
leagues. While he said he was "ashamed" of Enron accounting practices, he assured Congress
in testifying that he knew nothing and would retain his earnings from his shares and work
there. James Dao, Senators Question Credibility of Army Secretary on Enron, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 19, 2002, at A13.
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The following chart is adapted from a piece in Corporate Finance Re-
view.
349
THE LAPSES OF THE 2001-2002
COMPANY/ ISSUE STATUS
PERSON
Adelphia Communica- Company guaranteed Annual report delayed.
tions loans to another entity Shares lost 70% of
controlled by the Rigas value from March 2002
family. John Rigas and to April 2002. Ongoing
his sons held the top grand jury investiga-
executive spots at tions35 2 in Chapter 11
Adelphia. The result bankruptcy.353 The
was $2.7 billion in largest shareholder re-
guarantees and $1 bil- signed from Board. Ri-
lion in off-the-balance- gas family that founded
sheet debt35° with an company indicted and
overstatement of num- arrested and charges of
ber of customers and "looting" the company
cash.351  of more than $1 billion
in one of the largest
corporate frauds
ever.354 John Rigas and
his sons were in-
dicted.355
Arthur Andersen Auditor for Sunbeam; Found guilty of one
349. Marianne M. Jennings, Why Regulation Won't Fix the Problems Plaguing Corpora-
tions: Moral Clarity as a Resolution, 7 CORP. FIN. REV. 39 (2002).
The chart does not include coverage of Merrill Lynch despite issues there because reforms
there are somewhat different from the reforms of an Enron perfect storm and these other
companies with financial reporting issues.
350. David Lieberman, Adelphia's Woes "A Total Shock" to Many, USA TODAY, Apr. 5,
2002, at 3B.
351. Robert Frank & Deborah Solomon, Adelphia Inflated Customer Base, WALL ST. J.,
June 7, 2002, at A3.
352. Geraldine Fabrikant & Andrew Ross Sorkin, New Questions are Turning up in the
Inquiry into Adelphia, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2002, at Cl.
353. Bill Bergstrom, Adelphia Boss Took in $67 Million: Agents Document Hefty Ad-
vances from Cable Firm, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 2002, at 6.
354. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Founder of Adelphia and 2 Sons Arrested, N.Y. TIMEs, July
25, 2002, at Cl. Because we are relying on government numbers here, the claim "largest cor-
porate fraud case ever" could be right. Count on the Rigas family to use the defense, "It
wasn't $1 billion because, remember, we were cooking the books and what we embezzled
was not near what the government alleges because those earnings were always unrealized, pro
forma, marked-to-market and all manner of Ebitda."
355. Jerry Markon and Robert Frank, Five Adelphia Officials Arrested on Fraud
Charges, WALL STREET J., July 25, 2002, A3
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felony count of obstruc-
tion of justice in Enron
matter for destruction
of documents 356
Dynegy Accounting issues sur- CFO replaced; 360 has
rounding: Project Al- halted online energy
pha which reduced trading, citing poor
taxes and inflated cash credit;36' CEO quit
flow; adequacy of dis- when subpoenas from
closures;357 question- federal government re-
able partnerships;358 is- garding energy trading
sues on "round-trip" was announced362
trading of energy359
Enron Earnings overstated Company is in bank-
through mark-to-market ruptcy (touted as the
accounting. Off-the- largest bankruptcy in
book/special purpose the history of the US).
entities carried signifi- Shareholder litigation is
cant amounts of Enron pending. Congressional
debt not reflected in the hearings held. Justice
financial statements. Department and U.S.
Significant off-shore Attorney offices han-
SPEs (770 of 881 SPEs dling criminal investi-
were offshore - primar- gations. One guilty plea
ily in Cayman Islands) from Michael Kopper's
on money laundering
and wire fraud.
Andrew Fastow, former Multimillion dollar Resigned as CFO.
Enron CFO earnings from serving Multi-million dollar
as principle in SPEs of home under construc-
Enron created to keep tion in Houston. Ap-
debts off the company peared before Congress
books; significant sales and pled the Fifth
356. Jonathan Weil, et al., Andersen Win Lifts U.S. Enron Case, WALL ST. J., June 17,
2002, at Al.
357. Dynegy Probe by SEC Widens to Citigroup, supra note 54.
358. Riva D. Atlas, Dynegy Faces New Questions Over "Debt" of Partnership, WALL
ST. J., May 14, 2002, at CI.
359. Chip Cummins, CMS's Longtime CEO Resigns Amid Probe of "Round-Trip"
Trades, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2002, at A3.
360. Chip Cummins, Dynegy Replaces Financial Chief, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2002, at
Cl.
361. Mitchell Benson, Dynegy Halts Online Trading, Citing Poor Credit Environment,
WALL ST. J., June 21, 2002, at B7.
362. Noelle Knox, Dynegy CEO Quits Amid Scrutiny, USA TODAY, May 29, 2002, at
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of shares in the time Amendment. Indicted
frame preceding com- by federal govern-
pany collapse. ment.363
Kenneth Lay, former Significant sales of Resigned as CEO. Ap-
Enron chairman shares in time frame peared before Congress
preceding Enron col- and pled the Fifth
lapse; warning memo Amendment.
from one financial ex-
ecutive about possible
implosion of company
due to accounting im-
proprieties.
Jeffrey Skilling, former Resigned just prior to Testified before Con-
Enron CEO. company's collapse. gress; offered assur-
ances that he did not
understand what was
happening at Enron and
that he resigned when
he became aware
Global Crossing Deals with CEO's son's Filed for bankruptcy; 367
companies; 364 account- fourth largest bank-
ing questions surround- ruptcy in U.S. his-
ing booking of reve- tory.368 Investigation of
nues (Andersen was related party transac-
auditor);365 also ques- tions and sales of
tions on booking of shares by officers and
long-term leases. 366  an investigation into
analysts' role by NY
Attorney General.369
363. Mr. Fastow faces 78 felony charges. One of his direct reports, Lawrence M. Law-
yer entered a guilty plea and has agreed to provide information to prosecutors on Mr. Fas-
tow's activities at Enron. Kurt Eichenwald, Ex-Executive of Enron Enters A Plea of Guilty,
N.Y. TIEs, Nov. 27, 2002, C1.
364. Geraldine Fabrikant & Saul Hansell, Deals With Son of an Executive Raise Ques-
tions on Governance, N.Y. TIES, Feb. 18, 2002, at CI.
365. Simon Romero, S.E.C. Scrutinizing Another Company, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2002, at
Al.
366. Dennis K. Berman, Global Crossing Faces SEC Probe of Accounting Practices on
Leases, WALL ST. J. , Feb. 4, 2002, at B5.
367. Dennis K. Berman et al., Global Crossing Ltd. Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 29, 2002, at A3.
368. Jim Hopkins & Matt Kranz, Global's Troubles Shouldn't Surprise Anyone, USA
TODAY, Feb. 27, 2002, at lB.
369. Laurie P. Cohen & Dennis K. Berman, How Analyst Grubman Helped Call Shots at
Global Crossing, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2002, at A].
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370. Simon Romero, Global is Said to Admit Files Were Shredded, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2002, at C1.
371. Andrew Pollack & David Cay Johnston, Former Chief of ImClone Systems is
Charged with Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at Cl. The share price was over
$70 in December, 2001. By the middle of January it was selling at a little above $20 per
share. In June 2002, it was selling at $7.83 per share. Id.
372. Andrew Pollack, Ex-Chief of ImClone Refuses to Testify To Congress About Testing
of Drug, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2002, at Cl.
373. Kara Scannel, Waksal Made Money Betting Against ImClone, WALL STREET J.,
March 12, 2003, at Cl.
374. Alessandra Stanley & Constance L. Hays, Martha Stewart's To-Do List May In-
clude Image Polishing, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2002, at Al.
375. Charles Gasparino & Susanne Craig, Merrill Worker Questions Pact in Stewart
Sale, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002, at Cl.
Acknowledges shred-
ding documents 370
ImClone Questions surrounding SEC notified the corn-
the timing of disclosure pany that it will file a
of action by the FDA civil suit. Shares
relating to the com- dropped significantly
pany's anticancer drug, after announcement of
Erbitux, and its less- FDA action on Decem-
than-touted effective- ber 28 and dropped
ness. again upon revelations
of possible insider trad-
ing (see below).371
Dr. Samuel Waksal, Sold $50 million in Charged with insider
former ImClone CEO ImClone shares prior to trading and arrested by
releasing to public in- FBI at his SoHo resi-
formation that FDA had dence. Pled the Fifth
rejected marketing for Amendment before
Erbitux. Congress. Other inves-
tigations pending.372
Entered guilty plea.373
Martha Stewart, CEO Sold $227,000 in shares SEC investigation
of Martha Stewart Liv- of ImClone one day be- pending. Her Merrill
ing Omnimedia, Inc.; fore public announce- Lynch broker and the
close friend of Dr. ment of negative FDA broker who sold the
Waksal action on Erbitux.374  shares have been sus-
pended with pay. 375
Rite-Aid Earnings reporting is- Chapter 11 restructur-
sues that resulted in the ing. The company is
largest restatement of functioning but recent
earnings in the history indictments of former
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376. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Ex-Rite Aid Officials Face U.S. Charges of Financial Fraud,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2002, at Al. Note, however, that the amount was only $1.6 billion and
Xerox (see infra notes 397-99 and chart) has now tripled that figure, twice.
377. Kelly Greene, Dunlap Agrees to Settle Suit Over Sunbeam, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15,
2002, at A3.
378. Jonathan Weil, Five Sunbeam Ex-Executives Sued by SEC, WALL ST. J., May 16,
2001, at A3.
379. Floyd Norris, S.E.C. Accuses Former Sunbeam Official of Fraud, N.Y. TtMES, May
16, 2001, at Al.
380. Mark Maremont, Tyco Made $8 Billion of Acquisitions Over 3 Years but Didn't
Disclose Them, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2002, at A3; see also Herb Greenberg, Does Tyco Play
Accounting Games? FORTUNE, Apr. 1, 2002, at 83-86.
381. Laurie P. Cohen & John Hechinger, Tyco Suits Say Clandestine Pacts Led to Pay-
ments, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2002, at A3.
382. Mark Maremont et al., Probe of Ex-Tyco Chief Focuses on Improper Use of Com-
pany Funds, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2002, at Al; Alex Berenson, Tyco Cleared to Sell Unit to
of the U.S.376  executives do not help
market price.
Sunbeam Revenues overstated. Company is in bank-
$62 million of $189 ruptcy. Shareholder
million were mythical. suits pending. SEC ac-
Income had to be re- tions pending for
stated for a several year "fraudulent financial
period, reporting."
Al Dunlap, former Fired by Board in 1998. Settled shareholder
Sunbeam CEO suits by agreeing to pay
$15 million.377 Charged
with fraud by SEC.378
Andersen, as auditor,
settled shareholder suits
for $110 million.3 79
Tyco International Questions about ac- Stock dropped from
counting practices, par- almost $60 per share to
ticularly with regard to around$20 upon an-
the booking of mergers nouncement of
and acquisitions;3 80  accounting issues. Lost
clandestine deals be- 27% value in one day
tween CEO and Board following announce-
members for closing ments on CEO-see
deals (one commission below. Shareholder
to Board member was suits pending as well as
$20 million).38' other investigations.
Top lawyer for com-
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Board payments.38 2
Both top counsel and
CFO indicted 383
L. Dennis Kozlowski Former CEO, accused Indicted in New York
of improper use of for failure to pay sales
company funds.384  tax on transactions in
fine art.385 Indicted on
fraud charges by New
York and the SEC386
WorldCom Accounting issues cen- Work force cut by
tering around swaps- 17,000 employees.
selling to other tele- Revenues reversed for
communications corn- 2 years to reflect losses
panies and hiding ex- and not profits. 88 On-
penses, thereby going and new SEC in-
overstating revenue. 387  vestigations. CEO Ber-
nard Ebbers resigned




from over $60 per share
in 1999 to less than $10
in 2002.390 CFO Scott
Sullivan (40) fired.9
Mr. Sullivan was in-
dicted and several
WorldCom employees
the Public, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at Cl; Alex Berenson, Tyco Turmoil Deepens as it
Fires Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at C1.
383. . Andrew Ross Sorkin, 2 Top Tyco executives Charged With $600 Million Fraud
Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 13, 2002, Al, C3.
384. Probe of Ex-Tyco Chief Focuses on Improper Use of Company Funds, supra note
382.
385. Alex Berenson, Ex-Tyco Chief a Big Risk Taker, Now Confronts the Legal System,
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2002, at Bi. Mr. Kozlowski is challenging the charges and has moved
for their dismissal. David Armstrong, Former Chief at Tyco Moves to Dismiss Charges,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2002, at A3.
386. Alex Berenson, Ex-Tyco Chief a Big Risk Taker, Now Confronts the Legal System,
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2002, at BI.
387. WorldCom Says it Hid Expenses, Inflating Cash Flow $3.8 Billion, supra note 339.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Seth Schiesel & Simon Romero, WorldCom Out of Obscurity to Under Inquiry,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at Cl.
391. Shawn Young & Evan Perez, Finance Chief of WorldCom Got High Marks on Wall
Street, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at BI.
[Vol. 39
76
California Western Law Review, Vol. 39 [2002], No. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol39/iss2/2







Merck Recorded $12.4 billion Stock price dropped 5%
in revenue it never col- on its announcement.
lected by counting co- SEC has not announced
pays received by phar- any investigation or re-
macies for drugs, even quested changes in ac-
though that money is counting treatment.396
not actually received by
Merck. The amount




Xerox Improper booking of Settled charges with
revenues ($6.4 bil- SEC in April for $10
lion).397  million.398 Inquiry ex-
panded to KPMG.3 99
392. Kurt Eichenwald and Seth Schiesel, S.E.C. Files New Charges on WorldCom, N.Y.
TrMEs, Nov. 6, 2002, at C1.
393. Michael Schroeder et al., WorldCom Executives are Hit with Subpoenas by House
Panels, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2002, at A3. Inextricably intertwined in the Global Crossing
collapse and the WorldCom investigation, because of the business interrelationships, is
Qwest, another telecommunications giant. The author predicts that its revelations on account-
ing are forthcoming.
394. Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S.
Case, N.Y. TiMEs, July 22, 2002, at Al. And as noted, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Myers and others
have now been indicted for securities fraud. See supra note 339.
395. Barbara Martinez, Merck Booked $12.4 Billion it Never Collected, WALL ST. J.,
July 8, 2002, at Al.
396. Alex Pham, Xerox Adds to Scandals with Huge Restatement, L.A. TIMES, June 29,
2002, at BI.
397. James Bandler & John Hechinger, SEC Says Xerox Misled Investors by Manipulating
its Earnings, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2002, at A3.
398. Claudia H. Deutsch & Floyd Norris, S.E.C. Expands Xerox Inquiry to Ex-Auditor, N.
Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2002, at C 1.
399. Harvey L. Pitt, Auditing Reform Can't Wait for Congress to Act, WALL ST. J., June
19, 2002, at A18. The problem with this recommendation is that the SEC has not been par-
ticularly zealous in its oversight role. In 1992, the SEC's chief accountant indicated that the
peer review process in accounting was ineffective leading to the staff studying ways to im-
prove oversight of the profession. However, the staff work was halted and a report on flaws in
accounting practices and oversights was put on hold when Harvey Pitt became chairman of
the SEC. Jonathan Weil & Scot J. Paltrow, Peer Pressure: SEC Saw Accounting Flaw, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 29, 2002, at C1.
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The following were the suggestions that surfaced through various
sources as each of the above business stories has emerged and evolved:
* The Harvey Pitt plan of private regulation goes through a Board
called the Public Accountability Board (PAB), which will be
dominated by members of the public, not accountants, with in-
dependent funding, SEC oversight, the responsibility for setting
audit standards and the authority to discipline; 00
* The Robert A.G. Monks plan of institutional investors taking
charge in corporations and seeing to it that through shareholder
activism the books and records of the corporation are accu-
rate; 401
* Changes in accounting rules that were used and abused by the
companies now in financial trouble; 2
* Eliminate the conflicts of interest by prohibiting auditors from
also being consultants and brokers and analysts and from touting
stocks while having an interest in the company or using the tout-
ing to obtain business or giving potential customers preferences
on IPOs; 0 3
* More independence on Boards, especially on audit and compen-
sation committees; 4
400. See Marc Gunther, Investors of the World, Unite!, FORTUNE, June 24, 2002, at 78. To
some extent, some investors are doing so. New York and North Carolina's pension plans have
told Wall Street firms that they will do business only with firms that reduce conflicts of inter-
est. Charles Gasparino, Two Big States Tell Wall Street: Reform, or Else!, WALL ST. J., June
7, 2002, at CI.
401. Cassel Bryan-Low & Ken Brown, And Now, the Question is: Where's the Next En-
ron? Accounting Textbooks will Get Rewritten, but Few Practices in the Industry Might
Change, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2002, at Cl. One suggestion includes requiring companies to
fill their pro forma numbers with their GAAP numbers so that investors could see the side-by-
side comparison. Dirty Rotten Numbers, supra note 256, at 78 (taking idea from Jack Ciesiel-
ski, publisher of Analyst's Accounting Observer).
402. Watchdogs and Lapdogs, supra note 250. NASD has announced investigation into
the activities of Salomon Smith Barney's research analyst, Jack Grubman, for his touting of
Winstar, a Salomon investment bank client, knowing that the firm was experiencing deep fi-
nancial difficulties. Charles Gasparino, NASD Prepares Action Against a Star Analyst, WALL
ST. J., July 22, 2002, at Al.
403. Adam Shell, NYSE Calls for More Independence on Boards, USA TODAY, June 7,
2002, at lB.
404. Id.; see also Judith Bums, SEC Seeks Improvement In Reports, WALL ST. J., June 13,
2002, at C13. Effective July 1, 2002, the SEC requires CEOs and CFOs to sign under oath the
financial statements of the company. Id. The immediacy of the new requirement was achieved
by making the change through an SEC order that was deemed necessary as part of an ongoing
staff investigation into the accuracy and transparency of corporate financial reports. The order
applies to companies with $1.2 billion or more in assets and thus affects 947 companies. PBS,
Taking the Oath: Companies Subject to SEC Order 4-460, WALL ST. WK.,
http://www.pbs.org/wsw/news/certifying companies.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2003).
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* Make CEOs sign off on financial statements, which the SEC
adopted and which has President Bush's support; 5
* Allow shareholders to vote on all stock compensation pro-
grams ;406
* More rules on stock options; 07
" Increased penalties for violations of securities laws, including
false financial statements; 4
0 8
SEC Order #4-460 provides:
The officers are required to file their written statements with the Commission no later than the
close of business on the first date that their company is required to file a Form 10-K or Form
10-Q with the Commission on or after Aug. 14, 2002. The certifications are available to the
public on the SEC website.
The certifications apply to the following financial reports:
* the company's most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K filed with the Commission;
" all of the company's reports on Form 10-Q, all reports on Form 8-K and all definitive
proxy materials filed with the Commission subsequent to the filing of the most recent
Form 10-K; and
* any amendments to any of the above.
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N., Statement Under Oath of Principal Executive Officer and Prin-
cipal Financial Officer Regarding Facts and Circumstances Relating to Exchange Act Filings,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/4-460a.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003)[hereinafter SEC Re-
quired Attestation].
The attestation language under the Order is:
(1) To the best of my knowledge, based upon a review of the covered reports of [com-
pany name], and, except as corrected or supplemented in a subsequent covered report:
" no covered report contained an untrue statement of a material fact as of the end of the
period covered by such report (or in the case of a report on Form 8-K or definitive
proxy materials, as of the date on which it was filed); and
" no covered report omitted to state a material fact necessary to make the statements in
the covered report, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading as of the end of the period covered by such report (or in the case of a report on
Form 8-K or definitive proxy materials, as of the date on which it was filed).
(2) 1 [have/have not] reviewed the contents of this statement with [the Company's
audit committee] [in the absence of an audit committee, the independent members
of the Company's Board of directors].
Id.
405. Adam Shell, NYSE Calls for More Independence on Boards, USA TODAY, June 7,
2002, at I B.
406. Id.
407. Stephanie Strom, S.E.C. Widens Rule Covering Stock Options, N.Y. TMEs, Dec. 20,
2001, at Cl. President Bush has asked for CEOs to make voluntary and complete disclosures.
"I challenge every CEO in America to describe in the company's annual report, prominently
and in plain English, details of his or her compensation package, including salary and bonus
and benefits. And the CEO, in that report, should also explain why his or her compensation
package is in the best interests of the company he serves." The November Markets, WALL ST.
J., July 10, 2002, at A14. Due to a "withering lobbying campaign," the proposals for reforms
on stock option accounting have fallen flat. Jim Drinkard & Kathy Kiely, Stock-Option Rule
Change Blocked, USA TODAY, July 12, 2002, at IA.
408. Known as the Sarbanes legislation because of its drafter, Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, a
Maryland Democrat. The Senate version of additional penalties increases prison sentences to
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" The Goldman Sachs proposal of requiring CEOs to hold stock in
their companies for certain extended periods and return any
gains made on sales of shares within one year of bankruptcy;. 9
and
* Longer tenure for CEOs so that they are not as tempted to pro-
duce quarterly results at any cost 410
B. A Critique of Sarbanes-Oxley and the Other Proposals for Reform
The problem, generically, with all the proposals is that they are techni-
cal rules in response to buses of other technical rules by corporate officers.
Additional signatures, additional jail sentences, additional oversight Boards,
and additional rules for Boards are the types of changes that seem logical,
punitive and satisfying for an investor class hungry for the restoration of
ten years. S. REP. No. 107-205 (2002). The legislation passed unanimously in the Senate with
little debate. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Senate Backs Tough Measures To Punish Corporate Mis-
deeds, N.Y. TiMEs, July 11, 2002, at Al.
The House version for reforms differed. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-418 (2002).
On July 24, 2002, a joint bill made its way through joint committees, is assumed "signable"
by President Bush, and contains the following:
Creation of a regulatory board of accountants
Prohibitions on most types of consulting activities when accountants are also serving as audi-
tors
Lead partner on audit client must be changed every 5 years
Increased penalties on obstruction of justice, up to 20 years
Specific fraud statute related to shareholder fraud with 10-year penalty
CEOs and CFOs must certify financials and imposes 20-year penalties for "knowingly and
willfully" allowing materially misleading financial statements to be issued
No loans for executives that outsiders can't get
Prevents executives' use of bankruptcy laws to escape liability
Prohibits retaliation against research analysts who issue negative reports on their firms' cli-
ents
Lengthens statute of limitations for securities fraud
New protections for whistle-blowers
Jonathan D. Glater and David Leonhardt, Both Sides Say Bill Addressing Business Fraud Is a
First Step, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at Cl.
409. Patrick McGeehan, Goldman Chief Urges Reforms in Corporations, N. Y. TIMEs,
June 6, 2002, at Al. A recent study shows that in those companies in which officers hang on
to their stock, there are significantly higher returns for investors and those companies' shares
outperform the market when officers buy shares in the company. Jeremy Kahn, Insider
Trades-Exposed!, FORTUNE, May 27, 2002, at 164.
410. Professor Harvey Goldschmid, a nominee for an SEC commissioner position, notes,
"Previously the CEO's job was much more secure. Today, with CEOs that [are] much more
accountable for their stocks' performance, they are under greater pressure to keep the share
price up." Dirty Rotten Numbers, supra note 256, at 75. Another facet to this proposal is re-
quiring CEOs and directors to hang onto their stock and not be selling out while still officers
and directors. The president favors this although he did sell Harken stock while he was on the
Board of Harken. Do what I say, not what I did. Elisabeth Bumiller & Richard A. Oppel Jr.,
Bush Defends Sale of Stock and Vows to Enhance S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2002, at Al.
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trust. However, these mob solutions born of outrage often have unintended
consequences. For example, in response to shareholder outcry over excessive
CEO compensation, Congress passed reforms that limited the tax deductibil-
ity of compensation to executives to $1,000,000.411 Companies avoided the
regulation by traipsing down the path of stock options, an issue that is an is-
sue in financial transparency today because options are not booked as an ex-
pense and shareholders are often taken aback when they are exercised, par-
ticularly at the prices granted and in the volumes awarded. Proposed reforms
can backfire and, in the case of these reforms, it is not clear that they address
the root cause of the problems that gave rise to Enron's perfect storm, a
storm that has now found its way into the bellies of other companies.
3. The SEC Certification
One of the first changes in the law occurred through an expedited rule
change on the part of the SEC. Under a new rule, the SEC mandated that the
financial officers of 947 companies headquartered in the United States affix
their signatures to the mandatory SEC certification for their financial re-
ports.412 As the deadline approached, there was much posturing for there was
the underlying assumption that the fear of certification would begin a flood
of earnings restatements, delays and corrections. The August 14, 2002 dead-
line has come and gone and companies did not drop like flies. While there
has been an increase in the number of earnings restatements over the past
year, there was no flurry of last-minute activity regarding the certifications.
As of August 23, 2002, the SEC announced that only 16 companies were not
in compliance with the certified statements requirements.413
2. Sarbanes-Oxley
414
The key elements of this legislation are: (1) an accounting oversight
Board;" 5 (2) regulations on the independence of auditors; 416 (3) corporate
411. Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax
Code to Influence CEO Compensation, NBER WORKING PAPER No. w7842 (Aug. 2000). Pub-
lic outcry on CEO pay was cooking in the 1995-1997 period. There was a 54% increase in
1996, following a 30% increase in 1995. More Than CEO Pay, 6 ETHICAL MANAGEMENT 1
(1997); see also Executive Pay: It's Out of Control, Bus. WK., Apr. 21, 1997, at 58.
412. The SEC order was #4-460 and it was issued pursuant to Section 21(a) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 78 et seq. The certification language is attached
as Appendix A. See SEC Required Attestation, supra note 404.
413. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Statements by Company CEOs and
CFOs, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/extra/ceocfo.htm (last modified Jan. 23, 2003) (on file
with California Western Law Review).
414. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (enacted in scat-
tered sections of 15 & 18 U.S.C) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, &
29 U.S.C.) (enacted provisions set out as notes in scattered sections of 15, 18, & 28 U.S.C.)
(amended provisions set out as notes in 28 U.S.C. § 994) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act ].
415. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101.
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responsibility and governance issues including the structure of audit commit-
tees, 417 certification of financial statements418, forfeiture of bonuses and op-
tions,419 codes of ethics for senior financial officers420 , and professional re-
sponsibility rules for attorneys working with companies on certification of
financial statements421; (4) analysts' conflicts of interest 4 22; and (5) increased
criminal penalties for fraud in financial reporting.2 3
Everyone who proposed reforms got a little something in Sarbanes-
Oxley. 424 Both the SEC rules changes on certification of financial statements
by CEOs and CFOs and the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation are touted as major
reforms. However, a closer examination of the legislation reveals that both
the new SEC rules and the Congressional package change very little except
the penalties for financial fraud and other white-collar crime. In fact, a list of
the key provisions demonstrates the absence of meaningful change.
SARBANES-OXLEY AND SEC CERTFICATION REQUIREMENTS VS.
STATUS QUO
NEW RULE/LAW STATUS QUO
1. SEC certification of The standard for financial reporting is, and always
financial statements- has been: are these financial statements materially
"untrue statement of a true?425 Currently, auditing standards do not address
material fact" the key elements of qualitative vs. quantitative ma-
teriality; The quantitative standard for most auditors
is 5-10%. However, numbers as low as 1% can be
416. Id. § 103.
417. Id. § 301.
418. Id. § 302.
419. Id. § 304.
420. id. § 406.
421. Id. § 307.
422. Id. § 501.
423. Id. at Titles VIII, IX and XI.
424. The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002,
passed in the Senate by a vote of 97-0 and in the House by a vote of 423-3. 148 CONG. REC.
S6779 (dated ed. July 15, 2002), available at www.senate.gov; 148 CONG. REC. H5480 (daily
ed. July 25, 2002). It was eventually codified as P.L. 107-204.
The various names given during its passage included: Corporate Accountability
Bill, Accounting Industry Reform Bill, and Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Respon-
sibility, and Transparency Act of 2002. Corporate Accountability Bill, 148 CONG. REC. E1452
(daily ed. July 29, 2003)(statement of Edward J. Markey); Accounting Industry Reform Bill,
148 CONG. REC. H5474 (daily ed. July 25, 2002)(statement of Mr. Etheridge); Corporate and
Auditing Accounting Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002, 148 CONG. REC. H5467
(daily ed. July 25, 2002).
425. For a complete discussion of the standards of materiality, still applicable today, see
Marianne M. Jennings, Philip M. Reckers & Daniel C. Kneer, A Source of Insecurity: A Dis-
cussion and an Empirical Examination of Standards of Disclosure and Levels of Materiality
in Financial Statements, 10 J. CORP. L. 639 (1985).
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qualitatively material if they reveal a creative and
struggling management (in an accounting and vi-
able entitle sense)426
2. SEC certification of Inasmuch as all reports (10-K; 8-K; 10-Q) must be
financial statements- filed with the SEC and require the signatures of the
"the report does not CEO and financial officer as well as those of the
contain any untrue Board
statement of a mate-
rial fact or omit to
state a material fact
necessary in order to
make the statements
made, in light of the
circumstances under
which such statements
were made, not mis-
426. For example, the recent unraveling of the Sunbeam Corporation through both SEC
charges and its restructuring, demonstrate how quantitatively immaterial financial information
can carry significant qualitative materiality weight. Eventually, the SEC required Sunbeam to
restate its income by reducing the $189 million report by what it referred to as $62 million in
mythical income. One of the examples provided by the SEC related to the booking of con-
tracts that were not firm, but were quantitatively immaterial. Sunbeam, Inc., as a maker of
home appliances such as electric blankets, the Oster line of blenders, mixers, can openers and
electric skillets, has a rather large inventory of parts it needs for the repair of these appliances
when they are returned by customers while they are still under warranty. Sunbeam used a
warehouse owned by EPI to store the parts, which were then shipped out as needed. Sunbeam
proposed selling the parts to EPI for $11,000,000 and then booking an $8,000,000 profit.
However, EPI's appraisal of the parts came in at only $2,000,000. EPI and Sunbeam, there-
fore, just entered into an "agreement to agree. EPI would agree to buy the parts for
$11,000,000, Sunbeam would be able to book the contract as revenue of $11,000,000 and
then EPI could simply back out of the deal after the first of the year when the financial state-
ments were already completed. Sunbeam's auditor, Arthur Andersen, approved of the booking
of the agreement despite full information about the nature of the "agreement to agree" be-
cause the $11,000,000 was quantitatively immaterial. The Andersen partner, Philip Harlowm
was, of course, perfectly correct in the application of the materiality'standard. However, that
booking of a sham $11,000,000 contract represents qualitative materiality that would provide
investors and shareholders with substantial insight about management as well as the status of
the company.
The SEC did charge Sunbeam with fraud in relation to the booking of these transactions. The
SEC director of enforcement called the fraud accusations part of the SEC's ongoing efforts to
prevent "fraudulent earnings-management practices."
Mr. Harlow did hire another set of eyes and standards for Sunbeam. PricewaterhouseCoopers
was hired to go over Sunbeam's books. However, they simply concluded as Harlow did and
the financial statements went forward with little accuracy, but great comfort on materiality
and his judgment calls and those auditors agree that Mr. Harlow certified "materially accurate
financial statements." See generally, Why Regulation Won't Fix the Problems Plaguing Cor-
porations: Moral Clarity as a Resolution, supra note 349; Martha Brannigan, Sunbeam Audit
to Repudiate '97 Turnaround, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1998, at A3; Michael Schroeder, Dunlap
Settles Fraud Charges with the SEC, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2002, at Cl; Floyd Norris, Justice
Dept. Starts Inquiry at Sunbeam, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at CI.
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leading; ... as of, and
for, the periods pre-
sented in the re-
port' '427
3. SEC certification of CEO, Chairman and CFO sign everything anyway,
financial statements- from credit lines to SEC reports
officer signatures 42
8
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Most companies were already rotating audit part-
Sec. 203. Audit part- ners and many were doing so on less than-a-five-
ner rotation. Provides year basis; For some companies, 5 years is too long
for audit partner rota- to go without switching the partner; An additional
tion once every 5 issues is whether the company should switch audit
years.429  firms, something not required under these new laws
5.Sarbanes-Oxley Most companies with good Board processes and
Sec. 204. Auditor re- audit committee charters followed this process any-
ports to audit commit- way. The problem is that, as in Enron, no one was
tees.43°  capable of understanding what David Duncan's
charts were really telling them or they were afraid
to speak up and challenge the numbers. 431
6.Sarbanes-Oxley This is a major and much-needed change because
Sec. 206. Conflicts of the conflicts in being a consultant while certifying
interest. Strict prohi- financial statements are inherent. It is one of the




427. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 408, § 302.
428. Id.
429. Id. § 203.
430. Section 204 provides:
(k) Reports to Audit Committees.-Each registered public accounting firm that
performs for any issuer any audit required by this title shall timely report to the
audit committee of the issuer-
(1) all critical accounting policies and practices to be used;
(2) all alternative treatments of financial information within generally accepted
accounting principles that have been discussed with management officials of the
issuer, ramifications of the use of such alternative disclosures and treatments, and
the treatment preferred by the registered public accounting firm; and
(3) other material written communications between the registered public account-
ing firm and the management of the issuer, such as any management letter or
schedule of unadjusted differences.
Id. § 204.
431. See supra notes 157-165 and accompanying text for more information.
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432. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 408, § 201.
SERVICES OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF PRACTICE OF AUDITORS provides as follows:
(g) Prohibited Activities-Except as provided in subsection (h), it shall be unlaw-
ful for a registered public accounting firm (and any associated person of that firm,
to the extent determined appropriate by the Commission) that performs for any is-
suer any audit required by this title or the rules of the Commission under this title
or, beginning 180 days after the date of commencement of the operations of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board established under section 101 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (in this section referred to as the 'Board'), the rules of
the Board, to provide to that issuer, contemporaneously with the audit, any non-
audit service, including-
(1) bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial
statements of the audit client;
(2) financial information systems design and implementation;
(3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind re-
ports;
(4) actuarial services;
(5) internal audit outsourcing services;
(6) management functions or human resources;
(7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services;
(8) legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and
(9) any other service that the Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible.
(h) Preapproval Required for Non-Audit Services.-A registered public account-
ing firm may engage in any non-audit service, including tax services, that is not
described in any of paragraphs (1) through (9) of subsection (g) for an audit client,




7.Sarbanes-Oxley Again, while many companies followed this proc-
Sec. 301. Public corn- ess, Enron had far too cozy a Board with no on-the-
pany audit commit- surface conflicts, but a percolating set of conflicts
tees. Requires mem- once one dug deeper into the interrelationships




ployed at the com-
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at least one "financial





of certain bonuses and
profits. If the com-
pany must restate a
financial statement,
the officers responsi-
ble lose their bonuses




must return any prof-
its realized on sales of
Common sense requirement that the law has now
imposed.
The new law imposes a penalty for what should
have been done. The simple rule is no buying or
selling stock so long as you are running the com-
pany.
433. Id. § 301.
434. The SEC will define "financial expert," but the statute instructs the SEC as follows:
In defining the term 'financial expert' for purposes of subsection (a), the Commis-
sion shall consider whether a person has, through education and experience as a
public accountant or auditor or a principal financial officer, comptroller, or princi-
pal accounting officer of an issuer, or from a position involving the performance of
similar functions-
(1) an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial
statements;
(2) experience in-
(A) the preparation or auditing of financial statements of generally comparable is-
suers; and
(B) the application of such principles in connection with the accounting for esti-
mates, accruals, and reserves;
(3) experience with internal accounting controls; and
(4) an understanding of audit committee functions.
Id. § 407.
435. Id. § 304. Section 304 states:
If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material
[Vol. 39
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stock.435
10. Sarbanes-Oxley The law attempts to move officers, directors and
Sec. 306. Insider other insiders to a standard of absolute accountabil-
trades during pension ity in which trading in the company's shares be-
fund blackout periods, comes the exception, not the norm.4 37
Officers and directors
cannot trade in stock
during this black-out




11. Sarbanes-Oxley This rule already exists in both the language of pro-
Sec. 307. Rules of fessional responsibility as well as various interpre-
noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting
requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief finan-
cial officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for-
(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received by
that person from the issuer during the 12-month period following the first public
issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first occurs) of the financial
document embodying such financial reporting requirement; and
(2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12-
month period.
Id.
436. Id. § 306. Section 306 states:
Except to the extent otherwise provided by rule of the Commission pursuant to
paragraph (3), it shall be unlawful for any director or executive officer of an issuer
of any equity security (other than an exempted security), directly or indirectly, to
purchase, sell, or otherwise acquire or transfer any equity security of the issuer
(other than an exempted security) during any blackout period with respect to such
equity security if such director or officer acquires such equity security in connec-
tion with his or her service or employment as a director or executive officer.
(2) Remedy.-
(A) In General.-Any profit realized by a director or executive officer referred to
in paragraph (1) from any purchase, sale, or other acquisition or transfer in viola-
tion of this subsection shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective
of any intention on the part of such director or executive officer in entering into the
transaction.
Id.
437. Fortune magazine has reconstructed the securities trading activities of the CEOs of
companies now experiencing regulatory issues or financial setbacks. Even as these CEOs
were selling shares through a private or public offering, they were dumping their shares onto
the market at substantial profit. Mark Gimen, The Greedy Bunch: You Bought-They Sold,
FORTUNE, Sept. 2, 2002, at 64.
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misdeeds to CEO of
chief counsel and if
they fail to act, must
report such to the au-
dit committee. If the
audit committee is not
independent with re-
gard to the issue, then
the attorney must re-







tations of that language. The law codifies the ethical
standards that attorneys were to follow in corporate
work, of representing the company, and not the of-
ficers or Board. The responsibility to report mis-
conduct is expanded because several of these high-
profile cases involved lawyers who said nothing
about their concerns surrounding various transac-
tions.439
Absolute prohibitions on officers and Board mem-
bers entering into transactions with the company
through entities that the officers own or operate as
principals; only shareholder approval in some corn-
438. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 408, § 307. This section states:
[Corporate counsel must] report evidence of a material violation of securities law
or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent
thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or
the equivalent thereof); and (2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately re-
spond to the evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or
sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evi-
dence to the audit committee of the Board of directors of the issuer or to another
committee of the Board of directors comprised solely of directors not employed di-
rectly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the Board of directors.
Id.
439. Id. Section 307 of the Act further requires the SEC to develop minimum standards
of professional conduct for company in-house counsel within 180 days from passage that ad-
dress the absolutes quoted supra in note 432. The Act asks for the regulatory codification of
what was an interpretation under the existing ethical standards of the profession for corporate
counsel. However, the new law takes the duty out of the realm of interpretation and into man-
datory territory.
440. This could be nicknamed the "Bernie Ebbers" law because it prohibits loans to offi-
cers and directors by the company. It provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any issuer (as defined in Section 2 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002), directly or indirectly, including through any subsidiary, to extend or
maintain credit, to arrange for the extension of credit, or to renew an extension of
credit, in the form of a personal loan to or for any director or executive officer (or
equivalent thereof) of that issuer. An extension of credit maintained by the issuer
on the date of enactment of this subsection shall not be subject to the provisions of
this subsection, provided that there is no material modification to any term of any
such extension of credit or any renewal of any such extension of credit on or after
[Vol. 39
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Sec. 406. Code of eth-








for employees of pub-
licly traded compa-
nies who provide evi-
dence of fraud.
panies would permit such a transaction; Board
could not waive conflict of interest policy; many
companies did not loan money to officers and direc-
tors
Data indicate that most companies have codes of
ethics in place; training in the code; 442 strong state-
ment of values to go along with the compliance as-
pect of the code of ethics; interaction of senior
management with employees and meetings in
which employees can discuss issues and concerns;
anonymous hotline for reporting issues; compliance
officers and/or ombudspersons for disclosure and
discussion; enforcement of code; uniform applica-
tion of code principles to all employees; penalties
for violations, including losses of bonuses; investi-
gation of all tips and complaints; resolution of all
tips and complaints; compliance is included but the
code goes beyond just compliance and provides
employees with simple language and strong values;
companies will need to add some provisions on fi-
nancial reporting to be in compliance with the law
Of those companies with a hotline (30% as noted in
note 315, most provide a promise of no retribution
for good-faith reports of wrongdoing (even if em-
ployee turns out to be wrong); encouraging em-
ployees to come forward with issues, even anony-
mously; investigation of all complaints; no
that date of enactment.
Id. § 402.
441. A Code of Ethics is defined as follows:
In this section, the term "code of ethics" means such standards as are reasonably
necessary to promote-
(I) honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or apparent
conflicts of interest between personal and professional relationships;
(2) full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in the periodic re-
ports required to be filed by the issuer; and
(3) compliance with applicable governmental rules and regulations.
Id. § 406.
442. 80% of all publicly-traded companies have a Code of Ethics; 55% provide training
for their employees; and 30% say they have a hotline for reporting concerns. Ethics Resource
Center 2000 Survey, www.ethics.org at Ethics Today Newsletter archives. The reader may
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internally or to federal
agencies" 3
The legislation, in effect, codifies what were known to be the best prac-
tices of companies in terms of avoiding ethical collapse. Because of the new
specifics in the statute, there are changes all companies will be required to
make, even those firms following the best practices that already imple-
mented the statutory changes. For those companies following best practices,
the only significant issues they face with the enactment of this reform legis-
lation is that their code of ethics must contain a provision that deals specifi-
cally with financial reporting. Companies will be required to add programs,
training and distributions that establish for the SEC, as well as for use should
it become necessary under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, that all em-
ployees have been told and/or trained to understand the importance of full
and fair disclosure in financial reports and the critical role of honesty in fi-
443. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 408, § 806. Section 806 states:
No company with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781), or that is required to file reports under sec-
tion 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)), or any offi-
cer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may dis-
charge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate
against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any
lawful act done by the employee-
(1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in
an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes
constitutes a violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relat-
ing to fraud against shareholders, when the information or assistance is provided to
or the investigation is conducted by-
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person
working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or termi-
nate misconduct); or
(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in a proceed-
ing filed or about to be filed (with any knowledge of the employer) relating to an
alleged violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating
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nancial reporting. To make the notion of "full and fair disclosure" clear to
employees, and to satisfy the SEC, companies should develop and provide
examples and training for employees that walk through the specific types of
concerns regarding financial reporting. Generic training of employees dis-
cussing the simple proposition that financial reports must be complete and
accurate will not suffice under the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley. Companies
must be able to demonstrate that employees understand that if they are asked
to book expenses differently, spin debt off the company books, or even in-
clude overly optimistic figures in earnings, then they are in a situation that
requires some form of internal reporting on their part.
Sarbanes-Oxley is also a two-by-four to the heads of management ex-
ecutive teams because of the strict penalties that are now imposed for securi-
ties crimes and all other financial types of crimes and fraud. The penalty for
securities fraud has increased to twenty-five years."4 The White-Collar
Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002,44 5 enacted as part of the Sarbanes-
Oxley bill, increases the penalties for mail and wire fraud from five to
twenty years." 6 Violations of ERISA now carry greater penalties with
$5,000 fines for individuals increased to $100,000; 44 ' one-year imprisonment
increased to ten years;448 and company fines of $100,000 increased to
$500,000.44' The new provisions for certification of financial reporting im-
pose penalties of $1,000,000 and/or ten years and for willful violations,
$5,000,000 and twenty years. 450 Another statute that was part of the Sar-
444. Id. § 807. This section of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice-
(1) [T]o defraud any person in connection with any security of an issuer with a
class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934; or
(2) [T]o obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, any money or property in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security of an issuer with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or that is required to file reports under section
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; shall be fined under this title, or im-
prisoned not more than 25 years, or both.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
445. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2003).
446. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 408, § 903.
447. See id.; Id. § 904(1).
448. See id. § 904(2).
449. See id. § 904(3).
450. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1349 (West 2003) provides:
(c) Criminal Penalties.-Whoever-
(1) [Clertifies any statement as set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this
section knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement does
not comport with all the requirements set forth in this section shall be fined
not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; or
2003]
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banes-Oxley Bill, the Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, imposes
penalties for the concealment or destruction of documents related to the fi-
nancial reports of a company.45 The penalty is a hefty twenty years and
would have increased David Duncan's, the Andersen audit partner for En-
ron, punishment from a mere obstruction charge to one of financial fraud. 52
Penalties under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are increased sub-
stantially.4" 3 The existing $1,000,000, and/or ten years is increased to
$5,000,000 and/or twenty years and Company penalties are increased from
$2,500,000 to $25,000,000. CEOs also have exposure under the Internal
Revenue Code provisions for they must also now sign the corporate tax re-
turns. 4
54
The new legislation also makes the new stiffer fines largely inescapable
because debts that arise as a result of financial fraud are now non-
dischargeable in bankruptcy. 55 There is no longer a bankruptcy loophole for
officers of companies that have defrauded shareholders and are found guilty.
Any orders of restitution continue until paid. Further, the Act makes it easier
for litigation on securities fraud in that it increases the statute of limitations
from 1 year from the time of discovery but no later than three years after the
prospectus is issued to a two year/five year combination.45 6
(2) [Wiillfully certifies any statement as set forth in subsections (a) and (b)
of this section knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement
does not comport with all the requirements set forth in this section shall be
fined not more than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both.
Id.; See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 408, § 906.
451. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(c) (West 2003). The section states:
Whoever corruptly (1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document,
or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity
or availability for use in an official proceeding; or (2) otherwise obstructs, influ-
ences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined un-
der this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Id.
452. See id. This provision would then be called the "David Duncan Law" because the
penalty was so light for the auditor Congress proposed to nab everyone with a prison sentence
that hurts should they take it upon themselves to destroy evidence.
453. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a)(West 2003).
454. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 408, § 1001. "It is the sense of the Senate that the
Federal income tax return of a corporation should be signed by the chief executive officer of
such corporation." Id.
455. The Act adds this new non-dischargeable debt category to 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a) as
category (19). See id. § 803.
456. See id. § 804, amending 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658 to provide that securities fraud suits:
"[M]ay be brought not later than the earlier of-
(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or
(2) 5 years after such violation."
28 U.S.C.A. § 1658 (West 2003).
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More changes could be forthcoming, because the bill also mandates a
plethora of studies to be conducted over the next few years with substantial
funding from Congress, including studying the consolidation of public ac-
counting firms, credit reporting agencies, and the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines. 57 The Act also forms new oversight bodies with the audit profession,
now governed by an Accounting Oversight Board. 8 Those analysts who
were so terribly conflicted during the boom economy will now be required to
disclose their conflicts of interest in terms of research reports and compensa-
tion structures with clients and customers. 59
The key factor in Sarbanes-Oxley is for companies and their officers to
understand that, for the most part, companies do not operate as Enron or
WorldCom did. Sarbanes-Oxley is the codification of moral standards for
businesses, while providing the teeth for ensuring that those morals are un-
derstood and followed.
Now that the reforms have arrived, there are many still struggling with
new corporate requirements. The elimination of auditor conflicts, in that an
auditor cannot serve as the company's auditor while providing consulting
services, is critical. However, the accounting industry has been resistant to
457. Title VII of the Act provides the funding authorizations as well as the descriptions
of the areas to be studied. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 408, §§ 701-705.
458. Section 101 of the new legislation provides:
There is established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, to oversee
the audit of public companies that are subject to the securities laws, and related
matters, in order to protect the interests of investors and further the public interest
in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports for com-
panies the securities of which are sold to, and held by and for, public investors.
The Board shall be a body corporate, operate as a nonprofit corporation, and have
succession until dissolved by an Act of Congress.
Id. § 101.
459. Sarbanes-Oxley amends 15 U.S.C. § 78a by adding Section 15D with provisions on
protecting analysts from pressure through the following changes in analysts' relationships
with their employers:
(1)(A) [RIestricting the prepublication clearance or approval of research reports by
persons employed by the broker or dealer who are engaged in investment banking
activities, or persons not directly responsible for investment research, other than
legal or compliance staff;
(B) [L]imiting the supervision and compensatory evaluation of securities analysts
to officials employed by the broker or dealer who are not engaged in investment
banking activities; and
(C) [R]equiring that a broker or dealer and persons employed by a broker or dealer
who are involved with investment banking activities may not, directly or indi-
rectly, retaliate against or threaten to retaliate against any securities analyst em-
ployed by that broker or dealer or its affiliates as a result of an adverse, negative,
or otherwise unfavorable research report that may adversely affect the present or
prospective investment banking relationship of the broker or dealer with the issuer
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such reforms and mandatory elimination of the conflicts may be required.46 °
The same is true of brokers and analysts with regard to their relationships
and financial arrangements, both with clients, and in their compensation sys-
tems. There are two ways to eliminate a conflict of interest: "don't do it" or
"disclose it." In the case of auditors, "don't do it" is the only option because
the inherent conflict is not eliminated by disclosure.
The perfect storm is a systemic crisis. Different from the rogue traders
and the occasional corrupt corporate officer, these are crises in which the
systems inside and outside the companies failed to provide the checks and
balances. Fundamentally, the companies and the executives running them
lied.46' Accounting rules, interpretations, and legal opinions meant that their
actions were in compliance, the standard form of corporate ethics, overall,
they understood that their share prices were not justified given their true in-
ternal financial picture.4 62 Still, they continued this public deception, all
while making significant salaries and returns on their own options.
463
That people lie is hardly new to this era or business.464 What may be dif-
ferent is the personal interest in the diabolical activities, the challenge is
460. While serving as a consultant to Arthur Andersen, in the initial days following the
Enron collapse, Paul Volcker recommended the elimination of these conflicts, as well. Seth
Sutel, As Andersen Edges Toward Extinction, Volcker Team Trots Out Ways to Reform it,
THE COM. APPEAL, Mar. 12, 2002, at B8.
461. At Enron, some have labeled the activities as being more serious than lying. Robert
L. Bartley, editor of the Wall Street Journal has described the Enron conduct as follows, "So
it would appear, at least at this stage of the events that the chief financial officer and a few
partners were stealing from shareholders. Someone might even call it embezzlement, in the
broad sense of theft of company assets by those with fiduciary obligations." Robert L.
Bartley, Thinking Things Over: Enron: First, Apply the Law, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2002, at
A23.
462. There are more accounting tools and tricks out there that companies can employ to
keep debt off the books, thereby increasing their share value and risk while decreasing their
cost of capital including "synthetic leases," a means of getting back the now verboten tool of
selling company headquarters and then leasing it back to avoid carrying the debt. Some of the
companies with synthetic lease issues, disclosed and not disclosed to shareholders, are Krispy
Kreme, Cisco, Lexicon Genetics, and Dollar General. Seth Lubove & Elizabeth MacDonald,
Debt? Who, Me?; Enron is Hardly Alone When it Comes to Creative Off-Balance-Sheet Ac-
counting, FORBES, Feb. 18, 2002, at 56.
463. The reaction of some portions of the business community to even just the SEC's
new requirement on certification (see earlier discussion in Part IV) is not encouraging in
terms of meaningful reform. One lawyer advised his business clients to resist the change be-
cause he doubted the SEC's authority to take these steps. See Paul Beckett, SEC Order Forces
Executives to Swear by Their Numbers, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2002, at Al. And Scott Sullivan,
CFO of WorldCom, Gary Winnick of Global Crossing, and Martha Stewart have all contin-
ued with multi-million dollar renovations or constructions of mansions, with Sullivan's in
Boca Raton because bankruptcy exemptions there for homes are unlimited. See Jon Swartz,
Homes of the Rich and Infamous, USA TODAY, July 15, 2002, at 3B.
464. For example, Middle West Utilities collapsed in the years following the 1929 stock
crash precisely because it too had an astounding amount of off-the-books debt accomplished
through the use of interconnected companies and interlocking boards. Its structure was so
complex that it took the Federal Trade Commission seven years to unravel its financial struc-
ture. When it did collapse, Samuel L. Insull, its CEO, was very much a Ken Lay, someone
who had been generous with political donations and someone who quickly became a target for
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finding the means for curbing the diabolical activities of educated, and ex-
perienced business people, and those who reported to them because they
were able to perpetuate longstanding deception of a magnitude that contin-
ues to stun an already stunned investor class. 465 Incentive plans, stock op-
tions, bonuses, the unforgiving demands of quarterly results that meet an-
nounced goals, and not one penny less, served as both temptations and
rationalizations. 466
Still, the root cause is not solely these carrots, nor will the sticks of
fines, criminal charges and imprisonment solve the systemic crisis."67 While
there is presently a crisis in ethics in business, there is also a crisis in the
perceived fundamentals of business. What Andrew Fastow and WorldCom's
CFO, Scott Sullivan, and a host of executives at Xerox believed was that if
they could just hang on and keep the earnings coming using various FASB
stretches, their pro formas would become reality and they would reign as the
wizards of finance and business.4 68
The crises in ethics are partially a function of longstanding rationaliza-
tions justified by unrealistic finance theories and even investor expectations
in returns from those applied theories. Such a crisis cannot occur without the
acquiescence of investors who were all too willing to believe that these as-
tronomical share prices and earnings were possible on a continuing and
regular basis. Investors, because of the increased sophistication, will need to
vilification. He was tried for fraud and embezzlement, left the country as lawsuits from share-
holders were litigated and died of a heart attack while waiting for a subway in Paris. He had
only 85 cents in his pocket. Mr. Insull "went down with his ship," even as Enron executives
continue to enjoy a millionaire's life. Middle West's collapse was responsible for the passage
of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78), the Public Utility Holding Company
Act, and the Federal Power Act, the last two of which were federal laws in which Enron
found loopholes. Rebecca Smith, Enron's Rise and Fall Gives Some Scholars a Sense of Deja
Vu, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2002, at Al.
465. Incredibly, there seems to be little shame or remorse over Enron. For example,
when Mr. Skilling left Enron to "spend more time with his 3 children," having "missed too
many soccer games over the years," he engaged in a short sale on August 24, 2001 against an
Enron competitor, AES. Estimates put the value of the sale, because AES shares did indeed
decline, at between $15 and $30 million. Ken Brown, Enron Ex-CEO Made Sideline Bet vs.
Rival, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2002, at Ci.
466. In a recent piece in Forbes magazine, the chairman of Hypercom commented that
he was reluctant to fire the company's top salesman even though there were charges of sexual
harassment, abuse and at least one settlement of a case brought against the company for the
salesman's behavior, "He was bringing in $70 million a year. Do you fire your number one
rock star because he's difficult?" Daniel Lyons, Bad Boys, FORBES, July 22, 2002, at 99, 102.
467. This position is supported by Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan who
stated in testimony before Congress that Congress could not "effectively legislate morality or
character." Mr. Greenspan did acknowledge that additional criminal penalties for CEOs could
"have profoundly important effects" on corporate behavior. George Hager, Fed Chief Ex-
presses Guarded Optimism, USA TODAY, July 17, 2002, at Al.
468. And we must not forget "Ebitda" (Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization), a figure that was worshipped by many as a true indicator of firm performance.
It's just that taxes and interest are real expenses and as it turns out with WorldCom, they were
faking the real expenses anyway. Martin Peers & Robin Sidel, Days May be Numbered for
Ebitda Numbers, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2002, at Cl.
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be savvier. Fortunately, that investment savvy is guided by a simple and
overarching principle: if it sounds too good to be true, it is too good to be
true. Investors will need to examine not just earnings, but the quality of earn-
ings. If companies are reporting significant revenues and revenue increases,
investor should check earnings quality, by comparing revenues with cash
flow. Even when Enron's share price was still at $63 in May 2001, a simple
look at its lack cash and mounting debt would have been a tip to a relatively
unsophisticated investor that there was something significant behind the fi-
nancial statements.469
The fundamentals of sound business are not difficult: the business
makes a product or offers a service that customers want they make the prod-
uct or provide the service and keep costs down; they sell the product or ser-
vice and they have earnings. Just a glance at the chart of misdeeds demon-
strates that this fundamental along with very simplistic philosophies were
ignored. Investors were duped because they dismissed the old adage, if it
sounds too good to be true, it is too good to be true. These companies were
operating in such a leveraged fashion that when a rainy day came, i.e., in En-
ron's case, a downturn in the economy post September 11, they had no cush-
ion (savings) for a rainy day. The booking of revenues in advance of when
they were earned was a violation of the sage advice: Don't count your chick-
ens before they are hatched. There is so much of common sense that has
been ignored in business operations and financial reporting that this crisis
has caused the complexities of regulatory reform to consume the discussions
without acknowledging that there are far deeper problems, than whether
auditors have an independent Board supervising them.
The behaviors at Enron included lavish spending, and executives who
used their company as a means of self-enrichment or even as a bank for
loans with enormously favorable terms. 470 Some of these companies were
carrying inventory, as in the case of the telecoms with their capacity, so
large that there could never be a market of buyers large enough to use all the
capacity that they had. The wisdom, art, and science of doing business is lost
among the wizardry that is the substitute.
The crisis in confidence among investors has left them with the conclu-
sion that there is no need to invest in companies, when the government can
provide a financial return on instruments with lower rates of return but,
which have clear terms, and a transparency that gives them comfort. 471 Man-
469. Matt Krantz, Avoiding the Next Enron, USA TODAY, Feb. 1, 2002, at B3.
470. In some situations, the enormously favorable terms for the loans meant not having
to pay it back, the nirvana of all possible loan terms. The loan to WorldCom's Bernie Ebbers
was $366 million and has not been collected as yet. Rebecca Blumenstein & Jared Sandberg,
WorldCom CEO Quits Amid Probe of Firm's Finances, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2002, at Al.
471. Given the performance of the market over the past two years, investors have real-
ized that there is only a tiny additional gain to be made by investing in the market as opposed
to Treasury bonds. One calculation puts the difference between an investment of $100,000 in
1987 in Treasury bonds vs. a $100,000 investment in the market to be only $40,000 less "and
the investor would have been spared much of the angst of the 1987, 1998 and current market
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agers once used skills of strategy, quality, and sales to bring about the higher
returns for investors. Now companies, in all industries, have become finan-
cial service organizations that investors have difficulty understanding and
which fundamentally carry more risk, both in terms of the structure of the
financial instruments and trustworthiness. That investors no longer trust is
evidenced both by survey attitudes, with seven out of ten believing that
CEOs cannot be trusted,472 and in their behavior. During June 2002, with-
drawals from domestic mutual funds exceeded investments by $19 billion
according to Banc of America Securities.473 From July 9, 2002 through July
23, 2002, the Dow dropped 1393 points and declined eleven of the twelve
trading days during that period.474
Some internal changes could help curb reporting abuses in companies.
Enron's Audit Committee represented a case study in what not to do on a
corporate Board. In order to perform that function effectively, members of
the audit committee need the following:
" Expertise in reading financial statements (Sarbanes-Oxley gets at
this requirement, but only with regard to one person and an au-
dit committee needs financial expertise around the table,
particularly because there should be robust disagreement about
financial reporting issues and singular expertise will not provide
that debate)
* Business experience that is applicable to the company business
* No financial ties to the company other than director compensa-
tion fees
* No conflicts of interest in the performance of the director/audit
committee role (Again, Sarbanes-Oxley now requires something
that should have been inherently obvious prior to this legislation
and Enron. The statute provides a list of activities that constitute
a conflict of interest by definition, such as bookkeeping. Also,
as noted, conflicts can be more complex than simply relation-
ships with the company or company employees and the statute
is not broad enough to cover these types of conflicts)
downturns." What to Do When the Conventional Wisdom is Wrong: Market's Fall Discredits
Many Investing Rules; How to Respond, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2002, at DI.
472. Scandals Shake Public Trust, supra note 69. Additionally 8 out 10 investors believe
that CEOs "will take 'improper actions' to help themselves at the expense of their compa-
nies." Id. 69% indicate that they will rely less on the advice of a broker or analyst. Id. Even
the General Services Administration, the purchasing agent for the federal government, has
indicated it may not continue to do business with WorldCom because of its concerns about its
viability and ability to deliver service. Andrew Backover, SEC 'Disappointed' by WorldCom
Report, USA TODAY, July 2, 2002, at B1.
473. Scandals Shake Public Trust, supra note 69.
474. The Dow closed at 9096.09 on July 9, 2002, and at 7702.34 on July 23, 2002. E.S.
Browning, Nasdaq Stocks Sustain Biggest Loss of Year, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2002, at Cl; E.
S. Browning, Stocks Drop Amid Earnings Fears, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2002, at Cl.
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0 No excessive compensation and caution in using golden hand-
cuffs as a mean of retaining officers because of their tendency to
manipulate stock price to satisfy their desires upon departure in
terms of share price.
The performance of the audit committee work requires the following, a
set of factors not addressed by Sarbanes-Oxley:
" Regular meetings
* Familiarity with company internal auditors and internal controls
* Knowledge of the policy debates that are ongoing among man-
agers, internal auditors and external auditors about the financial
reporting issues of the company475
* Contact apart from management with both internal and external
auditors; best practices indicate that the audit committee should
interact regularly at each meeting with the internal auditors out-
side the presence of management and with the external auditors
outside the presence of both the internal auditors and manage-
ment. Again, Sarbanes-Oxley specifies this type of meeting, but
not with the delineation outlined here for these independent
meetings.
* Consultation with industry experts on key accounting issues in
the industry
476
While the various rules on audit committee independence have been in
place since the early 1990s, the definition of independence appears to be
somewhat fluid. A conflict of interest occurs, not just when a member of the
audit committee is an insider or is an outsider with extensive consulting or
contract ties to management and the company. A conflict occurs when there
is self-interest in going along with management. As noted in the discussion
of Enron's Board, conflicts can come in the form of excessive compensation,
non-profit connections, consulting contracts, and political connections.
477
475. Warren Buffett proposed his three questions for audit committee members three
years ago and continues to adhere to them as a means of curbing some of these problems:
If the auditor were solely responsible for preparation of the company's financial
statements, would they have been done differently, in either material or nonmate-
rial ways? If differently, the auditor should explain both management's argument
and his own. (2) If the auditor were an investor, would he have received the infor-
mation essential to understanding the company's financial performance during the
reporting period? (3) Is the company following the same internal audit procedure
the auditor would if he were CEO? If not, what are the differences and why?
Dirty Rotten Numbers, supra note 256, at 74.
476. It is interesting to note that the Corporate Library, an investor consulting company,
does not put much stock in credentials in Board members, pointing to the presence of former
Stanford business dean, Robert Jaedicke, on the Enron Board and noting what happened to
that company. The Corporate Library, run by Nell Minow and Robert Monks publishes grades
for both the quality of Boards and their decisions. In addition, they counsel investors on how
to oust poor CEOs as well as get through resolutions on reporting and accountability. Dyan
Machan, I Am Watching, FORBES, Mar. 4, 2002, at 68.
477. See supra notes 165- 166 and accompanying discussions.
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But the remainder of the repairs for the crisis in confidence comes from
an unequivocal return to honesty. Arthur Levitt was successful in obtaining
more public disclosures from companies including Web broadcasts,478 yet
because of the technical compliance with accounting rules we now have less
information about the true financial status of companies than ever. Regula-
tion, additional disclosures, and more widespread disclosures have not
solved the problem, nor will the new legislation and SEC mandates prove to
be solutions. Honesty cannot be legislated and the return of honesty is no
small task because dishonesty is so pervasive. For example, eighty-two per-
cent of executives confess that they cheat at the game of golf.479 Yet ninety-
nine percent of those same CEOs believe that they are honest in business.48°
The straightforward answer is something still evaded, despite the ongoing
crisis. When WorldCom declared bankruptcy, its new CEO, John Sidgmore,
appeared on the Today show to reassure. When asked, as a Board member,
whether he voted to approve the $400 million loan to former CEO Bernie
Ebbers, he was hesitant to answer. When pressed by Mr. Lauer, he re-
sponded that the Compensation Committee approved the loan. As a Board
member, he only "ratified" the contract.481
Apparently before we can demand honesty, we must define honesty.
The demands of honesty will force businesses to focus on the basics of busi-
ness, rather than the wizardry of complex financial instruments and esti-
mates of future returns. A simple definition of honesty in financial reporting
could consist of the following:
* If we didn't earn it, we don't report it.
" If we don't earn it for awhile, wait to report it.
* If it cost us, it's an expense.482
* When in doubt, report, record, and book.
* No creating new companies without a product, a purpose, and an
independent management team.
* Your bonus is tied to your honesty in your numbers, not just the
numbers themselves, and if the numbers are inflated, the bonus
is returned.
478. Joseph McCafferty, The Whole World is Listening, CFO, June 1, 1999.
479. Del Jones, Many CEOs Bend the Rules (of Golf), USA TODAY, June 26, 2002, at
Al.
480. Id.
481. Creditors, run for your lives or get rid of this new CEO. This guy is slick and can't
admit that the loan was wrong or at least own up to having made the loan.
482. Coca-Cola has already taken a step in this direction with its announcement that it
would book options as an expense. Coke follows Boeing and Winn-Dixie in this regard. Floyd
Norris & Sherri Day, Coke to Report Stock Options as an Expense, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2002, at Al. "1 think you will see other companies doing this," was Warren Buffett's re-
sponse. Id. Mr. Buffett is on the Board of Coca-Cola and called the decision a "classy move."
Alex Pham, Coca-Cola to Treat Options as Expenses, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2002, at B3. The
change will cost Coke a penny a share in earnings in 2002 and 3 cents per share in 2003.
Kathleen Pender, Is Coke's Big Move Real Thing?, S.F. CHRON., July 16, 2002, at B].
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* We have goals we want to reach, but we do not lie to meet the
goals.
" If we miss a goal, we say so, clearly, with an explanation and
with a promise to do better.
* We disclose when we know.
" We don't trade in stock before others are told.
" We remember the following - if I were a shareholder on the out-
side would I want to know this information?
483
" Why am I doing what I am doing? Am I hiding something? Am I
hoping things will get better?
Boards should send a clear signal to employees that if there is some-
thing in the earnings reports or operations that are troubling, they want to
know, and should provide employees with an outlet for reporting, including
anonymous reporting systems such as hotlines. With definitions of honesty,
a means for expressing concerns and reporting dishonesty, the ethical culture
of a company can change. Boards entrench that culture when they act on
employee concerns and follow through.
These reforms assume not just an independent Board, but also a fiercely
independent, indeed crotchety Board, not afraid of management and experi-
enced enough to ask the right questions. The fix for the crisis in confidence
is honesty, defined and the reinforced by a Board that is intolerant of one
whit of departure from that definition.
The current crisis in confidence in the markets is one that springs from
moral issues. Moral issues are resolved, not through additional Boards, inde-
pendent Boards, or new regulations. Moral clarity offered by business lead-
ers committed to honesty and a return to business fundamentals is necessary.
The only issue is whether companies have the courage to return to not just
sound moral ground, but the sound business practices that high ground de-
mands. If that move falters, we stand vulnerable, on the low ground, to more
perfect storms.
483. One anecdote about Enron characterizes the notion of the false impression art that it
had perfected:
One senior Wall Street official recalls recently asking Enron officials whether the
company had retained bankruptcy counsel. He was told no. He later found out that
while the company hadn't formally retained such representation, it had met with
bankruptcy lawyers. "If you don't ask the absolute right question, you don't get the
right answer," he says. "Enron does that a lot."
Scandals Shake Public Trust, supra note 69.
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